Suchergebnisse

This volume brings together Spanish and German scholars specialised in the field of religious interaction. Most medieval societies ruled by Muslims and Christians were religiously plural not by choice and ideal but by nature. Religious affiliation and identity had to be repeatedly negotiated, defined, and chosen. The impact of legitimated religious violence towards subordinate religions or of religious wars underlies the more peaceful periods. Semi-permeable borders between the religions favoured inter-religious exchanges, while at the same time the efforts to impose segregation and discrimination aimed to restrict contact and influence. Agency by members of the subordinate religions was administratively and economically welcome and religiously and socially inevitable. 0The authors address topics such as the different strategies for power, order, exchange and identity chosen to organise religious plurality in medieval societies. Rights and regulations by both dominant and subordinate religions for demarcation, and in the opposite direction, pragmatism and forum shopping, were important strategies. A comparative approach stemming from the controversy on the concept of convivencia or coexistence in and beyond the Iberian Peninsula, as a possible model of inter-religious cohabitation, is combined with the inspiring results on religious plurality unearthed by intense research on mixed societies in the Mediterranean, Byzantium, the Crusading States and Central Asia. New theoretical and empirical models and concepts are proposed for comparative work in this research field.

Religious fundamentalism is a vigorously debated topic these days. It is frequently confined to a one-dimensional structure, which has been connected to religious violence. The current study claims that the existing use of the term "extreme" did not apprehend the various perceptions, opinions, and outlooks that characterize excessive religious behavior. The study deconstructs the implication of the word "extreme" in religious perspectives and responds to researchers' calls for a complete framework encompassing the many different components that make up religion. The research typically progresses religious extremism in intellectual, ceremonial, social, and political dimensions of religion, centered on the diversity of Islamic groups in Islamic states. An examination that connects Muslim radicalism with violence is being conducted elsewhere. According to the study, Muslims (or any religious organization) can be severe in some areas but moderate in others, such as extreme in ritual but moderate in politics. Understanding religious extremism in terms of these four characteristics offers new visions into the worldwide issue of religious extremism and well predicts how religious extremism manifests. More often, the framework proposed in this study can aid in expanding one's understanding of radicalism beyond a focus on violence. ; : El fundamentalismo religioso es un tema fuertemente debatido en estos días. Con frecuencia se limita a una estructura unidimensional, que se ha relacionado con la violencia religiosa. El estudio actual afirma que el uso actual del término "extremo" no comprende las diversas percepciones, opiniones y puntos de vista que caracterizan el comportamiento religioso excesivo. El estudio deconstruye la implicación de la palabra "extremo" en las perspectivas religiosas y responde a los pedidos de los investigadores de un marco completo que abarque los muchos componentes diferentes que componen la religión. La investigación generalmente avanza el extremismo religioso en las dimensiones intelectual, ceremonial, social y política de la religión, centrada en la diversidad de grupos islámicos en los estados islámicos. En otros lugares se está realizando un examen que conecta el radicalismo musulmán con la violencia. Según el estudio, los musulmanes (o cualquier organización religiosa) pueden ser severos en algunas áreas pero moderados en otras, como extremos en el ritual pero moderados en la política. Comprender el extremismo religioso en términos de estas cuatro características ofrece nuevas visiones del problema mundial del extremismo religioso y predice bien cómo se manifiesta el extremismo religioso. Más a menudo, el marco propuesto en este estudio puede ayudar a expandir la comprensión del radicalismo más allá de un enfoque en la violencia.

La violencia política en India no es nueva. La traspasa como un eje sobre el que pivota toda la historia de este país sin que el pensamiento gandhiano de la no violencia la haya permeado a pesar de lo que creemos en Occidente. India hoy vive una situación de guerra de baja intensidad en la que la insurgencia maoísta, el enfrentamiento interreligioso y el independentismo de origen étnico, se entrecruzan y el Estado sólo puede enfrentar esta situación con un cambio de política que saque de la miseria absoluta a las tres cuartas partes de la población. ; Political violence in India is not a new phenomenon. It crosses it as a pivot around which the whole story of that country revolves, and Gandhian thought did not manage to put an end to it, no matter what we may believe in the West. Today India suffers a low-intensity war in which Maoist insurgency, inter-religious struggle, and ethnic aspirations for independence intercross. The State could only effectively face this situation by means of a policy change that would rescue the three quarters of its population from absolute poverty. ; 50-77 ; albercruz@eresmas.com ; semestral

The objective of the research was to identify the factors that contribute to the increase in rates of gender-based violence and to clarify the role of the authorities in the fight against this problem. To achieve this objective, the following methods were used: statistical analysis, hypothetical-deductive model, factor analysis, generalization and analogy and correlation analysis. It was found that there is a negative relationship between the level of violence against women and the economic situation, the level of gender inequality, the level of development of social norms and the level of gender development (only for violence against women who are not intimate partners). A positive relationship between the level of gender development and the level of domestic violence was demonstrated. Factors that directly negatively affected rates of gender-based violence were identified: cultural, traditional, religious beliefs about the status of women in society; authorities' restrictions on the rights of individuals associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. The authorities' tools to counter gender-based violence were identified. The perspective of further research is the identification of the social and legal aspects of this global phenomenon.

This document reflects on the articulation of bioethics in the construction of the new citizen that Colombia needs, regarding the events that arise with the signing and implementation of the peace process that is being carried out in the country. Urgently requires the formation of "new" Colombians who will be part of a rebuilt society and culture, who will be able to address the challenges that will be had in Colombia to achieve peaceful coexistence. In the development of the document, aspects of linking bioethics with the formation of citizens who are able to live harmoniously among each other are addressed, despite the diversity of opinion, culture, political ideas and religious beliefs, Colombians responsible and committed to The reconstruction of the country and the search for ways of social cooperation; Men and women who can live in balance with nature, recognizing that they are part of the ecosystem and therefore show respect for the environment in which they live. Emphasis is placed on the need to implement the statements of Unesco's Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, as well as on the Goals of Sustainable Development, as well as proposals from important contemporary thinkers who have made great contributions in search of peace World, such as Nelson Mandela, among others. ; Este documento reflete sobre a articulação da bioética na construção do novo cidadão que a Colômbia precisa, em relação aos eventos que surgem com a assinatura e implementação do processo de paz que está sendo realizado no país. Urgentemente requer a formação de "novos" colombianos que serão parte de uma sociedade e cultura reconstruídas, que poderão enfrentar os desafios que se terão na Colômbia para alcançar a convivência pacífica. No desenvolvimento do documento, os aspectos relacionados à bioética estão sendo abordados com a formação de cidadãos capazes de viverem harmoniosamente entre si, apesar da diversidade de opinião, cultura, idéias políticas e crenças religiosas, colombianos responsáveis e comprometidos com A reconstrução do país e a busca de formas de cooperação social; Homens e mulheres que podem viver em equilíbrio com a natureza, reconhecendo que fazem parte do ecossistema e, portanto, mostram respeito pelo meio ambiente em que vivem. A ênfase é colocada na necessidade de implementar as declarações da Declaração Universal da Unesco sobre Bioética e Direitos Humanos, bem como sobre os Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável, bem como propostas de importantes pensadores contemporâneos que fizeram grandes contribuições em busca da paz Mundo, como é o caso de Nelson Mandela entre outros.

Este artículo forma parte de una investigación sobre los cambios legislativos iniciados por la Ley 779 en Nicaragua, "Ley Integral contra la Violencia hacia las Mujeres", aprobada en febrero de 2012. Los textos primarios que analizo incluyen los debates parlamentarios para el anteproyecto de la Ley 779, el cuerpo original de la Ley 779, las Reformas de octubre de 2013, y el Reglamento a la Ley 779, emitido en un decreto presidencial en julio de 2014. Organizo el análisis alrededor de la figura jurídica más polémica de la Ley 779: la mediación. Al analizar la trayectoria de la Ley 779 dentro del escenario de posguerra en Nicaragua, concluyo que el restablecimiento de la mediación representa una reafirmación regresiva de la autoridad patriarcal bajo el disfraz de empoderamiento comunitario. La retórica centrada en la familia del Reglamento a la Ley 779 implica una capitulación a los sectores más conservadores y religiosos de la sociedad y un revés dramático de los logros feministas hacia el reconocimiento de las mujeres como sujetos de derechos. De hecho, estas son batallas sobre la interpretación cultural del lugar de la mujer, su autonomía y la realidad turbulenta de la familia nuclear y los lazos sociales normativos en la Centroamérica del siglo XXI. Muestran que la autonomía de las mujeres sigue siendo codificada simbólicamente como peligrosa, incluso como una amenaza a los intereses colectivos de la familia y la nación. (This article forms part of an inquiry about the reach of legislative changes initiated by Law 779 in Nicaragua, the "Integral Law against Violence towards Women", passed in February 2012. The primary texts I analyze include the legislative debates for the drafting of Law 779, the body of Law 779, the Reform to the law in October 2013, and the Regulations to Law 779, issued through a presidential proclamation in July 2014. I organize my discussion around the most controversial juridical figure in Law 779: that of mediation. Analyzing the trajectory of Law 779 within the Post-war cultural scene in Nicaragua, I conclude that the reinstatement of mediation represents a regressive reaffirmation of patriarchal authority in the guise of community empowerment. The family centered rhetoric of the Regulation to Law 779 signifies capitulation to the most conservative, religious sectors of society and a dramatic reversal of feminist gains towards recognizing women as subjects with rights. These are in fact battles over the cultural interpretation of women's place, their autonomy, and the troubled reality of the nuclear family and normative social bonds in twenty-first century Central America. They show that women's autonomy continues to be symbolically coded as dangerous, even as a threat to the collective interests of the family and the nation.)

La crítica ha valorado positivamente la novela de Daniel Caicedo en cuanto testimonio de los hechos atroces de la Violencia política de la mitad del siglo XX colombiano y denuncia de sus responsables, y la ha sancionado negativamente por su dimensión estética. Sin embargo, más que un registro burdo de esos hechos, Viento seco es un proyecto narrativo orientado por una visión políticoreligiosa de la Violencia. Este trabajo examina los mecanismos textuales esenciales en la definición de este programa ideológico literario y propone una lectura que devela la estrategia proselitista que define su programa narrativo. ; Literary critics have given positive evaluations of Daniel Caicedo's novel, specifically to its testimony of the atrocious actions of the political Violence in the middle of the 20th century in Colombia, as well as the denunciation of those responsible. It has, however, been evaluated negatively for its aesthetic dimension. Nonetheless, more than a rough register of those acts, Viento Seco is a narrative project guided by a political-religious view of the Violence. This work examines the essential textual mechanisms found in the definition of this ideological literary program and proposes a reading that reveals the proselytistic strategy that defines his narrative program.

This article analyzed the correlation between (a) Religion/Religiosity of 1,081 characters-victims and (b) Types, (c) Sub-types and (d) Nature of 1,081 acts of violence received by these characters; in 100 animated series, representing 33.22% of TV products and 54.34% of animated series, consumed by 2,088 schoolchildren in Mexico. The RESULTS reveal that: 84.08% are Victims-Without-Religion; 11.65% Victims-With-Religiosity-Animist/Pagan; and 1.85% Victims-With-Religion. Furthermore, the most violent interpersonal relationships for all religions/religiosities are the egalitarian ones at the community level; but the Victims-Without-Religion are the characters who receive the highest percentage of Interpersonal-Violence: 62.25% receive Interpersonal-Equallitaire Violence and 62.85% Interpersonal-Community Violence. These data are interpreted as symptoms of late modernity because they favor the breaking of modern political values with: (a) the social construction of negative stereotypes of the Modern-Social-Subject (Without-Religion/secular/laïc); and of the egalitarian political-social system/order; and with (b) the social construction of positive stereotypes of the hierarchical social system/order characteristic of pre-modern traditional religions/religious identities. ; Este artículo analizó la correlación entre (a) Religión/Religiosidad de 1,081 personajes-víctimas y (b) Tipos, (c) Subtipos y (d) Naturaleza de 1,081 acciones de violencia recibidas por estos personajes; en 100 series animadas, representativas del 33.22% de productos de TV y del 54.34% de series animadas, consumidas por 2,088 escolares en México. Los RESULTADOS rebelan que: 84.08% son Víctimas-Sin-Religión; 11.65% Víctimas-Con-Religiosidad-Animista/Pagana; y 1.85% Víctimas-Con-Religión. Además, las relaciones interpersonales más violentas para todas las religiones/religiosidades son las igualitarias del ámbito comunitario; pero son personajes Víctimas-Sin-Religión quienes reciben el mayor porcentaje de Violencia-Interpersonal: 62.25% recibe Violencia-Interpersonal-Igualitaria y 62.85% Violencia-Interpersonal-Comunitaria. Estos datos se interpretan como síntomas de tardomodernidad porque favorecen el quebrantamiento de valores políticos modernos con: (a) la construcción social de estereotipos negativos del Sujeto-Social-Moderno (Sin-Religión/laico/secular); y del sistema/orden político-social igualitario; y con (b) la construcción social de estereotipos positivos del sistema/orden social jerarquizado característico de religiones/identidades religiosas tradicionales pre-modernas.

AbstractCatholic-Nationalism is one of the defining, and also exclusive, characteristics of the Military Junta that ruled Argentina between 1976 and 1983. Such patriotic messianic ideology strongly influenced the armed forces' weltanschauung and justified, according to them, their actions. But this messianic ideology has its origins at the beginning of the 20th century and the coming of the first military regime in 1930. In order to properly describe the catholic-nationalist aspect of the Junta's dictatorship it is imperative to explore its origins; evaluate the Junta's discourse and its ideology in power; examine the role of the Argentinean Catholic Church and finally to see how the crusade transformed into actual divine violence among the repressive methods chosen by the military. Introduction Religious fundamentalism is maybe one of the last qualities that would characterize the military dictatorship that governed Argentina between 1976 and 1983. Nevertheless, it is the catholic-nationalist ideology that gave the Junta its most distinctive feature. The armed forces were convinced that they had the holy mission to fight a crusade against the enemies of the catholic foundations of the nation. Argentina, for them, was founded with "the sword and the cross" and together both of them protected the national identity from alien ideas. In the case of the military Junta, the foreign ideology that threatened the country's traditions was communism. The latter was particularly dangerous because it was an atheist creed. God was an integral part of the history of Argentina; attacking him meant attacking the foundations of the country: the Church and the military. To understand how the messianic trope played a pivotal role in the Junta's regime it is essential to: first, explore the historical origins of the catholic-nationalist ideology in Argentina and how they defined the nation and its internal enemies; second, to describe how the Junta incorporated that ideology into its politics and how it perceived that it was fighting a holy crusade against communism; third, to portray the legitimizing role of the Argentinean Catholic Church of the Junta and its repressive methods, particularly noting how the clerics identified themselves with the armed forces' holy mission and how they saw them as the natural protector of the national religion; and fourth, to depict how the repressive mechanisms chosen by the Junta to suppress foreign ideologies and reorganize society around Christian values contained certain elements an symbols that would categorize them as forms of divine violence. The OriginsThe idea of Argentina being governed by a political regime based on "the sword and the cross" was not created on March the 24th 1976. Catholic and authoritarian Argentina was conceived in the late 1920s early 1930s; although it could also be trailed into the 1890s (1). The catholic-nationalist movement that sprung between those years was the combination of two different political currents: the clerical and the nationalistic. The former was born from the catholic struggle against liberalism and laicism. The clericals were against several State policies, which they regarded as anti-Catholic, like the establishment of a public, mandatory and secular education and the creation of civil marriage among others. Juan Manuel Estrada was one of the intellectual architects behind clericalism and the figure that would lead a catholic insurrection against the liberal government of Juarez Celman in July 1890 (2). The clericals viewed liberalism and the secular State in Argentina as a negation of the natural- ergo, Christian -order and opposing to the historical messianic mission of the Republic that dated since colonial times. Interestingly, the catholic movement opposed the nationalist and fascist factions of the 1920s because both did not, yet, recognize Argentina's Christian identity.The nationalists, on the other hand, were a product of the backlash against immigration; particularly against non-white immigrants and Europeans of anarchist, socialist and communist ideologies. Massive immigration and its social repercussions was, according to the nationalists, threatening to radically change Argentina's national identity. The latter was defined, by the nationalist intellectual Ricardo Rojas, by taking into account Argentina's anti-European colonial legacy. Argentina was conceived as a Republic, but not as a democratic one. Democracy was an alien –European- element being introduced by immigrants, just like Judaism and Communism also were. The nationalists blamed the liberal governments for the open migratory policy that was undermining the traditions and identity of the country. If nationalists were anti-liberal, antidemocratic, anticommunist and anti-Semite they still did not recognize Catholicism as the pivotal ingredient of being Argentine. It took the work of an ex-anarchist and ex-socialist to make that fusion possible.Leopoldo Lugones was Argentina's main intellectual between the 1910s and the 1920s. He was also responsible of defining argentine nationalism in fascist, dictatorial, militarist, and finally, catholic terms. Lugones considered that the fatherland (la patria) had been created by the sword (la espada). The military were the true fathers of the nation. Therefore, he viewed the armed forces as a sacred cast superior to the people. The military was in charge of assuring the order of the Republic. Such order had been challenged by democracy and, consequently, socialism. Both ideologies were not part of the national tradition and their supporters were regarded as foreign internal enemies. The armed forces, then, had the sacred duty to violently reinstall the traditional republican order. This violence -the effective use of the sword– was not only legitimate and necessary, but more importantly, it was sacred (3). This sacrosanct mission to defend the fatherland was thought to be a continuation from the Spanish imperial rule. Accordingly, the Argentine military had also the holy mission to defend the foundational Christian identity of the nation. Violence was more than sacred; it was holy.The further development of Catholic-nationalism would have to wait until the end of the first military authoritarian regime. Uriburu's dictatorship inaugurated a long term period of modern military dictatorships, with more or less democratic regimes in-between, which would last until 1983. General Uriburu was a strong nationalist that sympathized with Lugones and that had participated in the Catholic insurrection of 1890 (4). He believed in Argentina's republican origins but he regarded democracy as an alien ideology that was undermining the foundations of the nation. Torture, political prisoners and executions were the rule during the two years dictatorship (1930-32). The picana was used for the first time in those years, but it did not have the same divine symbolism that would have in the last Argentinean military regime. Uriburu's despise for democracy prompted him to fundamentally restructure the State's institutions by trying to establish a pseudo-fascist corporative regime. This nationalist revolution did not succeed and Uriburu had to eventually let civic authorities take control of the government (5).Uriburu's dictatorship embodied the prototype of a nationalist authoritarian regime with close ties to the catholic tradition (6). Nationalist clerics, like Gustavo Franceshi and Julio Meinvielle, were the main thinkers behind the maturity of the catholic-nationalist ideology, during the 1930s, by describing the pivotal role that the Argentinean Catholic Church should have in legitimizing the armed forces' divine mission to protect the religious-national foundations of the country. The nationalist clerics saw themselves as God's political representatives and it was their mission to sanctify the crusade against the liberal, and democratic, regime. From then on, Argentina, for the catholic-nationalists, was conceived to be founded in the cross (the Catholic Church) and the sword (the Armed Forces).The nationalist movement of the 1930s in Argentina has to be regarded in a broad international context and cannot be detached from Europe's experience with fascism and other extreme nationalisms of the time (7). Argentine nationalists were deeply influenced by Italian fascism and would actually see themselves as fascists but with a religious twist. The political leader of the movement was not an earthly figure. It was Christ himself. Only he could have a truly totalitarianweltanschauung. The military and the clergy were his vicars in Argentina. The Nazis had their volksgemeinschaft; the Italian fascists their civiltá; and the argentine nationalist their cristiandad. According to each case, those were their respective nation's pillars. In the two first cases, the content is sacred, but pagan. In the last one, the content is holy and religious. Finally, the Spanish Civil War played a pivotal role in the Argentina nationalists' imaginarium. They witnessed how the most Catholic nation of all, the one that for centuries had defended the cross with the sword and that had even brought Christianity to Argentina's shores, was now battling an internal crusade against an atheist, and therefore foreign, ideology. The experience of the Spanish Republic and the subsequent Civil War would last in the Argentinean nationalist military's and clergy's memories.Even if the catholic-nationalist movement was popular, from the late 30s on, among the armed forces, the clergy and some middle class and elite sectors, it would not have the expected influence in the following military regimes from 1943 until 1966 included. Everything changed with the coup of 1976. (1) See Rock, David; La Argentina autoritaria. Los nacionalistas, su historia y su influencia en la vida pública; Ariel; Buenos Aires; 1993; pp. 45-71. (2) See Ibid; pp. 52(3) See Finchelstein, Federico; La Argentina fascista. Los orígenes ideológicos de la dictadura; Sudamericana; Buenos Aires; 2010; pp. 33; and Finchelstein, Federico; Transatlantic Fascism. Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy, 1919-1945; Duke University Press; 2010; pp.62-78.(4) See Rock, David; La Argentina autoritaria. Los nacionalistas, su historia y su influencia en la vida pública; Ariel; Buenos Aires; 1993; pp. 104.(5) Uriburu was not able to change the State's structure; however he sponsored the creation of fascist paramilitary groups like la Legión Cívica. See Finchelstein, Federico; La Argentina fascista. Los orígenes ideológicos de la dictadura; Sudamericana; Buenos Aires; 2010; pp. 41; Rock, David; La Argentina autoritaria. Los nacionalistas, su historia y su influencia en la vida pública; Ariel; Buenos Aires; 1993; pp. 109-115.(6) Uriburu's farewell speech clearly shows the catholic-nationalist ideology to which his regime belonged to. See Rock, David; La Argentina autoritaria. Los nacionalistas, su historia y su influencia en la vida pública; Ariel; Buenos Aires; 1993; pp. 109.(7) See Finchelstein, Federico; Transatlantic Fascism. Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy, 1919-1945; Duke University Press; 2010. *Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.E-mail: guere469@newschool.edu

Últimamente, la violencia contra los creyentes es muy alta y los casos cada vez más generalizados de intolerancia son el resultado de la inmadurez de la educación sobre los derechos civiles en la religión; este artículo utiliza una revisión de la literatura combinada con un análisis del concepto de "espacio público" de Habermas para hacer formulaciones sobre tolerancia, comunicación y apertura de la igualdad de derechos en los espacios públicos. Este estudio planta deliberadamente el valor de la democracia para hacer que la sociedad sea más democrática con una introducción intensa a cada elemento de la comunidad multirreligiosa a través de foros de discusión ciudadana. Los resultados, en el proceso de democracia deliberativa a través de la discusión del espacio público, puede establecer tolerancia entre las personas religiosas. ; Lately, violence against believers is very high. With regard to the increasingly widespread cases of intolerance which are a result of the immaturity of education regarding civil rights in religion, this article uses a literature review combined with an analysis of Habermas's concept of "public space" to make formulations for building tolerance, including communication and openness of equal rights in public spaces. This study focused on deliberately planting the value of democracy, with the aim of making society more democratic, intense introduction to each element of multi-religious community through citizen discussion forums. With the results, the process of deliberative democracy through discussion of public space is able to establish tolerance among religious people.

This text deals with new and uncomfortable aspects that stress processes of internal violence management and national reconstruction. Specifically, I analyze activities mobilized by religious agents who interpellate these efforts to show other figures of responsibility and suffering that are normally minimized by placing all eyes and devices on the essentialized victim-victimizer pair. I discuss this from examples from two different contexts: the South African post apartheid and the Basque peace process (Spain). The ethnographic material addresses the diverse effects and facets involved in the demands for "restitution" mobilized by the South African entity Restitution Center, which, without abandoning the category of reconciliation that dominated the TRC, aims to raise awareness among the white community about their debt, their responsibility during apartheid. The second is an ethnographic record of an event mobilized by the diocese of Bilbao (Basque Country) "Bake topaketa, Encounter for Peace", which aims to raise awareness among the population in general about cases of lesser-known victims, who in turn have relationship with ETA victimizers (ETA organization). It is interesting to think about the complexity of dimensions that encompass processes of internal violence, which as the years go by show new facets and new protagonists. The religious dimension here operates as a driving force for other movements, through religious activist specialists, with their specific rhetoric and resources. ; Este texto trata sobre aspectos nuevos e incómodos que tensionan procesos de gestión de violencias internas y reconstrucción nacional. En concreto, analizo actividades movilizadas por agentes religiosos que interpelan esas gestiones al mostrar otras figuras de responsabilidad y de sufrimiento que normalmente quedan minimizadas al colocarse todas las miradas y dispositivos en el esencializado par victima- victimario. Discuto esto a partir de ejemplos de dos contextos diferenciados: el post apartheid sudafricano y el proceso de paz vasco (España). El material etnográfico aborda los efectos y facetas diversas que conllevan las demandas por "restitución" movilizadas por la entidad sudafricana Restitution Centerque sin abandonar la categoría de reconciliación que dominó la CVR, tiene como objetivo concientizar a la comunidad blanca sobre su deuda, su responsabilidad durante el apartheid. El segundo es un registro etnográfico de un evento movilizado por la diócesis de Bilbao (País Vasco) "Bake topaketa, Encuentro por la paz", que aspira a sensibilizar a la población en general sobre casos de víctimas menos conocidas, que a su vez tienen relación con victimarios etarras (ETA organización). Interesa pensar la complejidad de dimensiones que engloban procesos de violencia interna, que según pasan los años van mostrando nuevas facetas y nuevos protagonistas. La dimensión religiosa aquí opera como agente impulsador de otros movimientos, a través de especialistas religiosos activistas, con sus retóricas y recursos específicos. ; Ce texte traite des aspects nouveaux et inconfortables qui mettent l'accent sur les processus de gestion de la violence interne et de reconstruction nationale. Plus précisément, j'analyse les activités mobilisées par des agents religieux qui interpellent leurs efforts pour montrer d'autres chiffres de responsabilité et de souffrance qui sont normalement minimisés en plaçant tous les yeux et les instruments sur le couple essentiel de victimes et d'agresseurs. Je discute de cela à partir d'exemples tirés de deux contextes différents: l'après-apartheid sud-africain et le processus de paix basque (Espagne). Le matériel ethnographique traite des divers effets et facettes impliqués dans les demandes de "restitution" mobilisées par l'entité sud-africaine Restitution Center, qui, sans abandonner la catégorie de la réconciliation qui a dominé la TRC, vise à sensibiliser la communauté blanche à leur dette, à leur responsabilité. pendant l'apartheid. Le second est un enregistrement ethnographique d'un événement organisé par le diocèse de Bilbao (Pays basque) "Bake topaketa, Rencontre pour la paix", qui vise à sensibiliser la population en général aux cas de victimes moins connues, qui ont relation avec les auteurs d'ETA (organisation ETA). Il est intéressant de penser à la complexité des dimensions qui englobent les processus de violence interne, qui, au fil des années, montrent de nouvelles facettes et de nouveaux protagonistes. La dimension religieuse agit ici comme une force motrice pour d'autres mouvements, par le biais de spécialistes activistes religieux, avec leur rhétorique et leurs ressources spécifiques. ; Este texto trata de aspectos novos e desconfortáveis que enfatizam processos de gestão da violência interna e reconstrução nacional. Especificamente, analiso mobilizado por agentes religiosos que questionam esses esforços, mostrando outras figuras de responsabilidade e de sofrimento que normalmente são minimizados para colocar todos os olhos e dispositivos no atividades vítima-agressor essencializada par. Discuto isso a partir de exemplos de dois contextos diferentes: o pós-apartheid da África do Sul e o processo de paz basco (Espanha). O material etnográfico aborda os efeitos e várias facetas que envolvem pedidos de "restituição" mobilizada pela entidade sul-Africana Restitution Center que, sem abandonar a categoria de reconciliação que dominava o CVR, visa sensibilizar a comunidade branca sobre sua dívida, a sua responsabilidade durante o apartheid. O segundo é xm registro etnográfico de um mobilizados pela Diocese de Bilbao (País Basco) "BAKE topaketa, Encontro para a Paz", que visa sensibilizar o público em geral sobre casos de evento vítimas menos conhecidas, que por sua vez têm relacionamento com os vitimadores do ETA (organização ETA). É interessante pensar na complexidade das dimensões que englobam processos de violência interna que, com o passar dos anos, mostram novas facetas e novos protagonistas. A dimensão religiosa aqui funciona como uma força motriz para outros movimentos, através de especialistas ativistas religiosos, com sua retórica e recursos específicos.

Abstract:On December 21 of 1965, the General Assembly of the United Nations sent out an alarm signal because of the constant manifestations of racial discrimination and because of the governmental policies based on racial superiority or hatred. Result of that assembly was an agreement which condemned all propaganda and all organisations based on the superiority of one race or groups of persons of a specific skin colour or ethnic origin. It declared as illegal all organised propaganda activities, and anyone that would promote the racial discrimination and incite to it. One year later, on December 16 of 1966, the same assembly announced another international agreement by which it prohibited any propaganda for war, any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that incites discrimination, hostility or violence. Both were widely accepted and internationally ratified. However, more than four decades later, we still stand between Zenith and Nadir.Also Switzerland was not immune to these manifestations of superiority and hatred. Its famous historical hospitality has been affected in recent years; on one hand, due to Swiss skepticism in accepting international law, and on the other, because of the rise of ultra conservative political parties, which, through their speeches and propaganda, have managed in numerous occasions, to incite against minorities by breaking the international law of human rights and the national law. Minorities, who they consider threatening to the Swiss cultural and historical values . ; Resumen:El 21 de diciembre de 1965, la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas emitía una señal de alarma ante las constantes manifestaciones de discriminación racial y por las políticas gubernamentales basadas en la superioridad y el odio racial. De aquella asamblea surgió un Convenio por el que se condenaba toda la propaganda y toda organización basada en la superioridad de una raza o grupo de personas de un determinado color u origen étnico; declarando ilegales las actividades organizadas de propaganda, y cualquiera que promoviese la discriminación racial e incitara a ella. Un año después, el 16 de diciembre de 1966, la misma asamblea anunciaba otro pacto internacional por el que se prohibía toda propaganda en favor de la guerra, toda apología del odio nacional, racial o religioso que incitara a la discriminación, la hostilidad o la violencia. Ambos fueron aceptados y ratificados ampliamente en el panorama internacional, sin embargo, pasadas más de cuatro décadas continuamos entre cenit y nadir.Desde entonces, el panorama helvético no ha sido ajeno a las manifestaciones de superioridad y odio. Su constatable histórica hospitalidad se ha visto doblegada en los últimos años; facilitada por un lado, por el escepticismo helvético en la aceptación del Derecho Internacional, y, por otro más influyente, ante la escalada de partidos políticos ultra conservadores, que a través de sus discursos y propaganda han logrado en numerosas ocasiones doblegar la voluntad del Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos y el propio nacional en contra de las minorías que consideran que desafían los valores histórico-culturales helvéticos.Abstract:On December 21 of 1965, the General Assembly of the United Nations sent out an alarm signal because of the constant manifestations of racial discrimination and because of the governmental policies based on racial superiority or hatred. Result of that assembly was an agreement which condemned all propaganda and all organisations based on the superiority of one race or groups of persons of a specific skin colour or ethnic origin. It declared as illegal all organised propaganda activities, and anyone that would promote the racial discrimination and incite to it. One year later, on December 16 of 1966, the same assembly announced another international agreement by which it prohibited any propaganda for war, any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that incites discrimination, hostility or violence. Both were widely accepted and internationally ratified. However, more than four decades later, we still stand between Zenith and Nadir.Also Switzerland was not immune to these manifestations of superiority and hatred. Its famous historical hospitality has been affected in recent years; on one hand, due to Swiss skepticism in accepting international law, and on the other, because of the rise of ultra conservative political parties, which, through their speeches and propaganda, have managed in numerous occasions, to incite against minorities by breaking the international law of human rights and the national law. Minorities, who they consider threatening to the Swiss cultural and historical values .

[ES] La evidencia empírica sobre la violencia en universidades se ha enfocado comúnmente en identificar conductas de agresión o acoso (bullying) entre estudiantes y en analizarlas en función del género y de variables psicosociales. Esta investigación correlación-mal-exploratoria aporta desde Colombia, una perspectiva novedosa al identificar actitudes frente a la violencia en contextos universitarios y las razones que dan los alumnos encuestados para justificarla por asuntos religiosos, académicos, económicos, políticos, étnicos y físicos o sexuales. Se aplicaron dos escalas confiables diligenciadas voluntariamente por 710 jóvenes universitarios colombianos con una edad promedio de 20 años. Los hallazgos indican que la justificación de la violencia en la universidad por razones físico-sexuales, económicas, religiosas, académicas e ideológicas está asociada significativamente con el género y con la actitud de las víctimas de buscar apoyo profesional y tolerar negativamente las conductas violentas sufridas por parte del agresor. Asimismo, los testigos que justificaban la violencia en la universidad tenían una mayor probabilidad de convertirse en cómplices del agresor. Estos resultados evidencian la necesidad de implementar estrategias educativas con un enfoque cognitivo que permita intervenir multidimensionalmente a víctimas, agresores y testigos para lograr resultados más eficaces a la hora de prevenir o reducir conductas violentas entre jóvenes universitarios. [EN] Empiric evidence of the violence in the universities has focused commonly in identify aggressive behaviors or bullying between students and analyze it depending on genre and psychosocial variables. This correlational-exploratory investigation delivers from Colom-bia, an innovative perspective identifying manners against violence in university environments and the reasons given by the surveyed students to justify it based on religious, academic, economic, political, ethnic and sexual-physical aspects. To accomplish this goal, they were conducted two reliable scales filled out voluntarily by 710 Colombian university students with an average age of 20 years old. Findings indicate that the excuse of violence in the universities for sexual-physical, economic, religious, academical and ideological reasons is significantly as-sociated with gender and aggressive behaviors suffered by the offender. Likewise, witnesses that justified the violence in the university had higher probability of becoming accomplices of the aggressor. These results reveal the need of implement educational strategies with a cogni-tive approach that allow to intervene multidimensionally in victims, aggressors and witnesses to achieve more effective results when it comes to prevent and decrease violent behaviors between young university students.

¨The actions taken by the Armed Forces are not a mere overthrow of a government but rather the final closing of a historical cycle and the opening of a new one in which respect for human rights is not only borne out by the rule of law and of international declarations, but is also the result of our profound and Christian belief in the preeminent dignity of man as a fundamental value.¨ (…) ¨It will be the objectives of the Armed Forces to restore the validity of the values of Christian morality, of national tradition and of the dignity to be an Argentinean; (…) a final solution to subversion in order to firmly found a reorganized Argentina on the values of Western and Christian civilization by eradicating, once and for all, the vices which afflict the nation. This immense task will require trust and sacrifice but has only one beneficiary the Argentinean people¨ (1). With these words the military junta addressed the Argentines after taking over the government through a coup d'état the 24th of March 1976. Already in this first official communication it is possible to find the strong messianic discourse where the armed forces were fulfilling their holy mission to protect the Christian-national identity of the country.For the first time in the history of Argentina catholic-nationalism, as a nationalist ideology, had an absolute control of the State and was backed by the entrepreneurship and by important sectors of the middle class.(2) The military junta, leaded by Jorge Rafael Videla, was the perfect embodiment of a permanent alliance between religion and fatherland. The armed forces were compelled, being the institution that gave birth to the nation, to fulfill a decisive role in the "holy mission" to morally regenerate the country. This would have allowed Argentina, and therefore all of the Western-Christian civilization, to not just vanquish communism but, also, all of its roots like liberalism, democracy and agnosticism. The military, alongside the Argentinean Catholic Church and its supporters, were convinced that the final battle of the "third world war" was taking place in Argentina. Generals Ramon Camps and Menéndez would even call the "Argentinean theater of operations" as third world war, where they thought the international subversive movements were playing a pivotal role (3). This extremely eschatological feeling was completely different from other similar Cold War scenarios in other developing countries. In Argentina the "final showdown against international communism" syndrome was exacerbated by this alliance between the sword and the cross that would fight communism in order to make a "healthy" society possible, which would lead the way to the regeneration of the "atheist infected" western world. This expectation was the pillar of messianic spirit that justified the extermination plan.But the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional (National Reorganization Process), as the military junta denominated the period that begun with the coup d'état, was more than an extermination plan; it aimed at a total "restoration" of society. The speech given by Lieutenant Jorge Eduardo Goleri at a book burning gathering in Córdoba in April 1976 clearly shows what the Junta was aiming for: "God's will requires that the military preserves the natural order manifest in the Western and Christian civilization to which Argentina is integral, but the East had organized a massive international conspiracy to subvert that civilization by restructuring society in accordance with the seditious and atheistic doctrine of communism. We are facing the imminent doom of our way of being Christian under the assault of subversion"(4).The Junta regarded itself as the creative agent of historical destiny(5). In their eschatological mindset they were analogous to the Messiah. They saw themselves as the mythological/biblical Hero that defended the most sacred/holy interests and appeared when a series of afflictions required his abilities of salvation. The Hero needed a nemesis in order to act and what better foe than international communism. But the latter was constructed in a Manichean, epical and apocalyptical manner. The myth of the Hero was opposite to the myth of a "Metaphysical Enemy". The former would engage in a Mythological/Holy War against an invisible but encompassing "Evil". Violent acts from left-wing guerrilla groups, which the Junta labeled as terrorism, perfectly ascribed that ontological description. Communism, with its terrorist offspring, was foreign, atheist and ideological. The military, then, had to combat it not just in the streets or countryside; but in the people's minds, and souls, as well. Guerrilla fighters were just the armed side; the roots of communism, meaning of terrorism and anti-Catholicism, were to be found in individuals that had ideas contrary to the Juntas' weltanschauung. They were ideas that opposed the catholic foundations of the nation and the society that it embodied.The Junta's adversary was an essentially ideological foe as General Videla stated to a British journalist: "A terrorist (read communist or atheist) is not just someone with a gun or a bomb, but also someone who spreads ideas which are contrary to Western and Christian civilization" and he continued, "…Subversion is all action that seeks the alteration or the destruction of the people's moral criteria and form of life, with the end of seizing power and imposing a new form based upon a different scale of values"(6). The guerrilla was not the most dangerous enemy; because in military terms it was already defeated before the Junta took power. The nemeses were communism, liberalism and democracy, ideologies that advocated an "Anti-Christian Revolution" that subverted the catholic foundations of the country(7). Accordingly, the subversive was guilty of the most serious crime against the Augustinian concept of "Common Good". In this latter sense, the battle against that invisible, but spiritual, Evil was a conflict inside each one of us. Like Massera said: "…the Third World War is not only fought in battlefields but, more importantly, in the believer's soul" (8). This Holy War mobilized the Junta as a "warrior-savior", as a modern crusader fighting for God and freedom from foreign atheist ideologies. This, in part, self-perceived holy mission strengthened the Junta's self-image as Christ's vicar, as crusading defender of Christianity and its Natural Order from the "pagan agents and antinational beings of the Antichrist"(9). Not surprisingly, the military profession was defined by Monsignor Bonamín as a profession of religiosity. Consequently, it is no wander that before the armed forces toppled Isabel Peron's government, they asked for the Catholic Church benediction the night before the coup(10). The Argentinean Catholic Church was as deeply as it could possibly be involved in this crusade. The Crusade's sanctification by the ChurchAfter Videla and Massera were blessed by the heads of the Argentinean Episcopate the night before the coup, Parana's Archbishop and military Bishop Adolfo Tortolo announced that the Catholic Church would positively cooperate with the new government (11). The Church was actively supporting and legitimizing the imminent armed forces' putsch. This probably did not surprise the future Junta's leaders. In December 1975, just three months before the coup d'état, Tortolo had called for the military to inaugurate a "purification process" and his subordinate Bonamín had stated, during the mass in front of future Junta leader General Viola, that Christ wanted the armed forces to be beyond their function in the future (12). The vicars of Christ on Earth were actually telling the military what were their Lord's orders. This symbiosis between the sword and the cross continued even after the first accusations of human rights violations against the Junta. On October 1976, Tortolo declared that he did not know of any evidence that proved that human rights were being violated or abused. In 1977 he went even further by affirming that the Church thought that the armed forces were acting accordingly to the special demands of the present juncture; meaning that the military was fulfilling its duty (13). The same with Bonamín's declarations regarding the role of the armed forces: "…it was written, it was in God's plan that Argentina did not have to lose its greatness and it was saved by its natural custodian: the army"; "…Providence has given the army the duty to govern, from the Presidency to the intervention in a trade union"; and finally "…the anti-guerrilla fight is a battle for the Republic of Argentina, for its integrity, but also for its altars (…) This fight is a fight in morality's defense, of men's dignity, ultimately a fight in God's defense (…) That is why I ask for the divine protection in this dirty war to which we are committed to." (14)The vast majority of the Argentinean Catholic Church favored and strongly supported the military junta's government and repression. Only four of the eighty-four clerical members of the Argentinean Episcopate publicly denounced the regime's repression (15). However, the Church was not just backing the Junta because it legitimized its sacred duty to defend the fatherland or because it identified itself in the Junta's messianic mission; but because Church also had to deal with its own internal enemies. The Argentinean Catholic Church was, perhaps, the most conservative Latin-American national Church. It was strongly in disagreement with the three most important progressive movements inside the Catholic Church: the Second Vatican Council, the Third World Priesthood Movement and the Latin-American Episcopal Council of Medellin. The Theological Liberation Movement that spread through Latin America during the 60s and 70s was extremely popular among young Argentineans. Several priests identified themselves with the Movement and tried to bring change to the Argentinean Church through their communal and pastoral actions among poor sectors. Additionally, several Montoneros' members were former catholic school's students that had radicalized, in part, because of their experience with the Theological Liberation Movement. The Catholic Church, then, supported, or did not protest too much against, the "internal cleansing" done by the military; like the killing of Father Mujica, Angelleli and four Palotines clerics among other cases (16).Lastly, the Catholic Church was involved in a much sinister way with the Junta's actions. The heads of the Argentinean Church knew about the repressive methods being used by the security and armed forces and chose not to condemn them. They considered them as necessary sacrifices for the Common Good. Nevertheless, several clerics went further by assisting and taking an active part in the implementation of torture and other repressive mechanisms used by the Junta. More than two hundred prelates participated in four different ways: offering confession/absolution to the victims before being executed or thrown into the sea; assisting the torturers by playing the "good cop" role; being themselves the torturers; and, by confessing and spiritually assisting the torturers and other victimizers (17). The priest Christian von Wernich is, maybe, one of the best examples of the fusion between the cross and the sword. Not only he assisted the torturers in their tasks, he even was involved in the kidnapping and torture of several desaparecidos and in the infiltration of exiled groups in New York (18). He, among others like Archbishop Plaza, Fathers Astigueta, Castillo and Perlanda López that also assisted torture sessions, justified the repressive methods, not considering them sins, by legitimizing their, and the military, behavior under the Augustinian and De Vitorian doctrines of "just war". The support of the Catholic Church for the fight against subversion and its blessing was a pivotal element in the implementation of the plan of extermination and its suppressive mechanisms. The repressive methods, chosen by the Junta, were not void themselves of a messianic and divine nature. Divine and Redemptory Violence The three main types of violent acts that reflected the Junta's Messianic crusade, which were an integral part of their repressive methods, were: torture, thevictim's throwing into the sea and the appropriation of the victims' children by families deemed proper by the military. These violent means, chosen by the perpetrators to perpetually annihilate the ideas that were subverting the Argentinean Catholic traditions, were constructed under the discourse of "love" in two different ways: firstly, the kind of love upheld by Thomas Aquinas where the authority could legitimately kill evil-doers when the formers were motivated by charity. The crusading Junta envisaged that the repressive methods it used had a transcendental value. That type of violence was constructive rather than destructive, insofar as it was able to eradicate evil in order to create good (19). Love was considered the reason for an act of violence, for a punishment that redeemed the sinner, disregarding whether the latter survived the penitence. General Ramón Camps, commenting of how the detention centers perfected the victims through torture, said: "It is love that prioritizes and legitimates the actions of soldiers. The use of force to put an end to violence does not imply hate since it is nothing other than the difficult search for the restoration of love. In the war we are fighting, love of social body that we want to protect is what comes first in all of our actions" (20). Massera and Videla also referred to the dictatorship's repression as an "act of love" or "work that began with love"(21). All these statements reflected how the just war's discourse of Christian charity was in their minds by giving love a pivotal place.Secondly, there was another, and more complex, kind of love in the Junta's Christian-inspired crusade, which contrasted with the former metaphysical type and appeared exclusively in the torture tables of the detention centers, and should be labeled as sexual love. The torture sessions were filled of sexual symbolisms and discourse. The eroticism present in the torments was the exteriorization of the torturer's sexual -religiously repressed- desires into the body -the sexual surrogate totem- of the tortured. Consequently, the act of torture symbolized the act of sex(22). Like Jacobo Timerman perfectly put it, the Junta's violence was the emotional and erotic expression of a militarized nation (23).An expression orchestrated by the use of the picana. The latter was the preferred torture instrument used by the torturers for many reasons. Historically, it was first used by the nationalists during Uriburu's dictatorship and it was extremely effective in administering the desired amount of pain. However, symbolically, thepicana represented, better than other torments, the rawest manifestation of the Junta's conception of power related to "love's twofold sense". Considering torture as a Christian act of love, the picana was the necessary instrument to get a confession from the torturer that would eventually get him redemption. But thepicana had to fill a "void space". According to the perpetrators the victims were atheists (then they were not Argentines), which meant that in order to get any kind of absolution they had to, somehow, recognize and accept the Word of Christ. The Word would fill the empty victims; but first the picana would have to fill them with the will to "repent" and "convert". Once the tortured had received several electric shocks, they would receive and recite the Word by being ordered by the torturers to deliver Catholic prayers (24). Through these confessions the Junta's self perceived role of being the vicars of Christ on Earth was realized every time. They had defeated the atheist enemy but, employing Christian charity, they also had won the battle for the subversives' souls. Redemption was offered to anyone, even the irrecoverable cases. Even if their bodies were deprived of life their souls were saved. One of the ways that the ones not redeemed during confession were granted spiritual salvation was by the purifying power of water. By throwing them into the sea alive they were bestowing them a new, or first, "baptism" (25). It was the perpetrators' holy mission to redeem the victims' souls in life or in death. The picana, when considering torture as a sexual act, was also a phallic symbol. The torturer would make use of the picana-phallus to inflict pain and, at the same time, through the victim's screams and spasms satisfy his own repressed sexual desires. The perpetrator would systematically use the picana-phallus in the erogenous parts of the body. The body of the tortured would then transform into the sexual object of the repressor's desires. A sinful object that had to be purified with repent or conversion but only after the torturer's sexual desire had been satisfied (26). Symbols of divine violence can be found in other examples of torture sessions during the Junta's dictatorship. The torturers would yell at the captives, and would also made them say, "Viva Cristo Rey" and would make them thank God for another day by make them recite prayers before sleep. The picana was sometimes referred as "giving holy communion" as well as water-boarding was named "baptism". Among the many names that the torture chambers were given by the perpetrators there were: "the confessionary" and "the altar" (27). The latter clearly reflects the idea of sacrifice embedded in the repressors' minds. Regarding the victims' religious creeds the torturers would make a distinction between the recoverable and irrecoverable cases. Among the former ones there would be victims that had a catholic background because they had gone to catholic schools or because they knew how to recite prayers (28). Nevertheless, being catholic was not synonym of survival. The irrecoverable Catholics would only have their souls saved, but not their lives. Amid the desaparecidos there were an important proportion of Jews. About 1% of the Argentine population was of Jewish origin, but 20% of desaparecidos shared the same religious background (29). The Junta believed in an international communist conspiracy that, like the Nazis before, was leaded by the Jewry. Being Jewish meant being a Bolshevik. Additionally, the Junta's Messianic trope further propelled the kidnapping and execution of the community that, according to them, was responsible for Christ's crucifixion (30). Lastly, the appropriation of the desaparecidos children by the military was, perhaps, the most sinister of the Messianic-inspired repressive acts done by the military., The kidnapped pregnant women that gave birth in captivity, after being tortured regardless of their condition, were deprived of their children. The newborns were appropriated by families that would rise according to Catholic tradition. Motivated by Christian charity and its doctrine, these children would avoid the atheism, Judaism or wrongly conceived Catholicism that their parents would have offered them. These newborns were, according to the Junta, truly "innocent" and deserved to have the chance to live a proper life in genuine catholic families. Concluding RemarksThe Messianic ideology during the dictatorship was present not only in the Junta's ideology, but also in its discourse and repressive methods. Even if not everything that happened during the military regime can be explained through the catholic-nationalist ideology, the latter provides the essential motivation for the government. It is difficult to imagine that the magnitude, and chosen methods, of the repression would have been the same without the Messianic trope. By comparing the level of Argentinean repression to other military regimes of the Southern Cone in the same period, the distinction is remarkable. Not only the repressive mechanisms used by the Argentinean dictatorship were distinct, and more sadist and cruel, than the Chilean, Uruguayan and Brazilian cases, but the amount of Argentina's desaparecidos dwarfs those cases.Additionally, the Argentinean Catholic Church was the only one to completely back the regime and its repressive methods. In Chile, for example, the heads of the Church were divided in supporting Pinochet. Ultimately, the majority of the Church would condemn the Chilean regime. Regarding the political leadership, there are no religious discourses that serve as justification for the regimes in the other Southern Cone's dictatorships. The military juntas of those countries never legitimized their governments or their respective coup d'états in God's will or the salvation of Christian-Western civilization. National security and the fear of communism were their justification. Even if the regimes were ideologically justified, these were never of a religious nature like in the Argentinean case. It is probably the catholic-nationalist ideology, matured in the 30s, augmented by the international communist conspiracy typical of the Cold War that prompted the Junta in Argentina to completely wipeout what they perceived as atheist and foreign elements in society. Without a Messianic military that was ready to fight a crusade in order to restore order to the nation and without the blessing and active support from the Church, the repression would not have had the size and the horror that it had. The armed forces were fighting what they thought was the last crusade of the 20th century against the atheist forces of communism. The "Third World War" was already happening to them. Winning it was more than strategic, it was a holy mission. (1) Excerpts from a radio announcement made by the Junta after taking control of the State. Cited in Loveman, David and Davies, M. Thomas; The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America; University of Nebraska Press; Lincoln; 1978; pp. 177. (2) See Novaro, Marcos and Palermo, Vicente; La Dictadura Militar; Paidos; Buenos Aires; 2003. (3) See Clarin, June the 26th 1976. Cited in Novaro, Marcos and Palermo, Vicente; La Dictadura Militar; Paidos; Buenos Aires; 2003; pp. 93. (4) Cited in Frontalini, Daniel and Caiati, Maria C.; El mito de la guerra sucia; CELS; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp. 90. Note how the East is viewed as the geopolitical source of "evil" similar to the Nazis' fear of the East. (5) See Graziano, Frank; Divine Violence. Spectacle, Psychosexuality, & Radical Christianity in the Argentine "Dirty War"; Westview Press; Boulder; 1992; pp. 120.(6) See CONADEP; Nunca Más; Eudeba; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp. 342. (7) See Castro Castillo, Marcial; Fuerzas armadas: Ética y represión; Nuevo Orden; Buenos Aires; 1979; pp.120. (8) Massera, Emilio; El país que queremos; FEPA; Buenos Aires; 1981; pp. 44. This concept of an internal and spiritual struggle is common to all religious fanatic ideologies. For example the original significance of Jihad was that of the soul's struggle against temptation. The concept would later evolve to holy war. (9) As subversives were defined by Ramon Agosti. Cited in Verbitsky, Horacio; La última batalla de la tercera guerra mundial; Legasa; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp.16. (10) La Nación, March the 25th 1976; cited in Mignone, Emilio; Iglesia y Dictadura; Colihue; Buenos Aires; 1986; pp.25. (11) See Mignone, Emilio; Iglesia y Dictadura; Colihue; Buenos Aires; 1986; pp.25. Additionally, Tortolo was Videla's private confessor. (12) Ibid; pp. 25(13) Ibid; pp. 26-28. (14) Ibid; pp. 30-31. (15) See Novaro, Marcos and Palermo, Vicente; La Dictadura Militar; Paidos; Buenos Aires; 2003; pp. 99 (16) Ibid; pp. 97(17) See Mignone, Emilio; Iglesia y Dictadura; Colihue; Buenos Aires; 1986; and CONADEP;Nunca Más; Eudeba; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp. 342-360. (18) See Mignone, Emilio; Iglesia y Dictadura; Colihue; Buenos Aires; 1986pp.179-188. (19) Graziano, Frank; Divine Violence. Spectacle, Psychosexuality, & Radical Christianity in the Argentine "Dirty War"; Westview Press; Boulder; 1992; pp.152(20) See Camps, Ramón; Caso Timerman: punto final; Tribuna Abierta; Buenos Aires; 1982; pp. 21. (21) CONADEP; Nunca Más; Eudeba; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp. 348. Additionaly, it is interesting to notice how Carl Schimitt's political theology theory is translated into the Junta's discourse. In this sense, the Junta's actions would be a Schimittian case of politics not being able to be dettached from religion. This, in turn, would contradict several secularization theories. See, Schimitt, Carl, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignity, Chicago Univertisty Press, Chica, 2006.(22) Interestingly, Saint Augustine described copulation in such a dreadful way that it seemed like an act of torture. See Foucault, Michel; Historia de la Sexualidad: Vol. 1, La voluntada del saber; Siglo XXI; Buenos Aires; 2008; pp. 37. (23) See Timerman Jacobo; Preso sin nombre, celda sin número; De la Flor; Buenos Aires; 2002; pp. 17. (24) See CONADEP; Nunca Más; Eudeba; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp. 347-360; and Graziano, Frank; Divine Violence. Spectacle, Psychosexuality, & Radical Christianity in the Argentine "Dirty War"; Westview Press; Boulder; 1992; pp. 166. (25) It is rather interesting to note that throwing victims alive into the sea or rivers was a common killing method used by other strongly catholic Messianic inspired authoritarian regimes or groups. The falangistas would throw communists, anarchists and socialists (and whoever they thought was not catholic enough) to the rivers during the Spanish Civil War. The Algerian French and later the OAS would throw FLN suspects to the Mediterranean during the Algerian War of Independence. Even in Argentina, during the 1930s, the nationalists were talking about pushing the communists into the sea. A more detailed research should be conducted on this issue. Probably the Spanish Inquisition's torture methods, involving boiled water or a pool where the suspected heretics would drown, clearly influenced all of these cases into using natural sources of water to purify their sacred lands from the nonbelievers. (26) For more on torture as a sexual act and the picana as phallus see Graziano, Frank; Divine Violence. Spectacle, Psychosexuality, & Radical Christianity in the Argentine "Dirty War"; Westview Press; Boulder; 1992; pp. 158-190. (27) CONADEP; Nunca Más; Eudeba; Buenos Aires; 1984; pp. 26-50. (28) Many tortured victims remember how the torturers were clearly surprised to see the formers wearing crosses after making them take out their clothes. In some of these cases the torturers would say to the victims that their life would be saved because they were Christians but had lost their way and it would be the repressors' task to show them the right path. (29) See Novaro, Marcos and Palermo, Vicente; La Dictadura Militar; Paidos; Buenos Aires; 2003; pp. 115. (30) During the trial of torturer known as Jorge "El Tigre" Acosta a witness remembered him saying, after killing a captive while torturing him, that he was happy that he had died because he was going to be freed but he did not want a Jew to walk freely in Argentina; all Jews were guilty because they had killed Christ. See Diario Perfil; "Juicio al Tigre Acosta por el asesinato de Hugo Tarnopolsky"; May the 12th 2007. *Estudiante de Doctorado, New School for Social Research, New YorkMaestría en Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos AiresÁrea de Especialización: Procesos de formación del Estado moderno, sociología de la guerra, terrorismo, genocidio, conflictos étnicos, nacionalismos y minorías.E-mail: guere469@newschool.edu

Colombia made a transition from a rural society in the 1970s to becoming an urban society in the late 1990s. The increasing urbanization process led cities to grow into large population centers with no democratic organization. The lack of planning for urban growth, the absence of public utilities, limited employment opportunities, and the serious issue of chaotic migration from the rural areas to the cities turned the then-small capitals like Bogotá, Barranquilla, Medellín, and Cali into unarticulated megacities lacking planning and development, and into centers that demonstrated a major presence of structural violence. This also led to an expansion of social conflict and structural violence as the disorderly demographic growth continued to evolve. It gave rise to responses against structural violence ranging from the intensification of the armed guerrilla struggle to the dynamic of protests led by labor unions, farmers, and the social urban movement. Additionally, on an electoral political level, this led third-party forces to express themselves through civic and grassroots movements. The purpose of this work is to point out the typical dynamics of the 1970s and 1980s, when social and civic movements made a transition from protests to political campaign actions in some cases. ; Colombia transitó de una sociedad rural en los años setenta del siglo XX, a una sociedad urbana de finales del mismo siglo. El creciente proceso de urbanización produjo que el crecimiento de las ciudades se desarrollara con inmensos contenidos ausentes de democracia. La falta de planificación en el crecimiento urbanístico, la ausencia de servicios públicos, las ofertas laborales reducidas y, lo que es más grave, el desorden de migración campo-ciudad, convirtió las pequeñas capitales de la época como Bogotá, Barranquilla, Medellín y Cali, en megalópolis desarticuladas de desarrollo y planificación, y en centros demostrativos de una gran presencia de violencia estructural. Lo anterior implicó que el conflicto social también se fuera expandiendo como violencia estructural en la medida en que más se fue desarrollando el crecimiento demográfico desordenado. Ello generó respuestas contra la violencia estructural, desde la intensificación de la lucha armada guerrillera, hasta la dinámica de protesta de los movimientos sindicales, campesinos y del movimiento social urbano. Y a nivel político electoral que se expresaran fuerzas de tercería a partir del movimiento cívico y popular. El presente trabajo tiene como propósito señalar esas dinámicas propias de la década de los años 70 y 80 del siglo pasado, cuando el movimiento social y cívico hizo el tránsito de la protesta a la acción política electoral, en unos casos determinados. ; A Colômbia transitou de uma sociedade rural nos anos setenta do século XX para uma sociedade urbana no final do mesmo século. O processo de urbanização crescente teve como efeito que o crescimento das cidades desenvolveu-se com ausência de democracia em imensos conteúdos. A falta de planificação no crescimento urbanístico, a ausência de serviços públicos, as reduzidas ofertas laborais e, o que é mais grave, a migração desordenada do campo para a cidade converteram as pequenas capitais dessa época, como Bogotá, Barranquilla, Medellín e Cali, em megaló- polis desarticuladas em termos de desenvolvimento e planificação, e em centros demonstrativos de uma grande presença de violência estrutural. Isto implicou que o conflito social também foi se expandindo como violência estrutural, na medida em que o crescimento demográfico desordenado foi se desenvolvendo ainda mais. Isso gerou respostas contra a violência estrutural, desde a intensificação da luta armada guerrilheira até a dinâmica de protesto dos movimentos sindicais e campesinos e do movimento social urbano. E foi a nível político e eleitoral que as forças de mediação se expressaram, a partir do movimento cívico e popular. O presente trabalho tem como objetivo assinalar essas dinâmicas, próprias das décadas dos anos 70 e 80 do século passado, em que o movimento social e cívico fez a transição do protesto para a ação política eleitoral, em alguns casos determinados.