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International audience ; Dieser Beitrag analysiert das Bild der abrahamitischen Religionen in den Präsidentschaftswahlprogrammen des Front National (2012 und 2017) im Vergleich zu anderen erfolgreichen rechtsextremen populistischen Parteien in EU-Ländern Nord- und Westeuropas. Die Analyse zeigt einerseits eine gemeinsame Tendenz, den Islam negativ darzustellen, andereseits auch Unterschiede zwischen den einzelnen Parteien in bezug auf die Darstellung des Judemtums und/oder Israel sowie der Bedeutung, die dem Christentum für die nationale oder europäische Identität zugemessen wird, die jeweils interessante Parallelen zu den nationalen diskursiven Traditionen und der Geschichte der jeweiligen Partei aufweisen. ; This article analyses the image of the three abrahamic religions in the recent political programs of the French Front National (2012 und 2017) in a comparative perspective with other successful populist radical right-wing parties in EU-Countries of continental Western and Northern Europe. It will be shown that even if there is a common tendency of representing Islam negatively and avoiding overt antisemitism, there are differences with regard to Judaism and/or Israel as well as to the weight of Christianity for the national and/or European culture, which have interesting parallels with the national discourse traditions and the particular radical right-wing history of these parties. ; Cet article analyse l'image des trois religions abrahamites dans les programmes politiques récents du Front National en la comparant avec celle créée par d'autres partis d'extrême droite populiste de pays de l'Union Européenne appartenant à l'Europe occidentale continentale et à la Scandinavie qui ont été couronnés d'un certain succès lors des élections récentes. Il sera montré que, même si l'on peut constater une convergence quant à l'image négative créée de l'islam ainsi que dans la tendance d'éviter un antisémitisme ouvert, il y a, toutefois, des différences en ce qui concerne le judaïsme et/ou Israël et le poids attribué ...

This book sheds new light on the cultural encounter between China and Europe, by discussing how Chinese religion and philosophy were represented in Dutch printed works between 1595-1700.; Readership: All interested in early modern encounters between Asia and Europe, and anyone concerned with printing and publishing in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic.

AbstractBecause of tectonic shifts in South Africa's political economy, overlapping, often translocal, systems of exchange, meaning and privilege are transforming the country's post‐imperial order. In the 'estuarial' zones where various demographic and ideational currents converge to create spaces of ongoing flux, religion serves as a mechanism of exclusion and a means of place making. In almost all cases, the historical privatization of religion among the country's black majority has meant that negotiations over difference and belonging take place beyond the sphere of state intervention and policy. The results are forms of horizontal citizenship that are uncertain and impermanent but often involve novel subjectivities shaped by local conditions but without defined territorial boundaries. Religious practices that resonate with migrants' nomadic impermanence, while hindering the consolidation of hegemonic political or social orderings, are crucial to these formations.

Résumé Cet article interroge les liens entre religion et action humanitaire/pour le développement à travers le cas de la religieuse française sœur Emmanuelle. Il fait valoir que ces catégories se chevauchent et sont mutuellement constitutives. Deux arguments sont mis en avant. Premièrement, replaçant l'action de sœur Emmanuelle dans le contexte de l'évolution de la mission chrétienne, nous soutenons que son approche matérialiste laïque illustre une mutation dans la mission au cours du XX e siècle, à savoir la relégation au second plan de la conversion au profit d'une nouvelle forme de solidarité humanitaire?: la lutte pour le «?développement?». Deuxièmement, en examinant la mobilisation d'acteurs «?religieux?» et «?non-religieux?» par sœur Emmanuelle, une telle dichotomie est problématisée en démontrant sa porosité. La religion a joué un rôle important, surtout dans les coulisses, pour fédérer les efforts de développement avec les ramasseurs de déchets du Caire, mais elle pouvait aussi être une entrave, lorsqu'elle était trop explicite.

This article traces the trajectory of UK government social policy since World War Two, with particular reference to the shifts in the past 10 to 15 years towards concepts such as multi-level governance, localism, the Third Way and the Big Society. It describes the shifting relationships between institutional religion and the State during that period, tracking the 'return of faith' in government policy and social welfare as it seeks to address a number of intractable social and economic issues related to cohesion and inequality, as well as a perceived absence of moral and ethical norms within public life. The article proposes a set of new analytical concepts (based on recent empirical research from the US and the UK) which seek to describe and evaluate this new 'post-secular' relationship between faith and government. The article concludes that the new 'post-welfare' landscape will continue to play well to the existing strengths and positionalities of religion, faith and spirituality in the UK as the twenty-first century moves into its second decade.

Although the role of religion in conflict has been gaining increasing attention in recent times, few cross-sectional studies have examined the extent to which internal conflict since World War II has been religious, and those that have done so are limited in either the type of conflict or time span they cover. Accordingly, this article uses the State Failure data set to assess whether the relative and absolute number of religious conflicts since World War II has increased, whether these conflicts are more intense than other conflicts, and whether any particular religions participate in conflict more often than others. The findings show that while occurring less often than other types of conflicts, religious conflicts have increased between 1950 and 1996, and are more intense than nonreligious conflicts. Also, Christian groups disproportionally participate in internal conflict, but most of those conflicts are with other Christian groups. This, along with other findings of the study, contradicts major elements of Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" theory.

Researchers who dealt with the Balkan national question saw religion as a large formative variable in the ethnic consolidation of peoples in this part of Europe. The main difference between the three largest Balkan Slav ethnic communities - Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims - is a religious one. Virtually all Serbs are Orthodox Christians, Croats Catholic and Bosnian Muslims, as their preferred ethnic reference suggests, all Muslim. Changing religion in the past meant changing nations. In the past centuries when Orthodox Serbs changed their religion into Islam they also changed their ethnicity and became Bosniac. The same holds for Croats. Today's situation shows that religious communities played very important role in development of national feeling of those nations. Nearly all Bosnian Muslim intellectuals say that the most important characteristic of their nation is their religious affiliation to Islam. Likewise, majority of Serbs and Croats consider Orthodoxy and Catholicism, respectively, as their national religion so that there is no reference such as Catholic Serb or Orthodox Croat. While the big part of the population may not be believers in the literal meaning of their religious faith, they, nevertheless, belong to it because of the tradition. Political analysis of Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian societies show that their religious institutions are the most respected pillars of the nation. Having in mind these facts, it is clear that the degree of patriotism, nationalism, jingoism and xenophobia in those societies and among these peoples can not be researched without exact facts on the position of religious institutions because without that knowledge, it isn't possible to evaluate the process of globalization of that region. . ; Istraživači koji se bave Balkanom nisu mogli da ne vide religiju kao jednu od činjenica koja je uticala na stvaranje nacija u tom delu Evrope. Najveća razlika između tri najveće jugoslovenske etničke zajednice, Srba, Hrvata i Bošnjaka, jeste religijska. Skoro da su svi Srbi pravoslavni, svi Hrvati rimokatolici i svi Bošnjaci muslimani. Menjanje religije u prošlosti je značilo menjanje nacije; kada su pravoslavni Srbi menjali veru prelazeći u islam, stvarali su pretpostavke da se danas transformišu u Bošnjake. Isto se desilo i sa Hrvatima. I danas se vidi da religija igra veliku ulogu u formiranju nacionalne svesti ovih zajednica. Skoro svi bošnjački intelektualci ističu da je islam jedna od osnova njihove nacije. Isto tako, veliki broj Hrvata i Srba smatra da su rimokatolicizam i pravoslavlje njihova nacionalna religija, pa se često čuju pojmovi pravoslavni Srbin i Hrvat rimokatolik. Mada je vidljivo, da značajan deo ovih zajednica zna da pokaže da nije vernik u pravom smislu te reči, oni ističu da pripadaju nekoj od ove tri konfesije zbog tradicije. Najznačajnije analize uglednih institucija pokazuju da ove tri zajednice smatraju religiju jednim od stubova njihove nacije. Imajući u vidu ove činjenice, jasno je da se patriotizam, nacionalizam, šovinizam, džingoizam i ksenofobija ne mogu istraživati kod ovih zajednica ako se nemaju tačne činjenice o stavovima religioznih institucija. .

Artikel ini mengkaji penggunaan wacana komunisme yang kerapkali dijadikan issu untuk merepresentasikan keberadaan individu, kelompok maupun institusi tertentu di Indonesia. Wacana digunakan oleh pihak pihak tertentu sebagai cara mengkomunikasi maksud untuk menarik perhatian, membentuk pencitraan, membelah opini publik, dan pada akhirnya sebagai saluran membangun letimasi politik. Pada akhir bulan September 2017 wacana komunisme sebagai bahaya laten bagi Negara kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI) merebak kembali melalui instruksi Panglima TNI Jendral Gatot Nurmantyo kepada jajaran TNI untuk memutar kembali film "G.30 S/PKIâ€. Instruksi Panglima TNI tersebut menimbulkan pro-kontra di masyarakat di luar internal TNI. Melalui analisis wacana model Althusser dan Faucoult akan dapat dikontruksi komunikasi politik yang terjadi di level individu maupun institusi berkaitan dengan ajang pemilu tahun 2019. Kajian ini dapat memberikan gambaran awal dan umum tentang issu issu yang digunakan sebagai instrument politik dalam kontestasi politik tahun 2019. Issu bahaya laten komunisme akan merecovery kelompok masa lalu yang dilabeling pada masa Orde Baru dan sebaliknya mereposisi kelompok Orde Baru yang dituduh mengaburkan sejarah dan akan muncul kelompok baru sebagai pendulum issu terdebut. Kata Kunci : Komunisme, Legitimasi, produksi wacana, reproduksi wacana, Pilpres 2019

The article deals with the features of sociological analysis of religion in Russia during the imperial period of its history. The national sociological tradition of studying religion as a socio-cultural phenomenon and a social institution, which was developed during this period, had its own unique and peculiar appearance and was just begun to revive again in post-Soviet Russia, contrasts with the tradition that took place in the West. In this context, the appeal to unfortunately undeservedly forgotten works of classics of Russian religious and socio-political though is very promising area of modern sociological research.When studying this problem, the author emphasizes the study of the works of representatives of three ideological areas of Russian religious and socio-political thought: conservatism, liberalism and socialism, as well as the peculiarities of the historical development of Russian society and the state and those events that had a significant impact on the formation and development of scientific understanding of religion in Russia. Among such features, the author, in particular, refers to the formation of an "antisystem" (systemic integrity of people who take a dim view of their homeland, hate their own nation, its values and culture, history, traditional religious, political and social systems) among the Russian intelligentsia, bureaucracy and part of the elite of Russian society, under a certain influence of Westernism, as a consequence of the spiritual schism of the 18th century, which occurred in the educated strata and elite of Russian society.The author of the article pays special attention to the analysis of "Christian sociology". In his opinion, it is a collective name for the peculiar and original Russian sociological tradition of studying religion as a sociocultural phenomenon and social institute. "Christian Sociology" combines the theoretical developments of representatives of the Russian Slavophile, moderately liberal and conservative camps, secular and religious socio-political thought, striving to formulate and reveal the Christian view and approach to the knowledge and understanding of the life of society and social space.

Fuelled by the power of the evangelical right, 'Religion and the public square' debates form a veritable industry in US political theory. Yet successive volumes frequently seem to retread old ground, making few advances. In the much less heated Australian religious atmosphere, such soul-searching can seem quaint or obsessive; yet recent political developments here, notably the success of 'family values' social conservatism, suggest that the relationship between political and religious views might merit further analysis here, too. I will take up recent US debates about the place of religion in public debate and argue that, although coming from widely divergent philosophical directions, they share a peculiar, and highly limiting, conception of the relationship between religious and political conviction. I will spell out where I think US debates grind themselves into an impossible corner and then point out how a more textured account of the political dimensions of religious belief can illuminate both US debates and the very different Australian religio-political climate.

This study explores the role of religion in engaging stakeholders in branding a place on social media and unmasks what implications this has for (re)constructing the three-dimensional meanings of a place brand. Using the content analysis method to examine the case of Saudi Arabia, it probes how the key stakeholder groups of the government and the residents structure and interact with the narratives of the cities—Jeddah and Riyadh—on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram. The results show the Islamic religion serves as a powerful tool for motivating the residents to engage in the government-led city branding initiatives at the individual level. However, the strategy of dwelling on religion to mobilize resident engagement at the individual level towards the social level with the aim of growing resources in support of social development should be reassessed within a dynamic social system. Theoretically, the proposed framework of religion city branding expands the scope of stakeholder engagement in place branding research through the integration with the driver of religion, especially unveiling how religious factors shape the personality traits of a place brand. It contributes to the practical sense that religious elements might be deployed by the key stakeholder groups of the government and residents in city branding initiatives, which potentially contributes to their relationship and the engagement of residents in co-creating a place brand with the government. This Saudi-focused study, therefore, possesses significance for place branding practices in Middle Eastern countries and beyond.

The focus of this article is to examine the process of Gus Dur's indigenousization of Islam as a response to the increasing phenomenon of religious formalization. This topic is considered important because it is an effort to keep local culture and traditions down to earth. Apart from that, the indigenousization of Islam is also a contra-naration against the conservative understanding of Islam which states that indigenous Islamic rituals are regarded as bid'ah, shirk or khurafat that must be rejected. This was raised because according to muslim fundamentalists, the religious practices of indigenous Muslims are opposite of the practices of salaf as-salih which conform Islam totality or kaffah and authentic Islam. In addition, the indigenousization of Islam emerged as a response to the phenomenon of the formalization of religion which leads to the commodification of religion by making religion as a sale value. This writing employes socio-descriptive method which has come to conclusions as follows. First, the indigenousization of Islam which was initiated by Gus Dur was the result of Gus Dur's long struggle with praxis in nature. Second, Arabization with its' formalization of religion has injured the diversity of the nation of the archipelago and opened up opportunities for the rise of ideological and political interests. Third, the common thread or root of the problem between conservative Islamic groups with their attitudes of formalizing religion and the indigenousization of Islam lies in the differences in understanding the values of Islamic normativity and culture.