Suchergebnisse

Abstract
There is growing evidence that leaders cooperate through regional intergovernmental organizations (RIOs) to address domestic security challenges. What sustains this collaboration? I present a theory of regional cooperation driven by mutual interest in stability and protection for heads of state. RIOs support the development of rules and norms around contributing to regional security and can legitimize pro-government military interventions. Leaders concerned that they may need external support—particularly against members of their own military—cooperate to remain in good standing with co-members. Using original security personnel deployment data for members of four Africa-based RIOs with mutual defense pacts between 1990 and 2017, I show that leaders facing higher coup risk were more likely to deploy personnel to support co-members. I also find evidence for the underlying mechanism—that these leaders contribute because they expect RIO members to reciprocate support in the future. Leaders who contributed more personnel to support co-members, and leaders who contributed more often, were more likely to receive military support from co-members in the future. These findings shed light on the dynamics sustaining regional security cooperation.

There is growing evidence that leaders cooperate through regional intergovernmental organizations (RIOs) to address domestic security challenges. What sustains this collaboration? I present a theory of regional cooperation driven by mutual interest in stability and protection for heads of state. RIOs support the development of rules and norms around contributing to regional security and can legitimize pro-government military interventions. Leaders concerned that they may need external support—particularly against members of their own military—cooperate to remain in good standing with co-members. Using original security personnel deployment data for members of four Africa-based RIOs with mutual defense pacts between 1990 and 2017, I show that leaders facing higher coup risk were more likely to deploy personnel to support co-members. I also find evidence for the underlying mechanism—that these leaders contribute because they expect RIO members to reciprocate support in the future. Leaders who contributed more personnel to support co-members, and leaders who contributed more often, were more likely to receive military support from co-members in the future. These findings shed light on the dynamics sustaining regional security cooperation.

The high point of 1990 came when the ICRC was granted observer status with the United Nations General Assembly (resolution 45/6 adopted by consensus on 16 October). Until then, the ICRC had had consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council; this did not reflect the institution's specific character nor its growing cooperation with UN bodies in New York.

Functional independence of international institutions is a sine qua non to their effective operation. Current international law reveals that international organizations have a legal capacity and certain privileges and immunities bestowed upon them by their member states to ensure their independence and that of their staffs. One vital component of functional independence is the freedom of travel for all members of the international staff. In examining the features of freedom of travel necessary for international organizations to discharge their responsibilities effectively, C. W. Jenks wrote:The freedom of movement which is necessary comprises more than the absence of any special restrictions; it includes the usual facilities for official travel, such as diplomatic or other special visas, priorities where these are necessary, exemption from immigration regulations and formalities, and similar measures; taken cumulatively these facilities involve a considerable saving of time and energy and are therefore an important element in securing the expeditious and unhindered travel necessary to the prompt discharge of international responsibilities.