Suchergebnisse

Do lokalnog se razvoja dolazi na temelju pažljivo pripremljene i provedene lokalne razvojne strategije. U jedinicama lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave nužno je usvojiti nov način strateškog planiranja, koji objedinjava proračunsko planiranje i strategiju razvoja lokalne jedinice s ciljem praćenja ostvarivanja rezultata trošečnjem proračunskih sredstava. U razvijenim se državama strategija lokalnog i regionalnog razvoja provodi putem participativnog pristupa u planiranju. To znači da u izradi strategije sudjeluju svi važni dionici koji djeluju na lokalnoj razini. U Hrvatskoj, slično kao i u većini drugih zemalja istone i jugoistočne Europe, ne postoji dovoljno iskustava u primjeni participativnog pristupa. Teorijska rješenja i praktična iskustva uspješnih država upućuju na važnost usklađivanja svih važnih elemenata da bi se pripremila uspješna strategija lokalnog razvoja. Suvremeni pristup strategiji lokalnog i regionalnog razvoja analizira se u okviru decentralizacije javnih poslova, odgovornosti za njihovo obavljanje i načina njihova financiranja. Lokalne i regionalne vlasti mogu najbolje upravljati lokalnim razvojem, a efektivnost se postiže u koordinaciji sa širom razinom vlasti, koja osigurava jasan okvir za strateško planiranje i donošenje odluka, kao i u suradnji i partnerstvu s privatnim i nevladinim sektorom. U oblikovanju lokalnih razvojnih strategija pristup dobrog upravljanja postaje ključnim pristupom za ostvarenje dobrih rezultata i korištenje konkurentskih prednosti. Premda fiskalna teorija poznaje više pristupa planiranju proračuna, programski proračun ključni je preduvjet za mjerenje lokalnih i regionalnih rezultata. Time se postiže veća učinkovitost i transparentnost, jer je programski proračun usmjeren na djelotvornost i mjerenje rezultata. Onda je odgovore na pitanja: što se želi postići? i Koliko će koštati ostvarenje cilja? Ta vrsta planiranja zahtijeva strateško planiranje koje uključuje jasno određenje misije, ciljeva i mjera za praćenje rezultata. Upravljanje na temelju mjerenja rezultata nalazi sve širu primjenu i u javnom sektoru, uključujući lokalnu i regionalnu razinu. Uspješno praćenje i vrednovanje rezultata ostvarenih u jednoj lokalnoj ili regionalnoj jedinici zahtijeva jasno prikazivanje rezultata u skladu s postavljenim strateškim ciljevima. ; Local development is the result of a care fully planned and implemented local development strategy. It is necessary to adopt a new way of strategic planning for local and regional self-government units, which would include budget planning and local unit(s) development strategy. The purpose is to monitor the results achieved by budget expenditures. In the developed countries, local and regional development strategies are implemented by using the participative approach. It means that all the relevant local and regional stake holders participate in designing a local and regional development strategy. Similar to the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, there is a lack of experience with the use of the participative approach in designing local and regional development strategies in Croatia. Theoretical solutions and real-life experiences of the successful countries stress the importance of co-ordination of all the relevant elements in order to design a successful local development strategy. Modern approach to the local and regional development strategy is analysed within the framework of decentralisation of public affairs, responsibility for their performance and the manner of their financing. Local and regional authorities are able to manage local development most successfully. Effectiveness is achived in co-ordination with the broader level of government, which provides a clear frame work for strategic planning and decision-making, and in co-operation and partnership with the private and NGO sectors. The good governance approach has become essential for achieving good results and using the competitive advantages. Although fiscal theory has several approaches to budget planning, program budgeting is the key precondition for assessing the results achieved at the local and regional levels. It leads to increased effectiveness and transparency, since program budgeting is focused on the effectiveness (planning) and measuring the achieved results, as well as answering the questions such as "What is the goal?" and "What are the costs of achieving that goal?". In order to achieve these objectives, program budgeting requires strategic planning which means clearly defined mission, objectives, and measures for monitoring the results achieved by local self-government units. Performance management has been spreading in the public sector, and consequently at both local and regional levels. Successful monitoring and assessment of the results achieved by a municipality, town, or region is going to require their transparent description in accordance with the strategic goals.

The author's starting assumption is that globalization institutionalizes new forms of governance, but that this does not diminish the significance of the national state. On the contrary, globalization forces the advanced industrial societies to find a new balance between calls for economic efficacy & expectations regarding social security. On the other hand, national states have avoided the impact of globalization primarily owing to the (1) institutional acclimatizing reserve of modern democracies, (2) development & application of new political governing instruments, & (3) intelligent usage of international cooperational pressures in favor of national political innovations. However, all this does not mean that the national state has gone through globalization unscathed. A new architecture of political governance has emerged, called by the author the transnational regimes of politics. They include, besides national states, international organizations such as the WTO, regional integrations (EU, NAFTA), as well as a variety of national & transnational interest groups & movements. The author concludes that the efficacy of the new forms of governance must not be overrated. Also, the basic problem today is the expansion of the areas lacking functional markets, successful national states, or global forms of governance. 45 References. Adapted from the source document.

Faza europeizacije hrvatske javne uprave započela je 2001. godine. Obuhvaća značajne promjene u središnjoj državnoj upravi, javnim službama (službama od općeg interesa), lokalnoj i regionalnoj samoupravi, službeničkom sustavu, upravnom obrazovanju, općem upravnom pravu te u sustavu pravne zaštite građana. U svim tim područjima razvijaju se značajni europski standardi, koji služe kao oslonac harmonizacije javnih uprava europskih zemalja. Europske standarde razvijaju Europska unija, Vijeće Europe, ali i same europske zemlje međusobnom razmjenom i učenjem. Reformama hrvatske uprave želi se ojačati upravne kapacitete, ostvarenje standarda dobrog europskog upravljanja i efektivni ulazak u zajednički europski upravni prostor. Europska je unija nametnula politiku i mehanizme kondicionalnosti te osigurala značajna financijska sredstva, projekte i stručnu potporu upravnim reformama u Hrvatskoj. Prilagodbe su u tijeku, a usprkos općenito dobrim rezultatima, ostaje značajni prostor za punu europeizaciju, u smislu postizanja odgovarajućih učinaka hrvatske javne uprave. ; Europeanization of the Croatian public administration formally started in 2001. This phase has encompassed important changes of the central state administration, services of general interest, local and regional self-government, civil service, administrative education and in-service training, general administrative law and system of legal protection of citizens. Reforms have been oriented towards strengthening administrative capacities, acquiring standards of good European governance, and effective entrance into common European Administrative Space. During that phase, till the Croatian accession, the European Union imposed conditionality policy and mechanisms, and ensured huge financial and expert support to the reforms. Reforms at the central level consisted of agencification, professionalisation and depoliticisation of the civil service, Europeanization of a significant part of sectoral public policies and strengthening openness and ethical standards. The purposes of reforms at the local and regional levels have been strengthening democratic legitimacy, reorientation towards economic development, and realisation of prerequisites for more efficient regional policy in line with European regional and structural policy. A new concept of services of general interest along with liberalisation, privatisation and commercialisation policy has been realised. Independent regulation of services of general economic interest and fostering better quality of non-economic services of general interest have been developed. Legal protection of citizens has been strengthened by introducing two-tier administrative justice and realisation of standards of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe, parallel with some administrative simplification. The right to good administration, established by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, has attracted increased attention. Certain steps towards quality modern education for key administrative personnel have been made.

Budući da je voda jedan od najvažnijih prirodnih resursa, potrebno je njome dobro i učinkovito upravljati. Premda je Hrvatska bogata vodom, sektor vodoopskrbe i odvodnje suočava se s velikim pristupanja Europskoj uniji. Uz usklađivanje pravnih propisa s pravnom stečevinom Unije (acquis communautaire), institucije i tvrtke koje se bave vodoopskrbom i odvodnjom morat će prihvatiti nove načine poslovanja. To će doves ti do integriranog upravljanja vodom, temeljenog na načelima održivog razvoja. Potrebno je revidirati politiku određivanja cijena vode u Hrvatskoj i oblikovati ju prema Okvirnoj direktivi o vodama Europske unije. U radu se navode koraci koje je potrebno poduzeti kako bi se ostvarili visoki standardi Unije u sektoru vodoopskrbe, kojiima značajan društveni, ekološki i gospodarski utjecaj. Poboljšanja u sektoru vodoopskrbe i odvodnje ne utječu samo na Hrvatsku, već i na cijelu regiju, budući da su hrvatski vodni resursi dio nekoliko riječnih slivova. ; Since water is one of the most valuable natural resources, it needs good governance and efficient management. Although Croatia is water rich country, its water sector is facing with major challenges during the EU accession process. Besides legal harmonization with EU acquis communautaire, water institutions and water supply companies will need to accept new operating models. This will lead to the integral water management, based on the principles of sustainable development. Water pricing policy in Croatia needs to be re-evaluated and structured according to the Water Framework Directive. This work presents necessary steps that should be under taken in order to achieve high EU standards in the water sector that has significant social, environmental and economic impact. The improvements in the water sector would have not only national, but also broader regional character, since Croatian water resources are significant part of several river basins.

U radu se istražuju ustroj i djelovanje Izvršnog vijeća Sabora NRH, republičkog izvršnog tijela vlasti, u razdoblju od njegova osnivanja Ustavnim zakonom NRH 1953. godine do donošenja novog Ustava SRH 1963. godine. U navedenom razdoblju rad Izvršnog vijeća prati se kroz tri mandatna razdoblja: prvo 6.2.-18.12.1953, drugo 18.12.1953.-10.4.1958. te treće mandatno razdoblje 10.4.1958.-27.6.1963. godine. Istraživanje se prvenstveno temelji na analizi arhivskoga gradiva fondova Izvršno vijeće Sabora SRH 1953-1990. i Sabor SRH 1945-1982. u Hrvatskom državnom arhivu te zakona, podzakonskih propisa i drugih akata objavljenih u službenim listovima (Narodne novine, Službeni list FNRJ). U prvom dijelu rada analiziraju se odredbe o postupku izbora Izvršnog vijeća te donosi pregled i popisi izabranih članova po mandatnim razdobljima. U nastavku rada naglasak je na definiranju poslova iz stručne nadležnosti, te pregledu organizacije i rekonstrukciji unutarnjeg ustroja Izvršnog vijeća (upravljanje Izvršnim vijećem, stručna tijela: odbori i komisije, administracija Izvršnog vijeća). U posljednjem poglavlju analiziraju se osnovna obilježja i rezultati rada Izvršnog vijeća u promatranom razdoblju, s posebnim osvrtom na rad u sjednicama, pripremanje prijedloga zakona, te donošenje podzakonskih propisa i drugih akata iz njegove nadležnosti. ; The article presents Executive Council of Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia (1953-1963), as one of the central governing institutions, with special interest i n its organization, functions and activity. The first chapter gives an overview of the provisions about constitution and procedure of members' election. It was constituted by 15 to 30 members, elected from members of the Republican Chamber of the Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia. Three mandate periods were established within which the activity of the Executive Council should be monitored: The first mandate from 6th February till 18th December 1953, the second mandate from 18th December 1953 till 10th April 1958 and the third mandate from 10th April 1958 till 27th June 1963. The same chapter brings the list of all members organized according to mandates. The second chapter gives an overview of the functions defined in regulations. According to the provisions of Constitutional Law from 1953, it is defined which functions has the Executive Council taken over from the authority of the abrogated Government of the People's Republic of Croatia and Presidium of the Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia. Further analysis points that in period from 1953 to 1956 Executive Council was acting as executive-administrative body and from 1956 to 1963 primarily as executive-political body. In 1956, due to the reorganisation of the public administration, the majority of administrative functions until then under the jurisdiction of the Executive Council were transferred to the authority of the Republic's governing bodies. According to that, Executive Council acts primarily as executive-political body, under which authority is enforcement of general politics and measures, as well as adoption of acts and putting precise tasks to governing bodies for their accomplishment. The next chapter gives an analysis of its organization, divided in three parts: guidance of Executive Council, working bodies (boards and commissions) and administrative and professional service. The last chapter gives an analysis of the activity of Executive Council. It is concluded that the most of the activity concerns the discussion of questions, preparation of laws and adoption of acts related to economy and finances, organization of central Republic's institutions, republican and regional (local) governing bodies, as well as education, science and culture. Less activity concerned the discussion of questions, preparation of laws and adoption of acts related to other administrative fields, first of all, system of justice and home affairs, health care system and social policy, as well as labour relations.

U radu se prikazuju rezultati istraživanja ustroja i djelovanja Izvršnog vijeća Sabora SRH u ustavnom razdoblju 1963-1974. Rad Izvršnog vijeća prati se kroz četiri mandatna razdoblja: četvrto 27. lipnja 1963.-11. svibnja 1967, peto 11. svibnja 1967.-9. svibnja 1969, šesto 9. svibnja 1969.-7. siječnja 1972. te sedmo 7. siječnja 1972.-8. svibnja 1974. Rezultati istraživanja temelje se na analizi arhivskog gradiva fondova Izvršno vijeće Sabora SRH 1953-1990. i Sabor SRH 1945-1982. u Hrvatskom državnom arhivu, te propisa i drugih akata objavljenih u službenim listovima. U radu se donosi sistematizirani pregled svih članova po mandatnim razdobljima, pregled propisima definirane nadležnosti i unutarnjeg ustroja te analiza obilježja i rezultata rada Izvršnog vijeća u promatranom razdoblju. ; The article presents Executive Council of Parliament of Socialist Republic of Croatia (1963-1974), as one of the central governing institutions, with special interest in its organization, functions and activity. The first chapter gives an overview of the provisions about constitution and procedure of members' election. Four mandate periods were established within which the activity of the Executive Council should be monitored: The fourth mandate from 27th June 1963 till 11th May 1967, the fifth mandate from 11th May 1967 till 9th May 1969, the sixth mandate from 9th May 1969 till 7th January 1972 and the seventh mandate from 7th January 1972 till 8th May 1974. The same chapter brings the list of all members organized according to mandates. The second chapter gives an overview of the functions defined in regulations. The next chapter gives an analysis of its organization, divided in four parts: guidance of Executive Council, working bodies (boards, commissions, workgroups), councils and committees, and administrative and professional service. The last chapter gives an analysis of the activity of Executive Council. It is concluded that the most of the activity concerns the discussion of questions related to economy and finances, organization of central Republic's institutions, republican and regional (local) governing bodies, as well as system of justice, security and home affairs. As well, follow questions related to education, science and culture, health care system and social policy, labour relations, foreign affairs and international relations.

Napor na uključenju načela održivosti u osnove prostornog planiranja u današnjem postsocijalističkom svijetu traži nove odnose između ustaljenih i suvremenih sudionika. Pojedini interesenti uključeni u razvoj, upravljanje i politiku djeluju na ishod regionalnih i urbanih sustava u Hrvatskoj ponekad bez obraćanja pozornosti na održivost. Njihovo djelovanje pokazuje nedostatak svijesti i negativan odnos prema održivosti u planerskoj praksi gdje je glavni cilj unaprijediti kakvoću života sadašnjih i budućih naraštaja. Bez dobrih ideja o nosivim kapacitetima i održivosti, neki od ovih sudionika zanemaruju planerska znanja i ekspertizu (CAVRIĆ, NEDOVIĆ – BUDIĆ, 2007.). Vještinama i znanjima planeri ih savjetuju, međutim, glavna pokretačka sila još je uvijek politički utjecaj. Takvi predlagači uspijevaju zaštititi svoje osobne probitke glede prostora i zemljišta nauštrb javnosti i običnih građana, podržavajući sustav izrade "preslikanih" planerskih izvješća, pogodujući tek daljem urbanom širenju i nenadziranoj izgradnji. Na žalost, poradi dužega vremenskog društvenog ignoriranja i jake sveze lobija investitora, arhitekata i građevinara, različite međunarodne planerske ideje s "održivošću na umu" još ne utječu na hrvatsku teoriju i praksu planiranja. Neke su od njih jednostavno neprihvaćane, netočno tumačene ili odbacivane zahvaljujući krutoj zakonskoj regulativi, nepostojanju formalnog školovanja planera i povlaštenom položaju tek jednog tipa ovlaštenih planera tj. arhitekata . Osjetljivost za alternativna razvojna rješenja, sudjelovanje javnosti, novine u ponašanju, organizaciji i tehnologijama, raznovrsnost pomagala za provedbu u planerskoj "kutiji s alatima", kao i različite vrste planerskih poslova u usmjeravanju održivih promjena, tek treba prepoznati u zemlji koja je u procesu pristupanja EU. Unatoč tomu, ovaj rad teži sumirati održivost i njezine sastavnice kao nove postavke, u kojima je glavna misao vodilja novoga globalnog pristupa planiranju, objavljena od Centra za ljudska naselja Ujedinjenih Naroda (UNCHS) kako slijedi: "Novo planiranje je manje kodirano i tehničko, više inovativno i poduzetničko. Ono je više sudioničko i usmjerenije projektima nego cjelovitim prostornim sustavima. Plansku ekspertizu sve češće ne zahtijeva samo država već i dioničarski i javni dijelovi građanskog društva. Prijeporno nije planiranje samo po sebi, nego njegov cilj: da li ga voditi uglavnom učinkovitošću, jačajući postojeću razdiobu bogatstva i moći, ili bi trebalo odigrati distribucijsku ulogu da može pomoći pri stvaranju minimalnih standarda urbanog življenja" (Hague, 2001.). ; Effort to incorporate sustainability aspects into the spatial planning agenda requires new relationships between conventional and new players in today's post-socialist world. Some stakeholders engaged in development, management and governance are sometimes tailoring the destiny of regional and urban systems in Croatia without sustainability concerns. Their activities show the lack of awareness and negative attitude towards sustainable planning practices where the major goal is to improve the quality of life of current and future generations. Without sound ideas about carrying capacities and sustainability, some of these actors have ignored the planning knowledge and expertise (CAVRIĆ, NEDOVIĆ – BUDIĆ, 2007). Planners advise upon them with their professional skill and knowledge but the driving force is still political power. These proponents have managed to safeguard their own spatial and land interests on the expense of the public and ordinary citizens, by maintaining the system of "copy-paste" planning blue prints, suitable for supporting emerging urban sprawl and uncontrolled construction activities. Unfortunately, due to the long-term social ignorance and strong alliance of developer's lobbies, architects and constructors, various international planning ideas with "sustainability in mind" have not affected Croatian planning theory and practice, yet. Some of them are petrified, misinterpreted or simply abolished owing to obstinate legislation, the non-existence of formal planning education, and the privileged position of only one brand of chartered planners (e.g. architects) . Alternative development solutions, such as public participation, behavioral, organizational and technological advances, diversity of implementing instruments in the planner's "toolkit", and the planner's numerous tasks in guiding sustainable change, are still to be recognized in this EU accession country. Notwithstanding, this paper aims to summaries sustainability and its derivates as the new paradigms, in which the guiding leitmotif of the new global agenda for planning is spelled out by the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (2001b) as follows: "The new planning is less coded and technical, more innovative and entrepreneurial. It is more participatory and concerned with projects rather than whole spatial systems. Planning expertise is increasingly sought not only by the state, but also by the corporate sector and civil society. What is controversial is not planning per se, but its goal: whether it should be directed chiefly at efficiency, reinforcing the current distribution of wealth and power, or whether it should play a distributive role to help create minimum standards of urban liveability" (Hague, 2001).

Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.