Suchergebnisse

This article explores whether the development of a common European asylum policy, & the construction of a directive on minimum standards for the granting of refugee status, is dominated by a security discourse. In such a security discourse, asylum is considered a cross-border threat to the realization of the internal market & the internal stability of Member States. While the social construction of asylum as a problem puts pressure on the traditional humanitarian framework on which international refugee protection is being based. The tension between these two approaches seems to result in a restrictive European common asylum policy, with a focus on control & prevention of migration into the EU. In this article, we analyse the tensions between the security & the humanitarian discourse in primary & secondary sources, using the model of Laclau & Mouffe. We conclude that while creating a common asylum policy, a securitization process is present. Tables. Adapted from the source document.

Between 1949 and 1962 the Netherlands renounced its sovereignty over most of its overseas territories. Nevertheless, during the entire period of the Cold War, the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) stood by its point of view that it had a global task to fulfil. This military-naval deployment, outside the NATO treaty area during and shortly after the Cold War in relation to the structural global ambitions of the Royal Netherlands Navy's leadership, is the central theme of this study. This theme is analysed on the basis of theories and an understanding of multinational fleet operations after 1945 and Dutch policy regarding naval operations outside the NATO treaty area, but above all through regional case studies (Korean War 1950-1955, operations around the Arabian peninsula 1984-2000, and in the Adriatic Sea and Montenegrin waters 1992-2001). These case studies were examined by addressing the following central questions: to what extent did these missions involve a traditional approach to Dutch foreign policy? To what extent did the Navy's leadership influence the political-strategic decision-making on these out-of-area operations? To what extent were Dutch tasks and operations different from those of coalition partners, specifically those of the British Royal Navy, which the Royal Netherlands Navy considered to be its 'sister navy'? To what extent did the existing national and international perceptions of the RNLN influence Dutch decision-making on these missions, and how much did the participation in multinational fleet operations subsequently contribute to the objectives the Dutch government had in mind? In all the three case studies, the national and international perception of the Netherlands as a maritime nation and the ability to deploy high-quality navy units were taken into account in the Dutch government's decision-making regarding the RNLN participation in multinational fleet operations. The missions always received international, and especially British and American, appreciation and respect. The fact that ...