Suchergebnisse
Filter
5 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
South Africa and the SADC Stand-by Force
In: Mandrup , T 2009 , ' South Africa and the SADC Stand-by Force ' , Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies , bind 37 , nr. 2 , s. 1-24 .
The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.
BASE
Sikkerhedspolitik i Arktis og Nordatlanten
In: Studier i global politik og sikkerhed 15
Introduktion : Stormagtskonkurrencen i Arktis og Nordatlanten og dens implikationer -- Rusland i Arktis : Fra Arktis som ressourcebase til aikring af suverænitet -- Kina i Arktis : Stormagtsambitioner og indenrigspolitiske prioriteter -- USA i Arktis : Kampen om isbryderne og USA's arktiske sotrmagtsidentitet -- Vil stormagtskonkurrencen ændre Arktisk Råds betydning for USA? -- Danmark har gode muligheder for at mindske sotrmagtkonkurrencen i Arktis -- Grønlands betydning for Danmark og kernen i det dansk-grønlandske forhold -- Grønland som udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitisk aktør -- Grænser for færøsk paradiplomati? -- Dansk militær opbygning i Grønland og fastholdelse af arktisk lavspænding -- Kampen om flåden : kystvagt eller krig i farvandene omkring Grønland -- Flyvevåbnets opgaver og operative udfordringer ved indsættelse af luftmagt i Arktis -- Færøerne er en selvstændig overvejelse i forsvars- og sikkerhedspolitikken -- Konklusion : Nye perspektiver på stormagtskonkurrencen og dens implikationer.
En nordområdepolitikk om alt – eller ingenting?
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 78, Heft 4, S. 490-499
ISSN: 1891-1757
I denne studien ser vi nærmere på hva som har skjedd med det som en gang var et utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitisk fokus, rettet mot våre umiddelbare nærområder i nord. Vi spør: I hvilken grad er dagens nordområdepolitikk egnet til å ivareta aktuelle sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer i våre nordlige nærområder? Svaret denne gjennomgangen gir, er nedslående. Over flere år er norsk nordområdepolitikk blitt så utvannet og strukket at den i dag omhandler nær sagt alt. Dagens nordområdepolitikk er ispedd vel så mye regional- og næringspolitikk som utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk. Satsingen er i beste fall redusert til en slags samordningspolitikk, men uten entydige mål. Konfrontert med en rekke tunge sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer i nord kan norske myndigheter fort oppleve at en altomfattende strategi bare blir en distraksjon. For en nordområdemelding om alt er gjerne også en nordområdemelding om ingenting.
Abstract in EnglishA Norwegian High North Policy about Everything – or Nothing?This study examines what happened to Norway's nordområdepolitikk, or High North policy, erstwhile a targeted effort to address foreign and security policy challenges in Norway's immediate neighboring northern areas. It finds that the current High North policy, after rounds of extensive revision, has become less suited to cope with Norway's pressing security challenges in the said areas. Over the years, the Norwegian High North policy has become so diluted and all-including that it encompasses virtually anything and everything with a northern dimension, including regional development and industrial policies, to the neglect of foreign and security policy considerations. The High North initiatives have, at best, gradually transformed into a broad policy coordination effort, but without clear or prioritized policy objectives. Faced with a number of weighty security challenges in its immediate neighboring northern areas, Norway is currently guided by a policy that has metamorphosed into a distraction. A High North white paper about everything resembles a white paper about nothing.
Norges debatt om kinesiske investeringer: Fra velvillig til varsom
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 78, Heft 1, S. 79-92
ISSN: 1891-1757
Den norske debatten om kinesiske investeringer og sikkerhet har gjennomgått et betydelig taktskifte på få år. Fra en situasjon hvor det i liten grad var en debatt, og hvor kritiske røster i hovedsak angikk bekymringer om arbeidsmiljøutfordringer, har kinesisk næringsvirksomhet i Norge nå også blitt en del av den sikkerhetspolitiske debattsfæren. To særtrekk gjør det norske eksempelet til en spesielt interessant studie av de fellesnordiske spørsmålsstillingene diskutert i denne Fokusspalten. Norsk økonomi har tjent særegent godt på det kinesiske veksteventyret, men Norge har også stått i en særegent vanskelig politisk stilling overfor Kina gjennom det siste tiåret. Kontrasten mellom disse to faktorene har stått sentralt i norsk Kina-debatt. Ikke desto mindre har den norske offentlige debatten rundt kinesiske investeringer vært relativt positiv. Dette har blant annet vært drevet frem av gode erfaringer blant norske selskaper som har blitt kjøpt opp av kinesiske partnere. Den offentlige samtalen har dog i nyere tid begynt å relatere til spørsmålet gjennom en politisk og sikkerhetsmessig vinkling. Dette er et taktskifte som ikke skyldes hendelser knyttet til eksisterende kinesisk aktivitet i Norge, men heller en norsk gjenspeiling av bredere globale og regionale trender. Huaweis rolle i den kommende utbyggingen av 5G-nettverket har vært et spesielt viktig bindeledd til denne internasjonale opinionsdreiningen.
Abstract in English:Norway's Debate about Chinese Investments: From Benevolence to CautionThe debate in Norway regarding security concerns related to Chinese investments has seen a notable change in character over a short period of time. From a situation where there was little discernible debate at all, and where negative coverage of Chinese investment flows were mainly concerned with working environment issues, Chinese capital flows to Norway have now also become part of the debate on national security. Two particularities make the case of Norway especially interesting with regards to the broader Nordic debates over the issues discussed in this Fokus section. The Norwegian economy has been particularly well placed to benefit from the extraordinary Chinese economic growth, but Norway has also been in a particularly problematic political position towards China over the last decade. The contrast between these two factors has been a structuring trait of the Norwegian China debate. Nevertheless, the Norwegian public debate on China has been relatively positive over a long period of time. This has been given impetus by the positive experiences reported from the Norwegian enterprises that have been the target of Chinese acquisitions. However, lately, the public debate has increasingly come to regard the issue also through a political and security-related lens. This changing character is not due to specific events concerning Chinese activities in Norway, as much as being a reflection of broader regional and global trends. The question of Huawei's role in the coming construction of the 5G network has been a particularly important driver in this regard, as well as conductive link to the international change in opinion.