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Resentment has been and continues to be a component of numerous ideologies of our century, forming as much a part of the right wing (nationalism, antisemitism) as the left, as it finds its way into various expressions drawn from both socialism and feminism. Resentment relies on basic fallacies: That any superiority that is acquired in the empirical world, in the world such as we know it, is in itself and without any further discussion, a sign of moral "baseness." That the values attached to it by the dominant ones are contemptible in themselves, that is to say as values - and not merely those uneven (tangible and symbolic) benefits that the dominant ones draw from such values. And that any subordinate or inferior situation grants one the status of a victim, that any failure to take advantage in this world can be metamorphosed and justified through grievances directed at the dominant and the privileged groups - thereby permitting a total denial of responsibility. Such an attitude involves an axiological reversal, an Umsturz der Werte, which Nietzsche and Max Scheler already described in divergent ways. It is sometimes difficult to immediately distinguish within different militant ideologies and fallacies of resentment on one hand and on the other the will for justice and emancipation behind which such fallacies hide or with which they are intertwined. This essay describes the idealtype of what I have called the thought of resentment which expresses itself through a specific rhetoric of argumentation (or rather a sophistics) and through a pathos of rancour and grievance. It seems that at the end of this century in industrialized societies - societies disintegrating into suspicious lobbies, obsessed by claims of their "identity," twisting the concept of Rights to suit the bickering market of "rights to difference," societies composed of groups or "tribes" fostering endless litigations based on insurmountable disagreements and a vindictive re-invention of the past - resentment is once again becoming an all-consuming attitude. This trend may be explained by the collapse of Socialism and the utopias of Progress among other determinants. This essay studies and illustrates briefly the axiology and the rhetoric of resentment. It retraces its relationship with the relativism that prevails today in philosophy and the social sciences. It sheds light on some of the mechanics of discussion which have allowed resentment to organize itself into an impregnable sophistics resisting compromise and pluralism. Such sophistics grant resentment the self-justified advantage of indefinitely putting rational debate at bay.

Building on an interview study from Sweden (n = 80), this article develops the concept of media resentment as a tool for understanding contemporary developments such as the diminished trust in news media and journalism. We view media resentment as a complex of feelings and ideas that are both individual and social, embodied, and ideal. Media resentment is defined as the feeling that the media – intentionally or unintentionally – are denying you or endangering what you have rightfully earned, whether by not giving it to you, by directly telling you to abstain from it or by intervening in social processes so that your enjoyment of what you have earned becomes impossible.

Discusses Arab public opinion on US and Western policies toward conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, in context of Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and war on terrorism.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century, Friedrich Nietzsche formulated, and Max Scheler further developed, the concept of ressentiment. Nietzsche linked this emotion with the rise of Christian morality, while Scheler linked it primarily with the formation of the bourgeois ethos in Western Europe. The present paper endeavors to show similarities and differences between the emotion thus designated and the more commonly recognized emotion of resentment. Moreover, conceptual analysis of these emotions necessarily leads to consideration of the social situations likely to give rise to each, as well as their likely outcomes. This latter discussion strongly suggests a needed modification of Nietzsche's and Scheler's conceptualization of ressentiment.

Despite the growing body of scholarship urging congressional scholars to consider the racialization of Congress, little attention has been given to understanding how racial resentment impacts legislative behavior. To fill this gap, we ask if and how racial resentment within a member's home district influences the positions she takes on racially tinged issues in her press releases. Due to constituent influence, we expect legislators from districts with high levels of racial resentment to issue racially tinged press releases. Through an automated content analysis of more than fifty four thousand press releases from almost four hundred U.S. House members in the 114th Congress (2015–2017), we show that Republicans from districts with high levels of racial resentment are more likely to issue press releases that attack President Barack Obama. In contrast, we find no evidence of racial resentment being positively associated with another prominent Democratic white elected official, Hillary Clinton. Our results suggest that one reason Congress may remain racially conservative even as representatives' cycle out of office may be attributed to the electoral process.

The aim of this paper is to show that Hume gives the passion of resentment a crucial role in explaining the origin of justice and society, and that this can be regarded as an important argument in favour of the recent attempts to include Hume in the canon of political realism. In the first part of the article, I shall mention some general realist theses that are supported by Humean philosophy. As Andrew Sabl has recently reminded us, these include the idea that the human passions and their capacity to be civilized are a central factor in explaining the transition from tribal communities to political society. Following Sabl's general approach, I shall show that Hume thought that resentment played a fundamental role in the passions involved in this process.