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The Islamic revolution in Iran at the closing decades of the twentieth century was a shocking, unexpected phenomenon in the context of modern history. Its religious emblem, the presence of the Shiite clerics as it's mobilizing motor for mass demonstrations and, eventually, the bizarre composition of Islam and revolution—an amalgam of two conceptually alien elements, with unprecedented ideological claims— created a new peculiar model of state and statecraft. The substitution of a fundamentalist regime for a semisecular monarchy replaced the crown with the turban as the paramount symbol of the Iranian national sovereignty, under the fundamentalist formulation of the "governance of the canonist" (velayat-e faqih). This new state manifesting itself through specific signs, symbols, slogans, discourses, and behaviors, as well as by appropriation of modern means of ideological propaganda, the use of revolutionary violence, and organized terror, embodied in the very structure of a state, addressed itself to the world as a new militant ideological and political power aiming, once again, to change the world. How could this extremely unexpected event happen? Explanations are various and they focus either on the dictatorial manners and erroneous actions of the shah, alongside the role played by the Western powers, specifically the United States, or on the presence and the political role of Shiism and its clergy in Iranian history. However, a few fundamental questions remain unanswered. How could a radically traditionalist religious establishment, which was normally marked by modern revolutionaries as reactionary, merge with the most radical revolutionary groups and views? What are the universal results of such a "chemical" composition for both the otherworldly religionism and secular revolutionism? How do they essentially differ in action and discourse from what they had been previously? What were the innermost historical forces that made possible this seemingly impossible phenomenon?

They describe the role of Iranian civil society in the process of transition to democracy in Iran and offer insight about the enduring legacy of previous social and political movementsstarting with the Constitutional Revolution of . ; 1st (Edition) ; Published version

AbstractAt the height of the influence of the secularisation thesis religion was understood to be absent from affairs of state and the law, including international politics and international law. As the critique of secularisation gained momentum this master narrative fell apart, and a new consensus began to take shape. The notion that religion had been ignored and should be 'brought back in' to International Relations took centre stage among many academics and practitioners. The assumption is that restoring religion in the right way will help address the problems associated with having ignored religion in IR, paving the way for the marginalisation of violent religion and globalisation of religious freedom. This article undertakes a critical analysis of this restorative narrative and the religious and political world it is creating. It then proposes a different approach to the intersection of religion and world politics after secularism. This approach draws attention to the authority of transnational actors such as the United States, United Nations, and European Union to shape the public administration of religious affairs globally. Channels through which this is accomplished include the promotion of religious freedom, humanitarian intervention, foreign aid, nation building and democratisation, counterterrorism and peace-building efforts, and the pronouncements of supra-national courts.

Secularism, for many of us, is not a terra incognita, and yet it is certainly an improperly defined and unexplained concept. For more than 150 years, intellectuals, politicians, and theologians have used secular and secularism in a rather ambiguous way. These terms therefore need to be clarified. The time has come to rethink our whole approach to the question of secularism. Given the inapplicability of the French model of secularism to the Muslim world, it becomes necessary to find a criterion by which state involvement, when it occurs in the domain of religion, can appear to the members of a religious group as both legitimate and fair. The Indian concept of secularism based on the toleration and equal protection of all religious communities without being supportive of any particular religion can supply this criterion. That said, to pursue a secular politics of rejecting sectarianism and demanding toleration requires that strategic priorities be rearranged without making historical shortcuts. In this case, a secular politics of toleration is a twofold struggle, a resistance to uniformization and an invitation to democratization. If such a strategy is to find any role in the regulation of the lives and activities of Islamic societies today, an alternative concept of secularism, rather than simply an alternative to it, needs to be worked out. The challenge is not to abandon secularism but to formulate it as a philosophy with spiritual values, rather than solely a policy of the state. This is the only way of rethinking our whole approach to the future in Muslim societies to the extent that the pluralist model of a "shared home" can be presented as "a third way" solution to the crisis of political societies in the Middle East and in opposition to the secular authoritarianism of the state and the rise of religious fundamentalism in civil society.

This paper discusses the varied perceptions of secularism both in its general meaning and its specific implementation in Turkey -- the first Muslim country that has the principle of secularism in its constitution. Initially giving the various understandings of the concept of secularism in Western academia, this paper contrasts those views with the implementation of Turkish secularism -- laiklik -- specifically in the light of the 2008 case of closure against the conservative ruling party by the staunchly secularist Chief Prosecutor. A close reading of the indictment and the ruling party's defense will be done in order to highlight the differences between each part's perceptions of secularism. Adapted from the source document.

Pakistan was created in 1947 by leaders of the Muslim minority of the British Raj in order to give them a separate state. Islam was defined by its founder, Jinnah, in the frame of his "two-nation theory," as an identity marker (cultural and territorial). His ideology, therefore, contributed to an original form of secularization, a form that is not taken into account by Charles Taylor in his theory of secularization - that the present text intends to test and supplement. This trajectory of secularization went on a par with a certain form of secularism which, this time, complies with Taylor's definition. As a result, the first two Constitutions of Pakistan did not define Islam as an official religion and recognized important rights to the minorities. However, Jinnah's approach was not shared by the Ulema and the fundamentalist leaders, who were in favor of an islamization policy. The pressures they exerted on the political system made an impact in the 1970s, when Z.A. Bhutto was instrumentalizing Islam. Zia's islamization policy made an even bigger impact on the education system, the judicial system and the fiscal system, at the expense of the minority rights. But Zia pursued a strategy of statization of Islam that had been initiated by Jinnah and Ayub Khan on behalf of different ideologies, which is one more illustration of the existence of an additional form of secularization that has been neglected by Taylor.

Pakistan was created in 1947 by leaders of the Muslim minority of the British Raj in order to give them a separate state. Islam was defined by its founder, Jinnah, in the frame of his "two-nation theory," as an identity marker (cultural and territorial). His ideology, therefore, contributed to an original form of secularization, a form that is not taken into account by Charles Taylor in his theory of secularization - that the present text intends to test and supplement. This trajectory of secularization went on a par with a certain form of secularism which, this time, complies with Taylor's definition. As a result, the first two Constitutions of Pakistan did not define Islam as an official religion and recognized important rights to the minorities. However, Jinnah's approach was not shared by the Ulema and the fundamentalist leaders, who were in favor of an islamization policy. The pressures they exerted on the political system made an impact in the 1970s, when Z.A. Bhutto was instrumentalizing Islam. Zia's islamization policy made an even bigger impact on the education system, the judicial system and the fiscal system, at the expense of the minority rights. But Zia pursued a strategy of statization of Islam that had been initiated by Jinnah and Ayub Khan on behalf of different ideologies, which is one more illustration of the existence of an additional form of secularization that has been neglected by Taylor.

The paper reverse the famous question of Susan Möller Okin "Is multiculturalism bad for women" and asks the question of the supposed "natural alliance" between secularism and democracy. It takes as an illustration the relation between secularist movement and women's claims in the history of Belgium from the Belgian revolution until now. It presents a first, sketchy description of the alliance, trying to show that three periods can be distinguished : until the end of the schoolwar, the relations between the secularist movement and women's claim are rather weak and the secularists tend to distrust women, they consider as allied of the clerics; during the period of 1960-2000, the alliance is stonger over the claim of "self-disposal of one's body'" ; then, from 2000 until now, there is a strong division between both secularist and feminist movements, and so there are two alliances : radical secularism and mainstream feminist movement are allied against islam while, radical feminist and tolerant secularism are allied against neo-colonialist position. ; Peer reviewed