Suchergebnisse

The lessons learned from the crisis management of the 2008 Great Recession are due to significant structural differences between the two centers of the world, the United States and the eurozone. This has been the worst and most widespread global economic downturn since the Great Depression. The crisis is over, but it seems that the crisis has long-lasting consequences. In the case of the United States, a monetary, fiscal and political union is realized, which with a single economic policy, operates as a coherent unit, uniting the three areas. GDP is rising, unemployment is at the lowest level since 1969 and government debt is the highest it has ever been which can cause problems in the long run. In the case of the eurozone, we can talk about a monetary union. The crisis has highlighted the structural flaws of the eurozone, because without a unified fiscal policy no effective economic policy can be achieved. The symptoms of the euro area crisis weren't the consequences of the global economic crisis; rather the stalling of the integration process, the lack of real convergence, and the weaknesses of monetary and fiscal policy were the problems that have been brought to the fore and exacerbated by the crisis. I consider the crisis management of the United States to be more successful, in which the single economic policy has played an important role – as long as the eurozone doesn't deepen integration, it will not be able to address vulnerabilities between its countries. For Central Europe to be competitive, it has to have the right economic policies and an independent monetary policy. The postcrisis recovery has taken place, but in order to avoid further crises and to have a faster convergence towards the eurozone, we need targeted steps which could create the opportunities.

This study describes the Habsburg officials and commission members appointed to conclude a peace treaty between the Habsburgs and Ottomans between 1627 and 1629 at Szőny (Hungary). Furthermore, by relying on a database of about 2,000 records drawn from diplomatic and administrative sources and utilizing a quantitative approach, it outlines the channels and focal points for communication between the Habsburg appointees, as well as the direction and intensity of the exchange of information. The analysis of the database leads to the conclusion that the Hungarian palatine, Miklós Esterházy had a major role in the negotiations and that the Imperial Court and War Council played an intermediary role between the palatine and the members of the treaty commission. Furthermore, it points out that the palatine maintained contact with the beylerbeyi of Buda, Murteza pasha, which may have had an impact on the negotiations at Szőny.

The period of the interim unconstitutional administration in Hungary (5.11. 1861-18.07.1865), the socalled 'Schmerling-Provisorium' had certain dual character concerning operating conditions of the civil associations. After the paralysis of the former decade the quantitative as well as qualitative indicators showed dynamic development having started already in 1857/58. On the other hand, the mechanisms of direct and indirect state control of their operation were turning even more oppressing. Through confidential and never published instructions Count Mor Palffy who as governor stood at the head of public administration of Hungary strove in these years to work out and enforce ever more and more stipulations in order to restrict their autonomy. Before 1864 he did not intend to issue new general regulation in this respect, instead he endeavoured to build further restrictive instructions into the statutes of the new associations. In 1864, nonetheless, he made an attempt at enforcing new comprehensive regulation, without success. In the Western provinces of the Austrian Empire the mere existence of the recently founded constitutional political institutions, first of all of the 'Reichsrat', prevented any similar attempt at bringing civil associatios under strict state control, moreover, Palffy himself considered the matter of associations as an provincial affair and not as an imperial one, thus he had to look for potential political supporters first of all among the high ranking Hungarian civil servants. The latter, however, mostly deemed Palffy's aspiration to be definetely harmful on the chances of any future political settlement.

This article considers the relationship between centralised, exogenous institutions and the embedded, endogenous institutions of rural governance in Europe through an examination of the evaluation procedures of the European LEADER programme. LEADER is presented in the literature as progressive in terms of innovation and stakeholder engagement. Yet, while the planning and management of LEADER embraces heterogeneity and participation, programmatic evaluation is centralised and is held at arms length from the delivery organisations. The article reviews previous efforts to improve evaluation in LEADER and considers alternative strategies for evaluation, contrasting LEADER practice with participatory evaluation methodologies in the wider international context. Can evaluation in itself be valuable as a mode of social learn-ing and hence a driver for endogenous development in rural communities in Europe? The article concludes by examining the challenges in producing a hybrid form of evaluation that accommodates both endogenous and exogenous values.