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The Selectorate Theory and International Politics
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"The Selectorate Theory and International Politics" published on by Oxford University Press.
An Experimental Test of Selectorate Theory
In: International interactions: empirical and theoretical research in international relations, Band 40, Heft 4, S. 533-553
ISSN: 1547-7444
An Experimental Test of Selectorate Theory
In: International interactions: empirical and theoretical research in international relations, Band 40, Heft 4, S. 533-553
ISSN: 0305-0629
The NPC System and Its Evolution: From Nomenklatura to Selectorate
In: Issues & studies: a social science quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian affairs, Band 34, Heft 3, S. 1-22
ISSN: 1013-2511
The NPC system and its evolution: From nomenklatura to selectorate
In: Issues & studies: a social science quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian affairs, Band 34, Heft 3, S. 1-22
ISSN: 1013-2511
World Affairs Online
Coalition Formation and Selectorate Theory: An Experiment
In: Political science research and methods: PSRM, Band 5, Heft 2, S. 261-275
ISSN: 2049-8489
This paper uses a laboratory experiment to examine how different rules for re-selecting the leader of a group affects how that leader builds a winning coalition. Leaders play an inter-group game and then distribute winnings from that game within their group before standing for re-selection. The results of the experiment show that leaders of groups with large winning coalition systems rely heavily on distributing winnings through public goods, while leaders of groups with small winning coalition systems are more likely to target specific citizens with private goods. Furthermore, the experiment shows that supporters of small coalition leaders benefit from that support in future rounds by receiving more private goods than citizens that did not support the leader. Meanwhile, citizens that support a large coalition leader do not benefit from this support in future rounds. Therefore, small coalition leaders target individual citizens to maintain a coalition over time in a way not possible in a group with a large winning coalition. Finally, in the experiment, small coalition leaders increased their payoffs over time, suggesting that once power has been consolidated, small coalition leaders narrow their coalition.
Leopold II and the selectorate: an account in contrast to a racial explanation
In: Historical Social Research, Band 32, Heft 4, S. 203-221
'Von 1885 bis 1908 war Leopold II nicht nur König von Belgien, sondern auch der Eigentümer des Freien Staates Kongo. Seine Politik in beiden Ländern konnte jedoch verschiedener kaum sein: Während in Belgien die Lebensbedingungen der Menschen verbessert wurden, errichtete Leopold im Kongo eine brutale Tyrannenherrschaft. Der Artikel analysiert die fundamentalen Unterschiede im Regierungsstil mit Hilfe der 'selectorate theory', die die unterschiedlichen Politikergebnisse auf Varianzen der politischen Institutionen zurückführt. Dafür modelliert er regierende Politiker als nutzenmaximierende Akteure, was für den Regierenden zu allererst bedeutet, seine Macht zu erhalten. Im Rahmen von Belgiens Regierungssystem benötigte Leopold II eine breite Anhängerschaft um an der Macht zu bleiben. Im Gegensatz dazu war er im Kongo nur auf eine sehr kleine Gruppe von Unterstützern angewiesen. Um zu zeigen, dass die 'selectorate theory' einer ad hoc Erklärung von Leopolds unterschiedlichen Regierungsstilen z.B. durch Rassismus überlegen ist, wird die fortdauernde Relevanz politischer Institutionen anhand eines Vergleichs mit der Regierungszeit des Kongolosen Mobutu Sese Seko gezeigt.' (Autorenreferat)
Speechmaking and the Selectorate: Persuasion in Nonpreferential Electoral Systems
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 53, Heft 5, S. 667-699
ISSN: 1552-3829
This article examines the extent to which legislators use legislative debates to engage in localism activities to cater to the interests of their selectorate in nonpreferential electoral systems. We define localism activities as the delivery of tangible and intangible benefits to a geographically confined constituency that is instrumental to legislators' re-selection. Our primary argument is that legislators whose selectorate operates at the local level make more speeches with parochial references. Results show strong support for this assertion. Furthermore, we find that high district magnitude leads to higher levels of localism. We use a mixed-methods research design, combining an original data set of 60,000 debates in Portugal with qualitative evidence from elite interviews. We make a methodological innovation in the field of representation and legislative studies by using a Named Entity Recognition tool to analyze the debates.
Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 56, Heft 3, S. 363-388
ISSN: 1086-3338
The authors tested five novel hypotheses derived from the selectorate theory of war with data for up to about 140 states and spanning the years 1816–1993. The hypotheses point to subtle differences in selection effects across regime types that should operate during crises that fall short of war and also during wars. Leaders who rely on a large coalition (such as democrats) to remain in office are shown to be more selective than their small-coalition counterparts in their willingness to fight wars when the odds of victory are not overwhelming. They are also more selective than their small-coalition counterparts in their willingness to take part in disputes that fall short of war when the odds are not exceptionally favorable. However, they are less selective about this form of participation than they are about war. Small-coalition leaders show no such selectivity in their preparedness to engage in disputes short of war or in war as a function of their odds of victory. These results hold whether the odds of victory are assessed continuously or whether they are based on a specific threshold. The authors also find, in keeping with the selectorate theory, that if a war fails to resolve quickly, democrats try harder than autocrats to win. And when the war is over, democrats demobilize much more slowly than autocrats.
Leopold II and the Selectorate: An Account in Contrast to a Racial Explanation ; Leopold II. und die Selectorate-Theorie: Eine Untersuchung in Abgrenzung zu rassismusbasierten Erklärungsansätzen
Von 1885 bis 1908 war Leopold II nicht nur König von Belgien, sondern auch der Eigentümer des Freien Staates Kongo. Seine Politik in beiden Ländern konnte jedoch verschiedener kaum sein: Während in Belgien die Lebensbedingungen der Menschen verbessert wurden, errichtete Leopold im Kongo eine brutale Tyrannenherrschaft. Der Artikel analysiert die fundamentalen Unterschiede im Regierungsstil mit Hilfe der 'selectorate theory', die die unterschiedlichen Politikergebnisse auf Varianzen der politischen Institutionen zurückführt. Dafür modelliert er regierende Politiker als nutzenmaximierende Akteure, was für den Regierenden zu allererst bedeutet, seine Macht zu erhalten. Im Rahmen von Belgiens Regierungssystem benötigte Leopold II eine breite Anhängerschaft um an der Macht zu bleiben. Im Gegensatz dazu war er im Kongo nur auf eine sehr kleine Gruppe von Unterstützern angewiesen. Um zu zeigen, dass die 'selectorate theory' einer ad hoc Erklärung von Leopolds unterschiedlichen Regierungsstilen z.B. durch Rassismus überlegen ist, wird die fortdauernde Relevanz politischer Institutionen anhand eines Vergleichs mit der Regierungszeit des Kongolosen Mobutu Sese Seko gezeigt. ; From 1885 until 1908 Leopold II was not only the King of Belgium but also the personal owner of the Congo Free State. The policy outcomes during his reign turned out to be fundamentally different in the two countries: Whereas in Belgium he improved living conditions, in the Congo he established a brutal tyranny. This paper analyses the reasons for these different leadership styles of Leopold II by means of the 'selectorate theory'. The selectorate theory explains policy outcomes as a function of governance institutions. It assumes that the ruler maximizes his own utility which means first of all to sustain himself in power. Under Belgium's governmental institutions Leopold II required broad support from the general public but in the Congo he only needed a very small group of supporters. To reduce the possibility that Leopold's different leadership styles were caused mainly by racism his period is compared to the reign of the Congolese leader Mobutu Sese Seko.
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Survival and Accountability: An Analysis of the Empirical Support for "Selectorate Theory": Survival and Accountability
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 53, Heft 3, S. 695-714
ISSN: 1468-2478
Power Tool or Dull Blade? Selectorate Theory for Autocracies
In: Annual review of political science, Band 18, Heft 1, S. 367-385
ISSN: 1545-1577
This article assesses the utility of selectorate theory as a tool for understanding authoritarian politics. We start by discussing the intellectual history of the selectorate concept and its original usage in the authoritarian context. We then turn our focus to the selectorate theory as developed in The Logic of Political Survival (LPS) ( Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003 ), identifying three problematic aspects of the theory and its application to authoritarian politics. First, the utility of the theory's key concepts of the selectorate and winning coalition is questionable in authoritarian systems where formal institutions to structure political transitions are absent or inconsequential. Second, measurement of the sizes of the selectorate and winning coalition is flawed, calling into question the empirical findings in LPS, such as its central claims about the survival of rulers. Third, the assumptions in the LPS version of the theory are restrictive in ways that reduce the utility of the selectorate concept relative to earlier works. We conclude that selectorate theory is a blunt instrument for understanding authoritarian rule.
Testing novel implications from the selectorate theory of war
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 56, Heft 3, S. 363-388
ISSN: 0043-8871
The authors tested five novel hypotheses derived from the selectorate theory of war with data for up to about 140 states and spanning the years 1816 - 1993. The hypotheses point to subtle differences in selection effects across regime types that should operate during crises that fall short of war and also during wars. Leaders who rely on a large coalition (such as democrats) to remain in office are shown to be more selective than their small-coalition counterparts in their willingness to fight wars when the odds of victory are not overwhelming. They are also more selective than their small-coalition counterparts in their willingness to take part in disputes that fall short of war when the odds are not exceptionally favorable. However, they are less selective about this form of participation than they are about war. Small-coalition leaders show no such selectivity in their preparedness to engage in disputes short of war or in war as a function of their odds of victory. These results hold whether the odds of victory are assessed continuously or whether they are based on a specific threshold. The authors also find, in keeping with the selectorate theory, that if a war fails to resolve quickly, democrats try harder than autocrats to win. And when the war is over, democrats demobilize much more slowly than autocrats. (World Politics / SWP)
World Affairs Online
Who Leads the Party? On Membership Size, Selectorates and Party Oligarchy
In: Political studies: the journal of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom, Band 65, Heft 1_suppl, S. 162-181
ISSN: 1467-9248
We examine the degree to which party leaders dominate their parties over time and across countries and analyse how leadership domination relates to formal aspects of party organisation. Moreover, we analyse whether antidotes against leadership domination – widening the selectorate and increasing the membership – explain change in leadership domination. For this purpose, we use a new dataset that brings together different sources of party data over time and between countries. We find that leadership domination indeed has increased over time, but still a lot of variation exists between parties. We also demonstrate that widening the selectorate – for example, letting members elect the party leader – and increasing membership boosts leadership domination. In other words, the antidotes against leadership domination do not work.