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The Nordic countries have long been renowned for their contribution to international peace and security. This contribution – occasionally viewed by both Nordic and non-Nordic policy-makers and academics as a particular model for facilitating peace and development in international affairs – is based on a combination of active contributions to peaceful conflict resolution, a high level of development aid and a continuous commitment to strengthening international society. However, recently Scandinavians have been making headlines for reasons that seem to contrast with their well-established brand as humane internationalist peacemakers. This article identifies the characteristics of the Nordic model for international peace and security and discusses how and why it has changed.

This brief synthesises the IECEU project's most essential findings on the effectiveness of European Union (EU) missions in four Africa countries: Libya, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). It describes the main elements and impact of the EU missions in these countries, identifies key strategic and operational shortfalls and offers recommendations on how the EU can improve its effectiveness in future conflict prevention and crisis management missions. The EU missions investigated differ in scale, length, objective, budget, priority and context. However, the EU missions presented in this brief share the main characteristic that they have all been deployed under the union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)2 with the explicit intent of improving the overall security situation and addressing conflicts in Africa. This brief will start by providing a short overview of each case, describing the conflict(s), security situation, mission objectives and obstacles. In this way, it compares the overall effectiveness of EU operational conflict prevention across the four African countries and discusses what lessons can be learned from them. The brief does not include all factors needed to answer thisquestion, but highlights the IECEU project's most significant findings in these cases.

The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.

A Danish researcher tells about his experiences with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in the 1970's, 80's and 90's and how the institute has changed over the years. Earlier the institute was heavily focused on security policy research, but in the late 20th century this focus widened into other research areas. L. Pitkaniemi

In the coming decade, Denmark will initiate replacement of its current fleet of F-16 fighters. In the spring Of 2009, most indicators suggest that politicians will have a choice of one of three options: the American F-35 joint Strike Fighter (JSF) & F-18 Super Hornet, produced by Lockheed Martin & Boeing, respectively, & the Swedish Saab JAS 39 Gripen. Denmark is thus on the verge of taking the first step in a process broadly similar to the one preceding the purchase of the F-16 in 1975. Also back then there was a choice between three candidates: the American F-16, the Swedish Saab 37E Viggen & the European Dassault Mirage FiE (of French origin). The purpose of the present article is to analyze the foreign policy considerations preceding the purchase of the F-16 in 1975 & to discuss their relevance in regard to the present pending decision. Adapted from the source document.

Globale helsespørsmål har mange berøringspunkter med internasjonal fred og sikkerhet, men har blitt viet relativt lite oppmerksomhet i diskusjoner i FNs sikkerhetsråd. Denne artikkelen gir en oversikt over kunnskapsgrunnlaget for sammenhengen mellom helse og internasjonal fred og sikkerhet, og belyser fire hovedgrupper av årsakssammenhenger. For det første kan uhelse føre til væpnet konflikt. For det andre kan helsekriser bidra til å svekke beredskapen mot konflikt. For det tredje kan helseintervensjoner bidra til å stabilisere sårbare samfunn i kjølvannet av konflikt. For det fjerde gjør konflikt det vanskelig å løse helsekriser. Alle disse berører også direkte eller indirekte Norges fire hovedprioriteter som valgt medlem i FNs sikkerhetsråd for perioden 2021–2022. Gjennomgangen av disse fire årsakssammenhengene demonstrerer at globale helsespørsmål på flere områder er klart relevante for global sikkerhet.
Abstract in English:Global Health and Security – an Overview of Academic KnowledgeGlobal health issues are relevant to international peace and security in numerous ways but have so far received little attention in the United Nations Security Council. This article provides an overview of the status of academic knowledge about the ways that global health and international peace and security are connected, and it highlights four main causal relationships. First, societies with poor overall health conditions or with great health inequalities between different groups, are more prone to armed conflict. Second, health crises can weaken societies' resilience and capacity to deal with conflict. Third, health interventions may contribute to stabilize vulnerable post-conflict societies in the wake of conflict. And fourth, armed conflict makes it more difficult to solve health crises. All four aspects of the health and security nexus directly or indirectly touch on Norway's four main priorities as an elected member of the UN Security Council in 2021–2022. The presentation of the various causal relations demonstrates that global health issues are clearly relevant for global security.

Covid-19-pandemien har tydeliggjort hvordan grensekryssende helse-trusler har samfunnsmessige konsekvenser. Epidemier ute av kontroll og andre ikke-kontrollerte grensekryssende helsetrusler kan sees som trusler mot fred og sikkerhet. Slike helsekriser kan ha store negative konsekvenser på helse, sosiale forhold og økonomisk utvikling, og har derfor potensiale for å bli både lokale, regionale og globale sikkerhetskriser. Stor ulikhet i tilgang til virkemidler for å kunne håndtere en helsekrise – eksempelvis medisinske mottiltak som vaksiner, legemidler og diagnostikk – kan skape eller forverre ustabilitet og være en sikkerhetsutfordring i seg selv. Med fokus på erfaringer fra covid-19-pandemien vektlegger vi i denne artikkelen global helsesikkerhet som et globalt fellesgode. En økende interesse for grensekryssende helsetrusler i FNs sikkerhetsråd gir muligheter og handlingsrom, men utfordrer også hvordan helsetrusler tolkes og tilnærminger til den internasjonale responsen.
Abstract in English:Outbreaks with Cross-border Potential and the UN Security CouncilThe Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted how outbreaks with cross-border potential have broader macroeconomic consequences. Uncontrolled epidemics and other uncontrolled outbreaks with cross-border potential can be seen as threats to peace and security. Such health crises can have severe consequences for health, social conditions and economic development, and have the potential to impact local, regional and global security. Inequality in access to medical countermeasures, such as vaccines, medicines and diagnostics, can impact or exacerbate instability and be a security threat in itself. Using lessons learned from the covid-19 pandemic, this article emphasizes global health security as a global public good. Increasing interest in outbreaks with cross-border potential in the UN Security Council might open windows of opportunity, but also challenges how global health threats are understood and the international responses to such outbreaks.