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Contents: Introduction; Part I Retributions: Varieties of retribution, John Cottingham; A taxonomy of retributivism, Leo Zaibert; Punishment, Alan Brudner; Retributivism, Thom Brooks. Part II Retribution and Desert: Marxism and retribution, Jeffrie G. Murphy; Does it matter if the death penalty is arbitrarily administered?, Stephen Nathanson; Three mistakes of retributivism, David Dolinko; Why punish the deserving?, Douglas N. Husak; Competing conceptions of modern desert: vengeful, deontological, and empirical, Paul H. Robinson; Retribution and capital punishment, Thom Brooks. Part III Proportionality: How to make the punishment fit the crime, Michael Davis; Justice, civilization and the death penalty: answering van den Haag, Jeffrey H. Reiman. Part IV Retributivist Emotions: The varieties of retributive experience, Christopher Bennett; The moral worth of retribution, Michael S. Moore. Part V Retribution and Mercy: Equity and mercy, Martha C. Nussbaum. Name index.

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Richard Nixon showed that there really are second (and third) acts in American life, but Congress didn't get the memo, and so Jean Montrevil may be denied his own American Dream. A Haitian citizen who came to the United States legally at age seventeen, Montrevil had a green card when he was arrested on drug charges in 1988 at age nineteen. He served eleven years of a thirty-three-year sentence and was released early for good behavior. But a law passed after he went to prison requires that non-citizens convicted of felonies be returned to their country of origin after completing their sentence. "Prison saved my life," says Montrevil, who believes he would have died in the drug trade had he not gone to jail.

Despite the prevailing sentiment in the USA, not every victim of murder claims revenge: some of the victims' families have learned that death row is no answer to their grief

AbstractThis paper addresses the relationship between amnesty granted to perpetrators of serious human rights abuses and retributivism. It rebuts arguments advanced by Dan Markel and Lucy Allais in support of their claim that the granting of conditional amnesty—amnesty in exchange for perpetrators' confessing to, and disclosing the details of, their wrongdoing—by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was consistent with retributivism. Markel contends that conditional amnesty was perfectly in line with recipients' desert, while Allais submits that the TRC secured as much retribution as was possible in the circumstances of South Africa's democratic transition. The argument of the paper is that while retributivists have good reasons to view conditional amnesty as justified, the reasons provided by Markel and Allais are not among them.

Revocation of community supervision is a defining feature of American criminal law. Nearly 4.5 million people in the United States are on parole, probation, or supervised release, and 1/3 eventually have their supervision revoked, sending 350,000 to prison each year. Academics, activists, and attorneys warn that "mass supervision" has become a powerful engine of mass incarceration. This is the first Article to study theories of punishment in revocation of community supervision, focusing on the federal system of supervised release. Federal courts apply a primarily retributive theory of revocation, aiming to sanction defendants for their "breach of trust." However, the structure, statute, and purpose of supervised release all reflect a utilitarian design justified solely by deterrence and incapacitation, not retribution. A utilitarian approach to revocation would not just be a theoretical change, but also would have a real-world impact by shortening prison terms, mitigating racial bias, and ending consecutive sentencing. While scholars view courts as the government branch most protective of criminal defendants, the judiciary has played a key role in expanding the state's power to punish through retributive revocation. Judges may feel a personal stake in sanctioning disrespect of their authority, yet they should revoke supervised release only to deter and incapacitate.

A philosophical discussion of the morality of punitive retribution. Marxist arguments show that soc conditions as they obtain in most societies make retributivism inapplicable within those societies. As K. Marx says, in those societies retributivism functions merely to provide a "transcendental sanction" for the status quo. As a consequence, modern societies largely lack the moral right to punish. The moral theory of I. Kant combined with a Marxist analysis of society is drawn upon to illustrate this lack of the state of the right to punish. Kant holds that guilt merits, & is a sufficient condition for, the infliction of punishment. The universal criticism of this position is rejected on the basis that if the law is to remain just, a guarantee is needed that those who disobey it will not gain an unfair advantage over those who do not obey it voluntarily. The writings of Willem Adriaan Bonger (1876-1940), a Dutch criminologist, are drawn upon, notably in AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINOLOGY (London, 1936) & RACE AND CRIME (New York, 1943). Bonger saw criminality arising out of 2 primary sources: (1) need & deprivation on the part of disadvantaged members of society; (2) motives of greed & selfishness that are generated & reinforced in competitive capitalistic societies. Other writings also support the theory that criminal behavior is almost entirely attributable to the combination of egoism & an environment in which opportunities are not equitably distributed. Some reflections on justice, benefits, & community further indicate that the moral right to punish presupposes a just society. Unless society is radically restructured toward that end, it does not have the right to punish. M. Maxfield.