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This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Income Distribution (edited by A.B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon), reviews some of the central issues that arise in thinking about the motives for, politics of, constraints on and measurement of, redistribution. Amongst the themes are: the potential usefulness of apparently inefficient policy instruments in overcoming the self-selection constraints on redistribution and limiting the damage that ill-intentioned policymakers can do; the continued (perhaps increased) ignorance as to the effective incidence of many key taxes and benefits; and, while there are circumstances in which redistribution may plausibly generate efficiency gains, the likelihood that some trade-off between equity and efficiency is inescapable.

There are many well-developed theories that explain why governments redistribute income, but very few can explain why this often is done in a socially inefficient form. In the theory we develop, compared to efficient methods, inefficient redistribution makes it more attractive to stay in or enter a group that receives subsidies. When political institutions cannot credibly commit to future policy, and when the political influence of a group depends on its size, inefficient redistribution is a tool to sustain political power. Our model may account for the choice of inefficient redistributive policies in agriculture, trade, and the labor market. It also implies that when factors of production are less specific to a sector, inefficient redistribution may be more prevalent.

There are many well-developed theories that explain why governments redistribute income, but very few can explain why this often is done in a socially inefficient form. In the theory we develop, compared to efficient methods, inefficient redistribution makes it more attractive to stay in or enter a group that receives subsidies. When political institutions cannot credibly commit to future policy, & when the political influence of a group depends on its size, inefficient redistribution is a tool to sustain political power. Our model may account for the choice of inefficient redistributive policies in agriculture, trade, & the labor market. It also implies that when factors of production are less specific to a sector, inefficient redistribution may be more prevalent. 75 References. Adapted from the source document.

Notices, advertisements and media releases. Invitation for suggestions. Invitation for comments on suggestions. Invitation for objections on proposed redistribution. Augmented Redistribution Committee, appointment of member. Consultations with the Augmented Redistribution Committee. Redistribution declaration notice. ; Chairperson of Augmented Redistribution Committee: Barry Chambers.

In this paper we deal with voluntary and compulsory redistribution in an economy where the enforcement of property rights is costly. Two agents engage in a common-pool contest and two types of potential distortions arise: the waste of resources in the contest and the dilution of incentives to produce as a result of the existens of externalities in the conflict equilibrium. We were able to show the following results: (i) In some situations Pareto-improving redistribution occurs voluntarily. (ii) Otherwise, the government may choose an indirect way to improve production in the presence of appropriation: In a situation of partial anarchy in some market redistributive policies in other markets may help to reduce the inefficiency in the anarchic market.

We study a model with majority voting on redistribution in which agents differ in their skills and their preferences for leisure. Redistribution is generous and average labor supply low if the decisive voter has relatively strong preferences for leisure, while redistribution is limited and average labor supply high if the decisive voter has relatively weak preferences for leisure. Given differences in the preference distributions due to cultural differences or positive complementarities in leisure, our model thus provides an explanation for the substantial differences in redistribution and average working hours between the United States and continental Western Europe. [Copyright 2008 Elsevier B.V.]

Recent development literature has placed priority on poverty reduction, and on possible growth enhancement from a more equal distribution of assets and income. At the same time, empirical work consistently shows that economic growth is no more than distribution neutral. In that context, this paper explores the relationship among growth, inequality and poverty, and demonstrates the following general conclusions: 1) a redistributive growth path is always likely to be superior to a distribution neutral path ('trickle down') for reducing poverty; 2) a redistributive growth path is always superior if a country's per capita income and inequality are relatively high; and 3) a static redistribution from the rich to the poor is superior to a redistributive growth path in its effect on poverty for most countries, but not for all. The paper then considers policy that might be used to make growth more equitable. – poverty ; inequality ; growth ; redistribution