Suchergebnisse

I use a simple banking model to study the circumstances under which excessive and inefficient securitization may occur. I first stress that increasing securitization rates that reduce banks' incentives to screen borrowers and thus lead to more defaults need not be inefficient. This may be an efficient response to higher gains from trade between banks and fixed-income markets in the presence of bank moral hazard. I then argue that if reaping such higher gains from trade induces a reduction in the informational efficiency of the securitization market, then there is room for excessive securitization. The model points at increased transparency and informational efficiency of the securitization market as key improvements for the future of the banking system.

I use a simple banking model to study the circumstances under which excessive and inefficient securitization may occur. I first stress that increasing securitization rates that reduce banks' incentives to screen borrowers and thus lead to more defaults need not be inefficient. This may be an efficient response to higher gains from trade between banks and fixed-income markets in the presence of bank moral hazard. I then argue that if reaping such higher gains from trade induces a reduction in the informational efficiency of the securitization market, then there is room for excessive securitization. The model points at increased transparency and informational efficiency of the securitization market as key improvements for the future of the banking system.

This article confronts securitization theory with the war in Afghanistan and thus explores questions and dynamics of securitization in a specific communicative situation of military combat. The confrontation highlights not only less well researched questions of implementation, resistance, legitimacy and difficulties of establishing authority in securitizations, but it also inspires a conceptualization of counter-securitization within the theory. In Afghanistan sovereign power to control and realize a securitization at the implementation stage was significantly fragmented so that processes of securitization became more iterative and interactive, and acts of acceptance versus resistance with regard to securitizing moves were more complex than traditionally assumed by the theory. Reflecting on securitization theory, the article thus explores the case of Afghanistan through a conceptualization of its dynamics as a prolonged political game of moves and counter-moves marked by securitizing and counter-securitizing speech acts in which the communicative situation of war becomes visible as a process of strategic interactions in continuous sequences of action and reaction.

This book aims to explore if and how securitisation changed financial intermediation and lending behaviour by reviewing the pre- and post-financial crisis theoretical and empirical literature. The book's distinctive feature is bringing the growing post-crisis empirical evidence to the attention of a wider audience by critically appraising it against pre-crisis arguments. With its thought-provoking insights, this book is of particular interest for students, practitioners and academics.

This article proposes an anthropological extension of the so-called Copenhagen School theory of securitization in International Relations. In contrast to existing attempts to show how, suitably elaborated, this model can be 'applied' to various non-Western contexts, our anthropological strategy is to use the contingency of empirical materials (namely the Cuban Revolution and the political forms it instantiates) as a means for transforming the basic coordinates of the model itself. The argument involves two main steps. First we relativize the Copenhagen School model, showing the contingency of its premises. In its paradigmatic form, we argue, the model is liberal in that its abiding concern with states of emergency turns on an ontological distinction between political subjects (e.g. people) and political structures (e.g. state). By contrast, revolutionary politics in Cuba concertedly rescinds just this distinction, to bring about an alternative, non-liberal political ontology. We then go on to use the Cuban case to construct an alternative model of securitization, which we call revolutionary. On this model, the move of securitization pertains, not to a passage from ordinary politics into a realm of emergency, but to a deliberate ontological fusion of the two, such that rule and exception also become coterminous.

In this article, we examine statements by state officials and individuals from the military and the medical establishment regarding the provision of medical aid by Israel to casualties from the Syrian Civil War. We argue discussions of this project have been characterized by three different discourses, each dominant at different times, which we classify as military, medical, and political-security. We propose "unintended securitization" to describe how the project moved from the military into the medical-civilian and then into the political sphere, and came to be seen as advancing the security interests of the Israeli state. We argue the relationship between humanitarianism and securitization seen here challenges the view that humanitarian apparatuses are often subordinated to military rationales by showing how securitization here emerged from the demilitarization of what was initially a military project.