Suchergebnisse

A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THE RESEARCH ON RENT-SEEKING ADDRESSES THE ISSUE OF RENT DISSIPATION. EARLY STUDIES SIMPLY ASSUMED DISSIPATION WOULD BE COMPLETE AND FISHER OBSERVED THE QUESTION OF DISSIPATION CAN BE ANSWERED ONLY FOR OVERTLY SPEICIFIED GAME STRUCTURES. A RENT-SEEKING GAME HAS BEEN INTRODUCED WHICH YIELDED INCOMPLETE DISSIPATION UNDER A WIDE VARIETY OF COST CONDITIONS. SEVERAL AUTHORS HAVE CONSIDERED NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR EXCESS DISSIPATION. WENDERS ADDRESSED THE SOCIAL COSTS OF RENT-SEEKING TO OBTAIN A MONOPOLY AND CONCLUDES THAT RECURRING OR SUNK EVEN THE LARGEST SPECIFICATION OF COSTS OF REGULATION MAY BE FAR SHORT OF THE ACTUAL WELFARE COSTS. THIS PAPER MORE FULLY DEVELOPS SOME OF THESE TOPICS AND PRESENTS CONCLUSIONS THAT HAVE NOT APPEARED IN THE LITERATURE.

Financial abuse of power and making decisions that would guarantee the achievement of personal goals have attracted the attention of many Iranian intellectuals in recent years. Evidently, these problems indicate a kind of corruption which is in turn caused by discrimination. A clear example of discrimination in the economic literature is rent seeking; a sinister phenomenon through which windfall wealth is gained. Nowadays, in Iran, the negative meaning of rent usually comes to mind. Unfortunately, it must be stated that political, administrative and financial corruption as well as different types of rent seeking especially economic and political rent have turned into one of the most important problems in the society. Presence of entire governments and politics of rentierism ihas intensifiednsified those problems. Rent seeking, weakens the motivation to work and be productive and causes productive powers to go astray and do wrong. In a society of rent-seekers, sources of wealth, education and power become exclusive and discrimination and corruption, bribery, and consideration of family relationships rather than the rules, unlawful appointments and dismissals, etc. spread all over the society.