Suchergebnisse

Abstract The paper examines the perceptions that representatives and would–be representatives have of their roles as MEPs, what accounts for those differences and what impact they have on MEP behaviour. Three dimensions of role differences were identified. Two of them, AGENT and TRUSTEE can be found in most assemblies but a third, a federal/confederal distinction, is perhaps peculiar to the EU. Individual attitudes to Europe explained this one quite well, nationality explained differences on the AGENT dimension and left–right position provided some explanation for differences on the TRUSTEE role. The combination of role perceptions appear to have some impact on MEPs' activities.

The paper examines the perceptions that representatives and would-be representatives have of their roles as MEPs, what accounts for those differences and what impact they have on MEP behaviour. Three dimensions of role differences were identified. Two of them, AGENT and TRUSTEE can be found in most assemblies but a third, a federal/confederal distinction, is perhaps peculiar to the EU. Individual attitudes to Europe explained this one quite well, nationality explained differences on the AGENT dimension and left-right position provided some explanation for differences on the TRUSTEE role. The combination of role perceptions appear to have some impact on MEPs' activities. (European Journal of Political Research/ FUB)

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Boxes -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1 Non-Representational Theories and Geography -- 2 Non-Representational Theories and Practice -- 3 Non-Representational Theories and Affect -- 4 Non-Representational Theories and Materiality -- 5 Non-Representational Theories and Landscape -- 6 Non-Representational Theories and Performance -- 7 Non-Representational Theories and Method -- Concluding -- References -- Index.

AbstractIt is often presumed by those who use propositions in their theories that propositions are representational; that is, that propositions represent the world as being some way. This paper makes two claims against this presumption. First, it argues that it does not follow from the fact that propositions play the theoretical roles usually attributed to them that they are representational. This conclusion is reached by rebutting three arguments that can be made in support of the claim that propositions are representational. This paper then advances the further claim that propositions are not representational. It considers several ways to overcome the difficulties traditionally associated with this claim, particularly how to account for falsity.

The purpose of this article is to evaluate and advance tools that marketing and consumer researchers have recently gathered from assemblage and actor–network theories. By distinguishing between two different styles of applying these theories we explain that a 'representational', interventionist and problem-solving mode has come to dominate existing uses of assemblage and actor-network theories in our field. We explain that current applications can be supplemented by a non-representational mode of theorising that draws on work pioneered by Nigel Thrift. Specifically, we explain that non-representational marketing theory can expand our ontological sensitivities through improved attention to the minutiae and hitherto unrepresented constituents of life. Towards this end, we offer methodological suggestions to extend attention to flows of everyday marketplace activity, precognitive forms of networked agency, as well as affect and atmosphere in consumption spaces.

Abstract
The standard opinion is that the force of the constitution hinges on the fact that it is willingly endorsed by the people or, at least representative of the people. This Article challenges this view. More specifically, I differentiate between two types of legitimation: representational legitimation and non-representational or reason-based legitimation. While representational legitimation rests on the fact that the constitution is representative of who the people are or what they want, reason-based constitutions are based on the judgement that the constitution is just or, at least grounded in reason. I also show that some of the puzzles in constitutional theory can be resolved by acknowledging the significance of the latter type of legitimation. For instance, I illustrate that constitutions that were not adopted freely by the nations and could not have been characterized as representative of the people such as the German Constitution can still be legitimate. To put it provocatively: the legitimation of a constitution need not rest on the conviction that it represents the people whom it governs; it may simply rest on the belief that it is a good or just constitution. Representational legitimacy is only one form of legitimacy but not the only one.

Formal approaches to the design of interactive systems rely on reasoning about properties of the system at a very high level of abstraction. Specifications to support such an approach typically provide little scope for reasoning about presentations and the representation of information in the presentation. In contrast, psychological theories such as distributed cognition place a strong emphasis on the role of representations, and their perception by the user, in the cognitive process. However, the post-hoc techniques for the observation and analysis of existing systems which have developed out of the theory do not help us in addressing such issues at the design stage. Mn this paper we show how a formalisation can be used to investigate the representational aspects of an interface. Our goal is to provide a framework to help identify and resolve potential problems with the representation of information, and to support understanding of representational issues in design. We present a model for linking properties at the abstract and perceptual levels, and illustrate its use in a case study of a ight deck instrument. There is a widespread consensus that proper tool support is a prerequisite for the adoption of formal techniques, but the use of such tools can have a profound effect on the process itself. In order to explore this issue, we apply a higher-order logic theorem prover to the analysis. ; Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia - PRAXIS XXI/BD/9562/96; European Union TMR Programme - TACIT network, contract ERB FMRX CT97 ...