Suchergebnisse

In the spring of 1935 there was the general election in Hungary. At this time Gyula Gömbös was the Prime Minister of Hungary. The vote still passed off by the general election law of 1925. In the city of Hódmezővásárhely the election was secret and made with party lists. It was held at the end of April. In the course of the campaign three parties managed to have the enough recommendations: the Party of National Unity (with the leadership of András Tasnádi Nagy under-secretary for Religion and Education) the National Agricultural Opposition (with the leadership of Béla Kun) and the Hungarian Social Democratic Party (with the leadership of Ferenc Takács). The recommendation threshold was 10 percent of the number of all constituent, which was meant 1828 people in this case. In the course of the campaign all of the parties attacked each other in the pages of newspapers.The election ended in complete victory for the opposition. The vote result was a big surprise. The winner was in close fight the Hungarian Social Democratic Party. The second place was owned by the National Agricultural Opposition. The parliamentarian of the city became Ferenc Takács and Béla Kun. They both lived in Hódmezővásárhely.

The EU is bound to respect the national identities of Member States. States might, at occasions, define their national identities in ways that breach inclusive constitutional values (e.g. equality) protected under TEU Article 2. The assumption behind the recognition of diverse constitutional identities is the peaceful coexistence of both, which is challenged by illiberal national developments. Instead, we see a zero-sum game between the constitutional recognition of exclusive values (e.g. dominant ethnicity or religion) and inclusive constitutional values; every gain by the proponents of emergent authoritarianism translates to a loss on the side of constitutional democracy. While exclusive norms appear in virtually every constitutional system, a critical mass of exclusive values can lead to the hollowing out of a democratic order, both on the national and on the supranational level. To try to draw the line where this shift happens, we are relying on the limits of toleration, and recognition, of exclusive norms and identity elements of minority communities in liberal theories of multiculturalism (e.g. Raz, Taylor, Kymlicka). We think that the case of illiberal minorities raise structurally similar theoretical questions, insights, and experiences than the dilemma defined above, the challenge of illiberal Member States undermining EU fundamental values.