The main objective of this article is to present some of the main arguments by Eric Weil that support the relevant thesis of the importance of free and deliberate choice of human beings for rational life. This demonstrates, therefore, that it is reasonable to search for a more and more humanized existence, founded on fundamental values of human life, such as honesty, justice and happiness. This makes gradually and progressively possible to overcome and to deter, as far as possible, different types of violence. However, human beings are aware that total eradication of violence in the world is unthinkable, since freedom of human beings is a process of continuous deliberation and choice, at personal, communal and social level.
The present work addresses the relationship between the notions of reason (Vernunft) and impulse (Triebe) in Max Horkheimer. We will focus on the analysis of two texts from the 1930s to point out that the philosopher rejects the idea -typical of what he considers the bourgeois conception of reason- of a radical opposition between these concepts, since it is on its behalf that a repression of the impulsive is ussually carried in the name of an optimization of thought. Horkheimer understands that while such repression seeks to emancipate reason from its other, it produces, in fact, nothing more than an atrophy of thought. We will point out that, according to Horkheimer, the radical opposition is false for two reasons: on the one hand, because reason becomes impulsive when she limits herself to reasoning. On the other hand, because without a conscious connection between reason and impulse, reason becomes prey of irrationality. We argue that there is in Horkheimer a materialist conception of the relationship between the notions of drives and reason, according to which only the establishment of a conscious relationship between the two, which does not neglect the satisfaction of impulsive demands, can prevent thinking from becoming irrational.
A partir das leituras e reflexões a respeito da temática Motivação, busco por meio deste relato, discutir os aspectos importantes sobre a motivação tanto docente quanto discente, contando com as contribuições da Psicologia. É válido ressaltar a importância da motivação num processo de ensino e aprendizagem que tem como premissa o prazer e o sentido tanto em ensinar quanto em aprender, possibilitando uma efetiva construção do conhecimento.
A partir das leituras e reflexões a respeito da temática Motivação, busco por meio deste relato, discutir os aspectos importantes sobre a motivação tanto docente quanto discente, contando com as contribuições da Psicologia. É válido ressaltar a importância da motivação num processo de ensino e aprendizagem que tem como premissa o prazer e o sentido tanto em ensinar quanto em aprender, possibilitando uma efetiva construção do conhecimento.
Religious issues permeate the whole Rawlsian work. The problem is to know how people with different religious understandings can come to overlapping consensus. The solution to the problem of how political legitimacy can be achieved, despite religious conflict, and how, between citizens of different faiths, political justification can be pursued without reference to religious conviction is related to the idea of public reason.
O presente trabalho foi encomendado no ano de 2014, por ocasião de conferência ministrada pelo Prof.Hilton Japiassú na UFT. Após a conferência, a então gestão da Universidade Federal do Tocantins instituiu o Prêmio Hilton Japiassú de Excelência em Pesquisa, através de sua Pró-Reitoria de Pesquisa e Pós-graduação. Em homenagem ao referido professor, a comissão editorial de Desafios decidiu manter o texto original, tal como foi enviado em sua primeira versão. O Prof.Hilton Japiassu faleceu, no Rio de Janeiro, no ano de 2015.
The goal of this article is to examine the incardination of the critical notion "limit of reason" and the dialectical notion "threshold" within the framework of Walter Benjamin's philosophy. To this end, in the first place, this article investigates Benjamin's determination of rational limits according to the correlation between the weakening of the mimetic experience and the instrumentalization of language. Then, based on an analysis of the dialectic of the media, it indicates why Benjamin's philosophy can be conceived as the attempt to dialectically transform the "limits of reason" into "thresholds" open to another rational experience. In this way, it is hoped to show one aspect of Walter Benjamin's thought: the updating of the critique of reason as one of the foundations of his program for a coming philosophy.
Starting from the arendtian distinctions of the concept of public as appearance, exhibition and publicity and public as sharing a common world I will try to show how our perception of reality is dependent on common sense. This own characteristic of the human condition submits all societies to the challenge of creating and maintaining a public realm, in which the different opinions can, in confronting each other and both with the perceived world, rise from the level of self-opinion to common vision of reality, thus making the world shareable. Next I present the characteristics of neoliberal reason to conclude that it can not found a public realm and even needs its destruction. I present this threat of the hegemony of neoliberal reason over contemporary common sense in terms of tendency, why the total destruction of public realm would also mean the extinction of human societies as social aggregation and politic, which has already been tried in totalitarian regimes and failed.
El pensamiento político de Derrida es testigo de las consecuencias de la racionalidad logocéntrica de dominación y de las guerras que que hicieron de los individuos seres sin domicilio fijo. Este ensayo tiene como objetivo discutir algunos elementos del pensamiento filosófico y político del autor, teniendo en cuenta especialmente sus relaciones con los conceptos de identidad y territorialización. Por último, el ensayo discute la tarea de deconstrucción y su relación con la ética y la política de la amistad. ; Derrida´s political thought witnesses the consequences of the logocentric rationality of domination and of the wars that have made homeless beings out of individuals. This essay aims to discuss some elements of the philosophical and political thought of the author, noting especially its relations with the concepts of identity and territorialization. Finally, the essay discusses the task of deconstruction and its relation to the ethics and politics of friendship. ; La pensée politique de Derrida témoin des conséquences de la rationalité logocentrique de domination et de guerres qui ont fait des individus êtres sans-abri. Cet essai a pour but de discuter de certains éléments de la pensée philosophique et politique de l'auteur, en notant en particulier ses relations avec les concepts d'identité et de territorialisation. Enfin, l'essai traite de la tâche de déconstruction et de sa relation avec l'éthique et la politique de l'amitié. ; O pensamento político de Derrida testemunha as consequências da racionalidade logocêntrica de dominação e das guerras que fizeram dos indivíduos seres sem domicílio fixo. Este ensaio tem como objetivo discutir alguns elementos do pensamento filosófico e político do autor, observando especialmente suas relações com os conceitos de identidade e territorialização. Por fim, o ensaio discute a tarefa da desconstrução e sua relação com a ética e a política da amizade.
The current study investigates the consistency between the claims of the Dialectic and those of the Canon concerning the problem of freedom, and does so through a comparative analysis of three interpretations, showing why two of them (Carnois and Allison) would be mistaken, and a third (Esteves), defensible. Carnois points out that there would be an incompatibility between Dialectic and Canon in considering that the freedom of the Canon would be a limited and empirical freedom, whereas in the Dialectic it would have an absolute spontaneity. Allison believes that the texts would be compatible, although both present relative and ambiguous practical freedom (dependent on a sensitive incentive), and therefore there would be a pre-critical morality in KrV. Esteves's interpretation seems to us to be more sustainable and allows us to understand the coherence and contemporaneity of texts (both present freedom with absolute spontaneity), showing that, although practical freedom is a relational freedom (applied to human beings and therefore in contact with the empirical), it is not an empirical but hybrid concept.
The present paper brings a reading of Immanuel Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (1788), seeking support on two central axes: a) the formulation of the categorical imperative; b) the doctrine of the fact of reason. The choice of this course supports the position that, despite the innumerable formulations given to the imperative of morality throughout the GMS, there would be, in the terms of the second Critique, a clearer and more precise formulation of this principle. Regarding the doctrine of the fact of reason, it will be treated in two ways: on the one hand, from an attempt to reconstruct Kant's original theses, based on the philosopher's textual course; on the other, showing to what extent this doctrine represents a change of position in relation to the impossibilities found in the GMS. The aim will be to show how Kant fails to engage in the task of analytically deducing the concept of freedom from the concept of will, and the appeal to the fact of reason is precisely the distinguishing feature of this change. From this, it will be concluded that not only pure reason can be practical, but only pure reason, not empirically constrained reason, is unconditionally practical. Finally, we will talk about the distinction between will and arbitrariness, emphasizing its meaning for the understanding the concept of autonomy and its relation to Kant's concept of anthropology and human nature.
In this paper, we will investigate the political meaning of history in Kant's and Hegel's Philosophy of History. Both of them, each in its own way, the substantiation of a given political system - centered in the structuration of the Constitutional State - the fulfillment of human's history supreme finality. We will analyze, to this end, the works 'Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose', written in 1784, five years before the French Revolution and 'Reason in History - a general introduction to Philosophy of History', organized from the lectures given by Hegel in his maturity. In the final considerations, we'll try to problematize the notions of "sense" and "finality" of History.
This study explores and presents some of correspondences of Kant, how to use to touch up or follow the schedule (1760-1781) of the ideas that have established the structure, problems and receipt of Pure Reason critique of Kant. Our focus in this exhibition is to demonstrate that the development issues involving Critique of Pure Reason. For this, we will make a chronological return starting this exhibition from the 1760s; advancing to the inaugural dissertation of 1770, this until the first edition of criticism, and finally to the last correspondence on the same matter in the years 1797.
O artigo aborda o tema da formação sob a perspectiva da filosofia, buscando enfrentar o problema de como conferir-lhe, nas atuais condições sociais e de pensamento, um direcionamento ético, moral e político. Com esse foco, a partir de um diálogo entre os pensamentos de Habermas e de Benjamin estabelecido com base em pesquisa bibliográfica, propõe e encaminha as seguintes questões: é possível formar sem transmitir conteúdos éticos, sem compartilhar experiências de vida?; é possível emancipar-se sem atribuir sentido à existência?; qual é a relação entre a razão e o sentido? Uma dupla hipótese orienta a investigação apresentada: a ética, a moral e a política constituem dimensões fundamentais da vida humana, sem as quais não há parâmetro para a formação; a formação para a emancipação depende de uma experiência da liberdade de pensar, criar, expressar e atribuir sentidos que passa, necessariamente, pela vitalização das possibilidades de comunicação entre aqueles que compartilham práticas de vida. A partir da pesquisa realizada, o artigo conclui que, para favorecer a abertura ao outro e fornecer parâmetros para o julgamento moral, autônomo - atitudes fundamentais para a convivência democrática nas sociedades complexas atuais -, a formação não pode prescindir do processo de transmissão de experiências éticas de vida, ainda que isso seja um grande desafio perante a razão secularizada de que dispomos hoje. ; This paper addresses formation in the perspective of philosophy, in an attempt to face the problem of how to make sure, under the current social and thinking conditions, an ethical, moral and political guidance is provided with such formation. Focusing on that, building on a dialogue between the thoughts of Habermas and Benjamin established as a result of bibliographical research, the paper proposes and addresses the following issues: is it possible to form (educate) without transmitting ethical contents, without sharing experiences of life?; is it possible to emancipate oneself without assigning meaning to existence?; what is the relationship between reason and meaning? A double assumption orientates the investigation presented herein: ethics, moral and politics are fundamental dimensions of human life, without which there is no parameter for formation; formation for emancipation depends on a experience of the freedom to think, create, express and assign meanings which has necessarily to do with the vitalization of the possibilities of communication between those who share practices of life. Building on the research undertaken, the paper concludes that, in order to favor openness to the other and provide parameters for the autonomous moral judgment - fundamental atitudes for the democratic cohabitation in the present complex societies -, formation cannot do without the transmission of ethical experiences of life, even if this is greatly challenges the secularized reason we have today.