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Covariant Realism
Hermeneutic phenomenology of science implies a particular version of realism. It approaches scientific entities in a twofold perspective: in their relation to other parts of the theory (as elements in a theoretical "language"), and in relation to the lifeworld as mediated by laboratory practices; as "fulfilled" in laboratory situations that "produce" worldly objects. The question then arises of the relation between the two perspectives; as Ginev has pointed out, there is danger of a theoretical essentialism which is implied when the mathematical projection is conceived as operationalized by experiment. Ginev's proposal to avoid this involves the concept of "inscription." This paper proposes another approach, covariant realism, which draws from Heidegger's notion of formal indication and which makes explicit the temporality of theoretical objects in the flow of the research process. Formal indication does not so much describe phenomena as call them to our attention in a way that we can activate ourselves (as in laboratory contexts); it characterizes phenomena which are understood to be provisionally grasped, already interpreted, and anticipated as able to show themselves differently in different contexts. The value of this approach suggests deeper possibilities for hermeneutic phenomenology of science than have hitherto been explored.

Declaring his departure from the modes and orders of his predecessors— especially the creators of imaginary republics and principalities (men like Plato, Aristotle and Augustine) — Machiavelli undertakes to show "whoever understands" a new and more promising road to political salvation and personal well-being. So compelling is Machiavelli's rhetoric that we seem to have forgotten just how "realistic" or "moderate" Machiavelli's predecessors we're, and how "unrealistic" or "immoderate" Machiavelli's own teaching is. This essay attempts to bring to light the extremism which underlies Machiavelli's realism and raises doubts about his ability to provide his readers the security he promises.

Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Chapter 1: In Defense of the No-Miracles Argument -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 The NMA -- 1.3 Laudan's Objection -- 1.4 The Rejection of the Demand -- 1.5 IBE -- 1.6 Evolutionary Theory -- 1.7 The End of History Illusion -- 1.8 Ad Hoc -- 1.9 Empiricism -- 1.10 Surrealism -- 1.11 Predictive Similarity -- 1.12 Summary -- References -- Chapter 2: Critiques of the Pessimistic Induction -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Pessimistic Induction -- 2.3 Problematic Positions -- 2.3.1 The Classic PI and IBE -- 2.3.2 The Classic PI and Evolutionary Theory -- 2.4 The Grand PI -- 2.4.1 Four Intrinsic Problems -- 2.4.2 The PUA -- 2.4.3 The Relative PI -- 2.4.4 The PI over Realists -- 2.4.5 The Epistemic PI -- 2.4.6 The Problem of Misleading Evidence -- 2.4.7 Proportional Pessimism -- 2.5 Summary -- References -- Chapter 3: Critiques of Scientific Antirealism -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The PI Over Antirealist Explanations -- 3.3 The PI Over Pessimists -- 3.4 The PI Over Antirealists -- 3.5 Explanation -- 3.6 Prediction -- 3.7 Two Epistemic Disadvantages -- 3.8 Epistemic Reciprocalism -- 3.9 Empiricism and the Problem of Unobserved Anomalies -- 3.10 Constructive Empiricism -- 3.11 Gap Antirealists -- 3.12 Summary -- References -- Chapter 4: Six New Arguments for Scientific Realism -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The Optimistic Induction Over Realists -- 4.3 The Argument from Undiscovered Evidence -- 4.4 The Argument from Neighboring Theories -- 4.5 The Counter-Induction for Realism -- 4.6 The English Notion of Rationality -- 4.7 The Grand Optimistic Induction -- 4.8 Tu Quoque -- 4.9 Summary -- References -- Chapter 5: Critiques of Five Variants of Putative Realism -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Entity Realism -- 5.3 Minimal Realism -- 5.4 Axiological Realism -- 5.5 Van Fraassen's Definition -- 5.6 Selective Realism -- 5.6.1 An Analysis.

A tale of two movements -- The seeds of time : legal realism and legal history -- The wealth of historicism : legal history in the critical mold -- Everything flows and nothing abides : the realist turn to social science-- Oh, the tangled webs we weave : the CLS critique of social science -- Night of the living dead : legal realist anticonceptualism -- The world well lost : variations on the linguistic theme -- Realizing realism : reconstruction in legal theory

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. A Tale of Two Movements -- 2. The Seeds of Time: Legal Realism and Legal History -- 3. The Wealth of Historicism: Legal History in the Critical Mold -- 4. Everything Flows and Nothing Abides: The Realist Turn to Social Science -- 5. Oh, the Tangled Webs We Weave: The CLS Critique of Social Science -- 6. Night of the Living Dead: Legal Realist Anticonceptualism -- 7. The World Well Lost: Variations on the Linguistic Theme -- 8. Realizing Realism: Reconstruction in Legal Theory -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

Sociological Realism presents a clear and updated discussion of the main tenets and issues of social theory, written by some of the top scholars within the critical realist and relational approach. It connects such approaches systematically to other strands of thought that are central in contemporary sociology, like systems theory and rational choice theory. Divided into three parts, social ontology, sociological theory, and methodology, each part includes a systematic presentation, a comment, and a wider discussion by the editors, thereby taking on the form of a dialogue among experts. This book is a uniquely blended and consistent conversation showing the convergence of European social theory on a critical realist and relational way of thinking. This volume is extremely important both for teaching purposes and for all those scholars who wish to get a fresh perspective on some deep dynamics of contemporary sociology.

International Relations scholars have long debated whether the American public is allergic to realism, which raises the question of how they would 'contract' it in the first place. We argue that realism isn't just an IR paradigm, but a belief system, whose relationship with other ideological systems in public opinion has rarely been fully examined. Operationalizing this disposition in ordinary citizens as 'folk realism,' we investigate its relationship with a variety of personality traits, foreign policy orientations, and political knowledge. We then present the results of a laboratory experiment probing psychological microfoundations for realist theory, manipulating the amount of information subjects have about a foreign policy conflict to determine whether uncertainty leads individuals to adopt more realist views, and whether realists and idealists respond to uncertainty and fear differently. We find that many of realism's causal mechanisms are conditional on whether subjects already hold realist views, and suggest that emotions like fear may play a larger role in realist theory than many realists have assumed. Adapted from the source document.