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Must free self-determination accept limits imposed by law? A first approach, instinctive, is to answer in the negative because the Law would not have vocation to interfere in the intimate relations that one maintains with oneself and which consequently does not concern the society. However, we must face the obvious: the law is legitimate to intervene in the free disposition of oneself because the intimacy is porous, and leaves between the meshes the presence of others, which authorizes the public authorities to intervene punctually in this area a priori dedicated to privacy. It is on the basis of public order that the legislator or judges determine whether free self-determination can flourish without danger for others or for the general interest. This public order, in its classical components ofleadership and protection, nevertheless appears to be struggling to contain the individual wishes that express themselves with conviction. Both the judge and the legislator have accordingly turned to another legal instrument ofa nature to regulate the free disposition of oneself. More recent, the dignity of the human person comes to protect thefree disposition of individuals in situation of weakness; or on the contrary, to limit the free disposition of oneself,protecting the person against his will. The second meaning of dignity is the one that predominates in the hands of thelegislator and the judges, leaving the free disposition of oneself at the mercy of a little nuanced instrument. We musttherefore look for a legal instrument that will ensure social cohesion without extinguishing individual aspirations. Itis a particularly delicate balance to find in that these two objectives are most often diametrically opposed. Research must be oriented towards public order because it is an eminently evolving concept. It is a public order that must beof direction, given the facts that it accompanies, with all the firmness required, individuals in the discovery of the options that are most favorable to them and that it is not ...

Must free self-determination accept limits imposed by law? A first approach, instinctive, is to answer in the negative because the Law would not have vocation to interfere in the intimate relations that one maintains with oneself and which consequently does not concern the society. However, we must face the obvious: the law is legitimate to intervene in the free disposition of oneself because the intimacy is porous, and leaves between the meshes the presence of others, which authorizes the public authorities to intervene punctually in this area a priori dedicated to privacy. It is on the basis of public order that the legislator or judges determine whether free self-determination can flourish without danger for others or for the general interest. This public order, in its classical components ofleadership and protection, nevertheless appears to be struggling to contain the individual wishes that express themselves with conviction. Both the judge and the legislator have accordingly turned to another legal instrument ofa nature to regulate the free disposition of oneself. More recent, the dignity of the human person comes to protect thefree disposition of individuals in situation of weakness; or on the contrary, to limit the free disposition of oneself,protecting the person against his will. The second meaning of dignity is the one that predominates in the hands of thelegislator and the judges, leaving the free disposition of oneself at the mercy of a little nuanced instrument. We musttherefore look for a legal instrument that will ensure social cohesion without extinguishing individual aspirations. Itis a particularly delicate balance to find in that these two objectives are most often diametrically opposed. Research must be oriented towards public order because it is an eminently evolving concept. It is a public order that must beof direction, given the facts that it accompanies, with all the firmness required, individuals in the discovery of the options that are most favorable to them and that it is not intended to to protect at all costs the free disposition ofoneself. Its adaptability to the circumstances of the case is made possible by the application of the principle of proportionality in concreto. This new public order would finally be nothing but an empty shell, without the objectiveof the common good, which makes it possible to discriminate between the licit and unlawful uses of free self determination.Framed by the public order of direction of the person, the latter can express himself without endangering the individual or the society. ; La libre disposition de soi doit-elle accueillir des limites imposées par le Droit ? Une première approche, instinctive,est de répondre par la négative car le Droit n'aurait pas vocation à s'ingérer dans les rapports intimes que l'on entretient avec soi et qui ne concernent en conséquence pas la société. Il faut pourtant se rendre à l'évidence : le Droit est légitime à intervenir dans la libre disposition de soi car l'intimité est poreuse, et laisse passer entre ses mailles la présence d'autrui, ce qui autorise les pouvoirs publics à intervenir ponctuellement dans ce domaine a priori dédié à la vie privée. C'est à l'aune de l'ordre public que le législateur ou les juges déterminent si la libre disposition de soi peut s'épanouir sans danger pour autrui ou pour l'intérêt général. Cet ordre public, dans ses composantes classiques de direction et de protection, paraît néanmoins actuellement à la peine pour contenir les volontés individuelles qui s'expriment avec force conviction. Tant le juge que le législateur se sont en conséquence tournés vers un autre instrument juridique de nature à encadrer la libre disposition de soi. De facture plus récente, la dignité de la personne humaine vient soit protéger la libre disposition d'individus en situation de faiblesse ; soit au contraire limiter la libre disposition de soi, protégeant la personne contre son gré. La deuxième acception de la dignité est celle qui prédomine entre les mains du législateur et des juges, laissant la libre disposition de soi à la merci d'un instrument peu nuancé.Il faut donc rechercher un instrument juridique qui permette d'assurer la cohésion sociale sans pour autant éteindre les aspirations individuelles. C'est un équilibre particulièrement délicat à trouver en ce que ces deux objectifs sont le plus souvent diamétralement opposés. La recherche doit s'orienter vers l'ordre public car celui-ci est un concept éminemment évolutif. C'est un ordre public qui doit être de direction, eu égard aux faits qu'il accompagne, avec toute la fermeté requise, les individus dans la découverte des options qui leur sont les plus favorables et qu'il n'a pas vocation à protéger à tout prix la libre disposition de soi. Son adaptabilité aux circonstances de l'espèce est rendue possible grâce à l'application du principe de proportionnalité in concreto. Ce nouvel ordre public ne serait enfin qu'une coquille vide, sans l'objectif du Bien commun, qui permet de discriminer entre les usages licites et illicites de la libre disposition de soi. Encadrée par l'ordre public de direction de la personne, cette dernière peut s'exprimer sans verser dans des extrêmes dommageables à l'individu ou à la société.