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This paper has three aims. The first aim is to measure religiosity across all European countries through an index that combines beliefs, practices, and attitudes. The second aim is to analyse the strength of societal factors on religiosity, including modernisation, communist rule, national identity, religious pluralism, and religious freedom. The final aim is to group European countries by religiosity and to characterise each cluster by dominant religions and these five societal factors. Based on EVS 2008, it was applied multivariate analysis to reach these aims. Cluster 1 is mainly composed of Orthodox, Muslims, and Catholics; cluster 2 of Catholics, Orthodox, and people without religion; cluster 3 by people without religion, Protestants, and Catholics. Across clusters, the degree of human development, religious pluralism, and religious freedom increase, while the degree of national identity decreases.

Presentado el 22 de mayo de 2014 en la Conference on Axioms, Results and Methods in Normative Economics, celebrada del 22 al 24 de mayo de 2014 en Granada (España). Presentado el 9 de junio de 2014 en el International Economic Association 17th World Congress, celebrado del 6 al 10 de juni de 2014 en el Dead Sea (Jordania). Presentado como conferencia en el Department of Economics, Università di Bologna. Presentado como conferencia en el Departamento de Fundamentos de Análisis Económico de la Universidad de Alicante el 31 de octubre de 2014. Presentado como conferencia el 2 de diciembre de 2015 en el Economics & Political Science (EPS) Seminars de INSEAD, The Business School for the World. ; In this paper we study the role of religiosity in political choices such as redistribution and individual liberties. To a standard model with consumption and effort, we add a third good: civil liberties with a cap established by law. More liberties, like divorce, abortion, gender parity, or gay marriage, may be considered good by the secular and detrimental by the religious individuals. With standard assumptions on individual preferences, one obtains that wider liberties increase the marginal utility of consumption to seculars, and decrease it to religious individuals. Labor supply and income are therefore lower for religious individuals in the presence of liberties. This implies a higher share of religious agents among the poor consistent with evidence that the poor care more about "moral values". We analyze the preferences of individuals over taxation and the legal cap over liberties. We show that restriction of liberties can arise as an equilibrium outcome of a simple political process when society is sufficiently religious. Moreover, if economic polarisation is lower than religious polarisation, restriction of liberties results in lower taxation. Thus more religious societies will impose lower taxation both because (i) their productivity is lower, (ii) repression of liberties is more likely to arise and result in lower taxes ; Joan Esteban and Laura Mayoral gratefully acknowledge financial support from the AXA Research Fund, the Generalitat de Catalunya, and the CICYT (ECO2011-25293) ; Peer Reviewed

Following the political and economic transformation processes in Eastern Europe the religious landscapes have also changed. While some countries display a revitalization of religion, others are continuously secularizing. The book explores this contrast, including different, empirical based studies on the topic in a wide range of Eastern European countries.

Religiosity is something available to every person, therefore it might be corelated with personality and maturity; this, however, should not be said about causality. This article shows that no matter what aspects of religiosity are studied, religiosity is always more than personality, hence the findings of many authors yield conflicting results. The research presented here serves to explain this problem from the perspective of examining the relationship between religiosity and personality and pseudo-religiosity and maturity. In the first study, Polish university students who declared to be believers and members of the Roman Catholic Church were examined using the Personality Inventory (NEO-FFI) and Scale of Personal Religiosity in order to investigate a relationship between some aspects of religiosity and personal traits. On the other hand, a second study shows that most members of charismatic groups, identified as pseudo-religious, exhibit personality immaturity. In this study pseudo-religious individuals were examined using the Personality Maturity Questionnaire (DoM) based on the Maslow Theory of Personality Maturity.

Argues that, contrary to current thought in the social sciences, religiosity and protestant evangelism are at the heart of Loyalist politics in Northern Ireland. Gives evidence based on figures about the religious involvement of members of the Democratic Unionist Party. (DCL)