Interactive Reason in Law
In: Law, Reason and Emotion (Cambridge U. P., 2017)
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In: Law, Reason and Emotion (Cambridge U. P., 2017)
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In: Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies, Band 2, S. 15-32
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There are often conflicting considerations bearing on what one ought to do or believe. This conflict is often resolved by appealing to facts about the relative weights of these competing considerations. Anyone who might once have looked for exceptionless principles relating options with oughts should look instead for an account of normative reasons and their weight. This volume aims to provide the beginnings of a theory of weight
In: Private Law and Practical Reason: Essays on John Gardner's Private Law Theory (Oxford University Press, forthcoming)
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In: Doctoral thesis, UCL (University College London).
This dissertation looks at the linked issues of justification and public reason – under what conditions do political authorities count as legitimate, and what is the appropriate mode of reasoning together in the public sphere? The main contender in the field currently is Rawls's political liberalism. His conception of justification gives a key role to the justifiability of political power to each citizen, based on shared (because mutually acceptable) reasons. This approach to justification affects how we reason in the public sphere – in discussing certain fundamental issues, Rawlsian public reason requires limiting our reasons to public ones (viz., those which others could reasonably endorse), and bracketing those based on disputed conceptions of the good. How we think about justification thus has concrete implications for how we live together in political society. Rawls's political liberalism is commonly pitted against comprehensive liberalism. The disagreement tends to be cast as being about comprehensive liberals rejecting the need for justifiability. I argue that this is mistaken, and that Rawls shares more than we might think with the comprehensive liberal. Taking Raz as the modern champion of comprehensive liberalism, I show that both Rawls and Raz are deeply committed to justifiability, and trace the disagreement between the two to a metaphysical dispute about how to conceive of the project of justifying the implementation of political principles. In light of their shared commitment to justifiability, the question becomes whether justifiability requires shared reasons. I propose a heuristic reading of Rawls's requirement of mutually acceptable reasons, which explains how Rawls's and Raz's views on justification can be brought together without needing to bracket the truth of the principles of justice. This proposed reconciliation leads to a mode of reasoning in the public sphere that does not require setting aside non-public reasons in order to proceed.
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In: Hypatia: a journal of feminist philosophy, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 77-103
ISSN: 1527-2001
Reason has regularly been portrayed and understood in terms of images and metaphors that involve the exclusion or denigration of some element—body, passion, nature, instinct—that is cast as "feminine." Drawing upon philosophical insight into metaphor, I examine the impact of this gendering of reason. I argue that our conceptions of mind, reason, unreason, female, and male have been distorted. The politics of "rational" discourse has been set up in ways that still subtly but powerfully inhibit the voice and agency of women.
In: Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology working papers No. 81
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In: Science and public policy: journal of the Science Policy Foundation, Band 43, Heft 4, S. 575-576
ISSN: 1471-5430
In: Revue française de science politique, Band 64, Heft 1, S. 151-152
ISSN: 0035-2950
In: Perspectives on political science, Band 42, Heft 1, S. 58-60
ISSN: 1930-5478