The welfare state has several objectives, implementation of which brings increasing pressure on public expenditure. Social policy is part of economic policy among its key elements include: social support, social assistance, employment, housing and others. The public sector plays an important role in achieving social policy objectives. In a time of economic crisis, the question arises whether to support growth, or rather a reduction in public expenditure in relation to the building of the welfare state.
The article analyses the changes in norm enforcement in the EU that were triggered by the Eurozone crisis. It attempts to demonstrate that the Eurozone crisis contributed to a 'transplantation' of conditionality instruments (which traditionally exist within the EU's external relations) into the internal operations of the European Union. In particular, the article identifies which new internal rule-enforcement mechanisms of the EU share common structural features with the external EU conditionality (e.g. a vague legal framework; the use of the expertise of non-EU actors; an excess of competencies conferred to the EU; the institutional weakening of the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice; the format of the sanctions). The article comes to the conclusion that the formation of the EU's internal conditionality occurred mainly within the instruments aimed at the crisis management of public finances of the Eurozone states (the EFSF, the EFSM, and the ESM), but it also concludes that there was an expansion of the new EU conditionality into other areas of the European integration, such as the Schengen cooperation and cohesion policy. Adapted from the source document.