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As part of this book, which looks at relations between image and power, the real influential struggle that has taken place, around the cinema, the Church and the supporters of secularism in France, throughout the first half of the twentieth century, is particularly symptomatic of the media's recognised propaganda power, well before any totalitarian state took over it. But let's start with the actors involved in this influence struggle, and their relationship to the image at the time of the birth of the cinema at the end of the nineteenth century. First, the Catholic Church. The Catholic religion is characterised by an ambiguous relationship to the image, in opposition, for example, to Orthodox Christians. While Catholics fear divine representation, the image has always been used throughout history as a privileged educational vector. From the 19th century, the icon was thus used as a 'bible for illiteracy'. The technical advances that mark the history of the image have always been integrated into the range of teaching tools used in the work of catechsis: the magic lantern, the print shop and thus the filmmaker. Thus, as soon as it has been developed, the animated image is used for the teaching of catechism, with the full approval of the religious authorities 1: educational films are therefore produced, illustrating the bible episodes, in full continuity with the use of fixed screenings. The question is more challenging about the inclusion of projections in preaching, which some priests claim in order to attract faithful to the offices. Some Catholics approve and encourage them, such as George-Michel Coissac, who wrote in 1903, how many examples could we cite of priests who have, by this means alone, succeeded in making genuine spiritual resurrections in their parishes? 2. But many others are revolutionised by these methods and call for a decision by the ecclesiastical authorities in this area. This 1, however, does not rule out the possibility that the filmmaker, as a show, has been rejected by a number of ...

Defense republican, republican fight, republican front, republican meritocracy, equality republican, republican secularism, etc., expressions abound, especially during the electoral evenings, combining the adjective Republican to a noun. These expressions, familiar for many sound like recognition signals. They replay the rally reflexes of the divided dispersed forces against the supposed enemies of the Republic. Adapted from the source document.

Rawls distinction between "comprehensive" philosophical, moral and religious doctrines on the one hand, and "political" conceptions on the other hand, means that, in a secular State, citizens of faith are not allowed to use directly their religious arguments in the political sphere as this would threaten the equal dignity of their fellow citizens' conceptions of the Good. But what about a philosophical doctrine such as secularism or laicity? The logical consequence of Rawls's distinction is that every citizen, religious or secular, has to use public reasons in the political debate in application of his duty of civility. This raises the problematic issue of a liberal conception of secularism. In a Public Reason Revisited, Rawls paradoxically claims that the secular State cannot be defended on the basis of secularism. This essay proposes to explore this liberal alternative to secularism, concerned with the plurality and equal dignity of comprehensive reasonable doctrines. Adapted from the source document.

Contemporary discussions of secularism in India have been constrained by the tradition-modern (western) dichotomy. For some, secularism is originally a Christian doctrine adapted to modern western conditions, & means the strict separation of church & state. It is also predominantly a single-value doctrine, motivated either by liberty (as in the United states) or equality of citizenship (as in France) more suited to single-religion societies than to the socio-cultural context of India where it is more appropriate to rely on resources of multiple & indigenous religious traditions for the sake of quite different values of peace & toleration. Others argue that India has the civilizational resource from which to retrieve its own conception of secularism captured best by the phrase 'sarva dharma samb-hava' (equal respect for all religions). I argue instead that India has worked out a distinctive conception of the secular that was at once Indian & modern. This remains a practical conception rather than a coherent doctrine or theory, & can thus be called Indian secularism only by extension. This conception builds on traditional resources as well as on the legacy of the British colonial state but innovatively transforms them. Many distinctive features characterize it. First, it deals simultaneously with inter-religious & intra-religious domination. Second, it has an explicit multi-value character. Third, it rejects strict separation. Separation does not mean exclusion or strict neutrality but what I call principled distance. Fourth, it implies neither respectful indifference nor active hostility but respectful transformation of religion. In short, secularism inherits the tradition of religious reform that began in India both prior to the advent of colonial modernity & because of a critical engagement with it. Finally, Indian secularism is an ethically-sensitive practical settlement & less a scientific, rationalist doctrine worked out by ideologues & implemented by political agents. Adapted from the source document.

The Russian state is formally secular. Several elements, however, suggest that the principle of secularism has run out of steam in Russia. These include the absence of real debate concerning this particular question, growing state control over social forces, the increasing visibility of the Russian church in public spaces & the persecution to which many religious minorities are subjected. In addition to supporting this observation, which is based on a normative approach to secularism, a consideration of the social construction of relations between church & state allows one to assess the degree of secularization attained by Russia. This is the result of conflicts & compromises between social actors who identify with secular principles or who, conversely, condemn them in order to advance their own positions. In Russia, relations between politics & religion are defined according to the principle of "hierarchized pluralism" & are explained by the predominance of the collective over the individual in representations. As a central element of tradition, religion is a legitimizing factor of the social order. Representations of secularism, for their part, draw upon the Soviet heritage as well as liberal perceptions. Adapted from the source document.

Secular? Theocratic? The case of the Israeli state defies the usual categories & gives rise to much confusion; for this reason, it requires a nuanced approach. The secular cause is itself divided over the strategy to pursue. For moderates, the religious monopoly in the area of personal law must be broken by demanding, in particular, that civil marriage be made an option alongside religious marriage. For radicals, by contrast, arrangements of this type, however important they may otherwise be, only mask the intrinsic ambiguity that stems from the close ties between nation & religion (and not just between synagogue & state). After examining the political, cultural & demographic factors that have in recent decades given increased weight to religious forces in political & social life, one should take stock of the factors that provide a counterweight to religious expansion. These include the active intervention of the Supreme Court in religious affairs, the preponderance of a secular ethos shared by the economic, political & intellectual elites centered in Tel-Aviv & the presence of CIS immigrants -- a portion of whom are not Jewish according to religious criteria -- and immigrant workers who have long resided in Israel. Adapted from the source document.

Turkey is the only Muslim country in which laicism is enshrined in the constitution. State, politics & in Turkey are for the most part secularized. Moreover, Islam in Turkey has been politicized in two distinct ways: the state, in order to secularize the population, homogenize different ethnical & confessional groups & preserve the country's territorial integrity propagating a republican & ethno-nationalist state Islam; & by & social groups! so as to break the Kemalist monopoly on the interpretation of Islam & end restrictions on religious freedom. On the whole, the Kemalist interpretation of laicism is authoritarian & undemocratic. The extent to which it can serve as a model for other Muslim countries is therefore limited. Adapted from the source document.

International audience ; This essay analyzes recent transformations in French secularism, observed from the standpoint of the changes in the hierarchization of various secular norms. After reviewing the legal and historical context of French secularism and the interpretation of it as "ambiguous liberalism" (Jean-Pierre Machelon), the essay focuses on the special relationship that this secularism has to Islam. The second part of the essay concentrates on the period 2002-2012, focusing, in particular, on the policies of former Minister of the Interior and, later, President of the Republic Nicolas Sarkozy. Three stages in this transformation are reconstructed here: they lead from "New Secularism" through so-called "Positive Secularism" to "Falsified Secularism". ; Le présent article propose une analyse des transformations récentes de la laïcité française, observées à partir d'un changement dans la hiérarchisation des différentes normes laïques. Après un retour sur le dispositif juridique et historique de la laïcité et sur son interprétation comme « libéralisme ambigu » (Jean-Pierre Machelon), nous mettons en lumière le rapport particulier qu'elle entretient à l'islam. Une deuxième partie est consacrée à la période 2002-2012 et particulièrement à l'action politique de l'ancien Ministre de l'Intérieur puis Président de la République Nicolas Sarkozy. Nous reconstruisons trois étapes de transformation : de la « nouvelle laïcité » à la « laïcité falsifiée » en passant par la laïcité dite « positive ».

International audience ; This essay analyzes recent transformations in French secularism, observed from the standpoint of the changes in the hierarchization of various secular norms. After reviewing the legal and historical context of French secularism and the interpretation of it as "ambiguous liberalism" (Jean-Pierre Machelon), the essay focuses on the special relationship that this secularism has to Islam. The second part of the essay concentrates on the period 2002-2012, focusing, in particular, on the policies of former Minister of the Interior and, later, President of the Republic Nicolas Sarkozy. Three stages in this transformation are reconstructed here: they lead from "New Secularism" through so-called "Positive Secularism" to "Falsified Secularism". ; Le présent article propose une analyse des transformations récentes de la laïcité française, observées à partir d'un changement dans la hiérarchisation des différentes normes laïques. Après un retour sur le dispositif juridique et historique de la laïcité et sur son interprétation comme « libéralisme ambigu » (Jean-Pierre Machelon), nous mettons en lumière le rapport particulier qu'elle entretient à l'islam. Une deuxième partie est consacrée à la période 2002-2012 et particulièrement à l'action politique de l'ancien Ministre de l'Intérieur puis Président de la République Nicolas Sarkozy. Nous reconstruisons trois étapes de transformation : de la « nouvelle laïcité » à la « laïcité falsifiée » en passant par la laïcité dite « positive ».