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This article is intended to think together of secularism as a social principle (legal and political), as a historical principle (enshrined in history, but above all by making history or contributing to 'beating time'), as a mental principle (which can be used by the individual in the face of clerical institutions) and finally as a principle of freedom (understood as negatious). Trying to assume a dialectic psycho-political structure, the article tries to address the problem of the apparent ambivalence of secularism, oscillating between tolerance and anti-religion. It therefore considers secularism as a principle of breaking religious relationships of domination; the democratic nature of secularism; its functioning as an internal obligation of freedom, i.e. as a requirement of power over oneself; finally, the conditions for the metaphysical possibility of secularism: what must be the human subject for secularism to be possible? ; Cet article vise à penser ensemble la laïcité comme principe social (juridique et politique), comme principe historique (inscrit dans l'histoire certes mais surtout faisant histoire ou contribuant à « faire époque »), comme principe psychique (ferment de souveraineté utilisable par l'individu face aux institutions cléricales), enfin comme principe de liberté (comprise comme négativité). Essayant l'hypothèse d'une structure psycho-politique dialectique, l'article tente de régler le problème de l'apparente ambivalence de la laïcité, oscillant entre tolérance et anti-religion. Il examine donc la laïcité en tant que principe de rupture des rapports religieux de domination ; la nature démocratique de la laïcité ; son fonctionnement comme obligation intérieure de liberté, c'est-à-dire comme exigence d'un pouvoir sur soi-même ; enfin, les conditions de possibilité métaphysiques de la laïcité : que doit être le sujet humain pour que la laïcité soit possible ?

In this paper I analyze Cécile Laborde's conception of justificatory secularism. Laborde points out that in her formulation and defense of the conception of justificatory secularism, she follows Rawls' conception of political liberalism to a certain extent. For that reason, I first provide a sketch of Rawls' conception of political liberalism. Then I focus on justificatory secularism, trying to show to what extent it displays similarities with the conception of political liberalism, but also how it differs. I am interested in whether justificatory secularism represents a better alternative to the conception of political liberalism or whether these two conceptions should be considered complementary. ; U ovom radu analiziraćemo stanovište sekularizma opravdanja koje je nedavno formulisala Sesil Labord. Labord jasno ističe da prilikom formulisanja i odbrane koncepcije sekularizma opravdanja u određenoj meri sledi Rolsovo shvatanje političkog liberalizma. Zbog toga ćemo u ovom radu najpre ponuditi skicu Rolsove koncepcije političkog liberalizma. Potom ćemo analizirati stanovište sekularizma opravdanja i nastojaćemo pritom da ukažemo u kojoj meri ono ima sličnosti sa koncepcijom političkog liberalizma, ali i u kojoj meri se od nje razlikuje. Tako da će nas prvenstveno interesovati da li koncepcija sekularizma opravdanja predstavlja bolju alternativu u odnosu na koncepciju političkog liberalizma ili na te dve koncepcije treba gledati kao na komplementarne

This study demonstrates how profoundly Turkey's main social clevage –Islam versus Secularism – is produced and reproduced by political parties in their attempts to form coherent sociopolitical bloc as a basis of mass support. The main purpose is to challenge the paradigm which understands social cleavages to be part of a 'social structure' that exists prior to political articulations. According to this standard perspective, social cleavages create the demand for political parties.

International audience ; What should be the right place for religions in France ? Our debates are old and sharp. France has two legislations : a concordat (Napoléon) for two departments and the common rule (1905). The word "Laîcité" was not employed at the beginning, but appears progressively. Do Muslims living in France are changing the concept ? Do they imply a new manner of seeing things ? What are the results of the attacks of 2015 and 2016 on the opinion ? We analyse in this communication for the universities of Bucharest and Craiova articles published in the newspaper Le Monde. What is the reflection about the concept of "laïcité", what are the traditional arguments and the new ones ? ; La définition de la place des religions est une question récurrente en France. Les débats sont anciens, notamment depuis la période révolutionnaire. Ils ont abouti à un régime de concordat, puis à la loi de 1905 de séparation des Églises et de l'État. Le concept de laïcité est apparu au fil des arguments. La présence de l'islam sur le sol français pose-t-elle des problèmes spécifiques ? Les terroristes islamistes peuvent-ils avoir raison de notre manière de vivre ensemble ? Après un retour sur les débats qui ont accompagné la loi de 1905, nous analyserons ici les articles d'opinion parus dans le journal Le Monde après les attentats de 2015 et de 2016. Il s'agira de présenter les thématiques et les arguments développés, avec un triple souci : identifier ce que l'on pourrait nommer les thèmes et arguments qui concernent indistinctement toutes les religions, les thèmes spécifiquement liés à l'islam, et enfin les thèmes nouveaux qui émergent.

International audience ; What should be the right place for religions in France ? Our debates are old and sharp. France has two legislations : a concordat (Napoléon) for two departments and the common rule (1905). The word "Laîcité" was not employed at the beginning, but appears progressively. Do Muslims living in France are changing the concept ? Do they imply a new manner of seeing things ? What are the results of the attacks of 2015 and 2016 on the opinion ? We analyse in this communication for the universities of Bucharest and Craiova articles published in the newspaper Le Monde. What is the reflection about the concept of "laïcité", what are the traditional arguments and the new ones ? ; La définition de la place des religions est une question récurrente en France. Les débats sont anciens, notamment depuis la période révolutionnaire. Ils ont abouti à un régime de concordat, puis à la loi de 1905 de séparation des Églises et de l'État. Le concept de laïcité est apparu au fil des arguments. La présence de l'islam sur le sol français pose-t-elle des problèmes spécifiques ? Les terroristes islamistes peuvent-ils avoir raison de notre manière de vivre ensemble ? Après un retour sur les débats qui ont accompagné la loi de 1905, nous analyserons ici les articles d'opinion parus dans le journal Le Monde après les attentats de 2015 et de 2016. Il s'agira de présenter les thématiques et les arguments développés, avec un triple souci : identifier ce que l'on pourrait nommer les thèmes et arguments qui concernent indistinctement toutes les religions, les thèmes spécifiquement liés à l'islam, et enfin les thèmes nouveaux qui émergent.

La secularización es un proceso que refleja los profundos cambios que han sufrido las sociedades contemporáneas. La religión ha cedido su poder al Estado, a los medios masivos de comunicación e informáticos, a los grupos de poder económico y político. El esquema religioso de valores también ha sido vulnerado. Sin embargo, la necesidad de autonomía humana fincada en la secularización no es ajena a un anhelo de trascendencia que todo ser humano se formula en alguna etapa de su vida. Una mirada objetiva a la dinámica de la secularización permite entender que ella es posible porque forma parte del mismo designio de Dios. De este modo, la secularización es una necesidad de nuestro tiempo afín a la búsqueda de sentido y trascendencia ; Secularization is a process that reflects the deep changes that contemporary societies have suffered. Religion has ceded its power to the state, to mass and informatics media, and to groups of economic and political power. The religious schema of values has been harmed too. Nevertheless the need of human autonomy founded in the secularization is not strange to a desire of transcendence that every human being has formulated at one stage of his life. An objective look at the dynamics of the secularization allows us to understand that secularization is also part of Gods plan. In this sense, secularization is a need of our time adjacent to the searching of sense and transcendence.

The revival of the religion in the new context of a global world-society, which is as modern as religious, doesn´t happen only as a sociological result of the dismantling of the postcolonial world —which denies the secularist forecast of the religion decline and provides the pluralism phenomenon with an unthought-of ethical and political complexity and virtuality—, but as a result of the modern reason crisis too, that makes reason rationally unable to justify political life relying on a rationalist ethical monism. The rationalist last foundation crisis affects as much the fundamentalist religious claims —which pretend to interpret the so called «religion resurgence or religion revival» in a «postsecular society» in a rapidly triumphal way, as the secularist claims which pretend to deny the religion any ethical and political virtuality in the public sphere. The democratic turn, antiauthoritarian and antidogmatic, coherently demanded within the context of the modern reason crisis by three wellknown representatives of the postmetaphysical, hermeneutical and pragmatist philosophy, such as Vattimo, Habermas and Rorty, replaces the debate between secularism and religion on the basis of true questions with the other on the basis of solidarity questions. ; La presencia revitalizada de la religión en el contexto globalizado de una sociedad-mundo, tan moderna como religiosa, no acontece únicamente como resultado sociológico del desmantelamiento del mundo postcolonial —que desmiente de hecho el pronóstico secularista del ocaso de la religión y que dota al fénomeno del pluralismo de una complejidad y virtualidad ética/política impensadas—, sino también como resultado de la crisis de la razón moderna y sus postulados, que se revela incapaz de justificar desde el monismo ético racionalista la convivencia política. La crisis de fundamentación racional última afecta tanto a las pretensiones fundamentalistas de la religión —impidiendo una lectura precipitadamente triunfalista del llamado «retorno de la religión» en la «sociedad postsecular»— como a las pretensiones secularistas de negación de toda virtualidad ética y política de la religión en la esfera pública. El giro democrático, antiautoritario y antidogmático, postulado coherentemente en la crisis de la modernidad por tres representantes de la filosofía postmetafísica, hermenéutica y pragmatista, tales como Vattimo, Habermas y Rorty, sitúa el debate entre secularismo y religión en claves no de verdad, sino de solidaridad.

The classical liberal concern for freedom of religion today intersects with concerns of equality and respect for minorities, of what might be loosely termed 'multiculturalism'. When these minorities were primarily understood in terms of ethno-racial identities, multiculturalism and freedom of religion were seen at that time as quite separate policy and legal fields. As ethno-religious identities have become central to multiculturalism (and to rejections of multiculturalism), specifically in Western Europe in relation to its growing Muslim settlements, not only have the two fields intersected, new approaches to religion and equality have emerged. We consider the relationship between freedom of religion and ethno-religious equality, or alternatively, religion as faith or conscience and religion as group identity. We argue that the normative challenges raised by multicultural equality and integration cannot be met by individualist understandings of religion and freedom, by the idea of state neutrality, nor by laicist understandings of citizenship and equality. Hence, a re-thinking of the place of religion in public life and of religion as a public good and a re-configuring of political secularism in the context of religious diversity is necessary. We explore a number of pro-diversity approaches that suggest what a respectful and inclusive egalitarian governance of religious diversity might look like, and consider what might be usefully learnt from other countries, as Europe struggles with a deeper diversity than it has known for a long time. The moderate secularism that has historically evolved in Western Europe is potentially accommodative of religious diversity, just as it came to be of Christian churches, but it has to be 'multiculturalised'.

La laicidad representa un principio importante para la consolidación de un Estado de derecho y la ilustración de la ciudadanía. No obstante, a pesar y debido a su importancia, sufre constante ataques por parte de distintas fuerzas sociales y políticas. En este artículo, el autor identifica cuatro enemigos de la laicidad: el clericalismo, los fundamentalismos religiosos, el comunitarismo y el laicismo. El objetivo consiste no sólo en denunciar esos enemigos sino también en proporcionar argumentos contra sus ataques al principio de laicidad. ; Laicity (or secularism) embodies an important principle for the rule of law and the enlightenment of the citizenship. Nonetheless, and because of this relevance, different social and political forces constantly criticize it. In this article, the author identifies four enemies: clericalism, religious fundamentalisms, communitarianism, and laicism. The aim is not only to denounce those enemies but also to provide some arguments against their attacks to the principle of laicity. ; Este trabajo forma parte del proyecto "Professor Visitante do Exterior" (PVE) de la CAPES, en colaboración con la PUC-Rio (Pós-graduação em Direito / Núcleo de Direitos Humanos). Integra también el proyecto de investigación "Secularización, Laicidad y Libertad de Conciencia" -CSO2011-14850-E. El autor quiere agradecer el apoyo de la Fundación Gregorio Peces-Barba para el Estudio & Cooperación en Derechos Humanos.

Recently, Bangladesh celebrated its half-century of independence and victory, the Golden Jubilee, with great ceremony and circumstance. The birth centenary of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the architect of Bangladesh, was also celebrated with due dignity. On this crucial double occasion, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has administered oaths simultaneously all over the country (United News of Bangladesh, 2021). All of the nation's citizenry shared the vision of a new Bangladesh, a Bangladesh that is corruption-free, non-communal and democratic. In other words, a future Bangladesh built in the light of the principles and ideals of the Father of the Nation - towards his Sonar Bangla (Golden Bengal). […]

It is conventional to see individualisation or privatisation as one of the chief responses to religion in modernity. In this paper, I explore a different line of argument, the attempt to align religion with the cohesion of communities. I take my starting point in antiquity, specifically Varro's idea of political theology and its critique in Augustine's City of God. I then show how these ideas were picked up and transformed by various thinkers since the seventeenth century: Rousseau, de Maistre, Boland, Comte, and Durkheim. It becomes clear that both liberal and conservative thinkers during these centuries found the notion attractive that religion is needed as a bond holding societies together. This created a problematic relationship between religious and political dynamics.

The Iranian 2009 massive anti-regime protests in the wake of the contested presidential elections and the Arab Spring have taken the scholars of Middle Eastern Studies and the international community by surprise. It seems that, despite the very diverse outcomes of the uprisings in Iran and across the Arab world, Middle Eastern societies are in the very middle of what has been called an 'unfinished revolution' (Sakbani 2011). Despite the confusion that affected the academic community following the surprising events of the past few years, a great amount of studies have been produced in order to identify the roots and make sense of the uprisings. For the most part, however, explanations for the events refer to and are based on well-known theoretical debates and paradigms. In the case of the Arab world, the fall of long-standing authoritarian regimes has revived scholarly interest for the transition to democracy paradigm, whereas studies on the resilience of authoritarian regimes are now perceived as over-estimating authoritarian rulers' grip on society. In addition, the electoral success of Islamist parties has re-ignited scholarly enthusiasm for the rather trite debate on the compatibility between Islam and democracy. In the case of Iran, similar debates centred on democratization versus authoritarian persistence and on the relationship among Islam, democracy and modernity have been animating academic discussions for the last two decades. The 2009 crisis strengthened 2 scholars' perception of Iranian society as democratic, liberal, secular and in conflict with the authoritarian Islamic regime. Indeed, many social scientists of Iranian Studies support the idea that the explosion of political and social crisis in Iran, such as the 2009 uprising, demonstrates the existence of that liberal, secular and 'modern' civil society willing to shake a backward and authoritarian regime off. These four books elaborate on this interpretative line of inquiry, setting forth interesting arguments for an analysis of the current ...

When the "jurisdictions" of religion and science overlap, the conclusions they each reach sometimes conflict. For example, religiously conservative views towards sex or the formation of the universe may be undermined by the secular instruction students receive in public schools. With respect to normative matters, such as views towards sex, courts have resolved the conflicts by stating that public school teachers can neither directly contradict religious beliefs nor compel adherence to the secular view. However, with respect to empirical matters, such as how planets formed, courts have implicitly recognized—although never expressly stated—that a different standard must apply. So long as sufficient evidence exists to support an empirical claim, a public school may teach it. The fact that it directly contradicts a deeply held religious belief, as does evolution for example, is irrelevant. How far does this principle extend? If scientific evidence leads us to conclude that a particular aspect of God cannot be true, can this be taught in the public schools? In order to explore this issue, I first lay out a framework that isolates the tension that exists between religion and science and that introduces the concept of the memist God. Second, I examine the extent to which science has spoken to the question of God's existence and I determine that it has certainly addressed one particular aspect. Specifically, science has disconfirmed the claim that the theist God has the power to violate the laws of physics. Last, once the issues are properly identified and the framework set, I explore whether teaching the non-existence of the theist God would violatethe underlying values of the religion clauses. I conclude, first, that teaching that the theist God does not exist would not violate any of the underlying values and second, that the consequences of doing so are not as far-reaching as may be initially believed.

The multiple interpretations in international law of ICHL's neutrality vis-à-vis religion in the case of sites with multiple religious/historical layers and the concept of "specially affected" state are explored with the latest issue of the transformation of Hagia Sophia into a mosque in mind.

Religious fundamentalism has been found to predict endorsement of aggressive counterterrorism techniques, such as the use of severe interrogations and pre-emptive military attacks (e.g. Barnes, Brown & Osterman, 2012). The present study tested whether a perceived increase in secularism constitutes a psychological threat to American religious fundamentalists, and thus increases endorsement of such counterterrorism tactics. Replicating previous research, religious fundamentalism was found to positively predict endorsement of aggressive counterterrorism techniques, even when controlling for ideology and party identification. Contrary to hypothesis, the secularism prime had no effect. An unpredicted finding of this study was that religious fundamentalism only related to the counterterrorism attitudes of political experts, not political novices. This moderation via expertise suggests that, rather than having a direct psychological effect (such as out-group aggression), fundamentalism's relationship to such attitudes emerges through the application of political knowledge.