Suchergebnisse

Operation Iraqi Freedom began early on 20 March 2003. On 9 April US forces took control of central Baghdad and the Iraq Government fell. Major combat operations ended formally on 1 May 2003, although by 14 April -- when US forces gained control of Tikrit, the last Iraqi city to exhibit organized resistance -- coalition forces had occupied all of Iraq. As of May 2004 the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was still in Iraq, facing resistance from various Iraqi forces, while the role of the USA and the wider international community in rebuilding the country remained deeply contentious. The 2003 Iraq war was, and is likely to remain, one of the most controversial conflicts of modern times. The decision by the world's only superpower to go to war in Iraq without explicit authorization from the United Nations Security Council provoked deep divisions within the international community and within states. Controversy surrounded the public justification for the war, in particular the degree and immediacy of the threat posed by Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapon programs and whether the use of force was the most effective approach to dealing with that threat. The war was also controversial because it raised deeper issues of principle and precedent, including whether and under what circumstances the use of force may be a legitimate and effective response to the proliferation of NBC weapons; whether and under what circumstances the removal by force of governments or leaders -- 'regime change' -- may be a legitimate and wise policy; the role of the UN Security Council in arriving at decisions of this kind given the inherent limitations of that body; and the role of the USA in world affairs given its overwhelming power. Supporters of the war can claim that one of the world's cruelest regimes has been brought to an end, that the possibility that that regime might develop a strategically threatening WMD arsenal or supply such weapons to terrorists has been removed, and that new prospects for political change in the Middle East have been generated. Critics can argue that the extent of the WMD threat posed by Iraq -- the primary casus belli -- was greatly exaggerated; that the costs of the war in terms of lives lost, economic outlays and the destabilization of Iraq have been high; and that the fabric of international order has been damaged. The ambiguous outcome of the war -- the successful overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, the failure to discover evidence of WMD and the serious ongoing post-war problems -- suggests that neither argument has been fully vindicated. The Iraq war and the Bush Administration's formalization of the doctrine of pre-emptive warfare in its 2002 National Security Strategy provoked much debate about whether the USA would engage in similar operations elsewhere in the world-with Iran, North Korea and Syria seen as the most likely targets for US-imposed regime change. The rapid and overwhelming victory of the USA in March-April 2003 appeared to vindicate the view that US military superiority had revolutionized the nature of warfare and to suggest that the Iraq war might be a precedent for similar US actions elsewhere. The subsequent post-war problems faced by the USA, however, showed that the challenges of post-war stabilization may be greater than those of war itself; that the long-term costs, direct and indirect, of regime change may be very great indeed; and that the USA is likely to need wider international support to achieve its objectives. The USA could yet succeed in building a democratic Iraq, defeating those determined to prevent such an outcome and making Iraq a catalyst for democratic change elsewhere in the region. The ongoing violence in Iraq and the continuing disputes between the country's political, religious and ethnic groups could, however, also result in continuing instability within Iraq; the country becoming a failed state or even descending into civil war; and the spill-over of instability into neighboring states. The impact of the Iraq war on WMD proliferation and terrorism is also difficult to assess. Potential proliferators may draw the conclusion that the costs and risks of acquiring WMD have increased significantly, but they may also conclude that the only way to prevent themselves from becoming the victims of regime change is to develop a credible deterrent. Similarly, the Iraq war may have exacerbated the problem of international terrorism by creating a new frontline in Iraq and by fuelling Arab and Islamic resentment. Conversely, by triggering new debate on the political future of the greater Middle East it may also have created a chance to address the deeper causes of radical Islamic terrorism. Adapted from the source document.

The states of the Western Balkans region (and the province of Kosovo) face greater challenges in security sector reform (SSR) than the other post-Communist states of Central Europe. Recent conflict has left a legacy of material damage, ethnic division and bitterness, and refugee and war crimes issues. The presence of international forces and administrations -- still executing many functions of normal state security -- means that reform can only be completed hand in hand with re-localization of authority. Transnational 'new threats' are rife and national progress is tied up with regional factors to an unusual degree. North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union aid, and the spur of ultimate accession to these institutions, provide the outside world's main leverage for reform in the Western Balkans. This situation has advantages but also risks making progress in SSR over-dependent on outside support and pressure, and thus insufficiently grounded domestically. Generic challenges common to the region are police reform (after the inflation and misuse of police forces during recent wars), and the strengthening and professionalization of border controls. Outside donors have also put (perhaps excessively) strong emphasis on anti-terrorism. Albania is the most underdeveloped state in the region and a major source of human trafficking. Military and police reforms are handicapped by corruption and basic failings in democracy. Bosnia and Herzegovina faces special challenges in military and intelligence reform because of the degree of control thus far delegated to its ethnically defined 'entities'. Crucial reforms at the centre are being pushed through by the internationally appointed High Representative with support from NATO and the EU. Croatia set up new military and security forces on independence and the main task now is to de-politicize them after their civil war experiences. As a credible candidate for NATO membership Croatia is increasingly gearing its defense reforms to standard NATO requirements. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is doing likewise in the military field, but has problems in creating internal security forces that will be equally representative of and respected by the Albanian ethnic minority. The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro has been dogged by nationalist influences and made a late start on true defense reform, but is now bidding for Partnership for Peace membership. The current constitutional deal with the province of Montenegro was essentially EU-imposed and remains fragile. The strengthened position of nationalist parties after the latest elections gives cause for concern. The open question of Kosovo's ultimate status -- which international actors insist can only be reviewed after internal progress -- create an extra dimension of instability for the province and the entire region. Serious concerns remain over the safety of the Serb minority there. Although a new-style police force has been created, Kosovar armed forces remain more of a problem than a solution. Throughout the region, the new reform agenda is an improvement on wartime conditions but the progress made is vulnerable to donor fatigue and is still hampered by imperfect international coordination. The outside world requires more time and patience to ensure that reforms not only give due place to democratic (e.g., parliamentary) institutions, but are achieved with democratic methods and adequate local ownership. Adapted from the source document.