What Is Self‐Ownership?
In: A Political Theory of Rights, S. 25-42
In: A Political Theory of Rights, S. 25-42
In: The Good Society: a PEGS journal, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 50-57
ISSN: 1538-9731
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Working paper
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 47, Heft 3, S. 311-337
ISSN: 1552-7476
This essay considers self-ownership as a rhetorical and political practice. Scholarly attention to the rhetoric of self-ownership, notably in feminist theory, often rejects the term for its capacity to distort and fragment notions of the self, the body, social relations, and labor. The ambiguous character of self-ownership, in this view, carries the risk of subversion of more inclusive and relational uses. Adopting a broader notion of rhetoric as creative and effective speech, I recast self-ownership from this critical depiction through a revised understanding of C. B. Macpherson's possessive individualism and then to the texts of John Locke, the Levellers, and the Putney Debates. These early-modern exemplars offer insights into the political promises and risks of the rhetoric of self-ownership that contemporary critics obscure. The ambiguity and plurality too often rendered as a liability for self-ownership instead offer conditions for its agonistic invocation for novel claims and emerging audiences.
In: A Political Theory of Rights, S. 43-65
In: The journal of political philosophy, Band 17, Heft 4, S. 399-417
ISSN: 1467-9760
In: Politics, philosophy & economics: ppe, Band 1, Heft 2, S. 237-276
ISSN: 1470-594X
Part I of this essay supports the anti-egalitarian conclusion that individuals may readily become entitled to substantially unequal extra-personal holdings by criticizing end-state & pattern theories of distributive justice & defending the historical entitlement doctrine of justice in holdings. Part II of this essay focuses on a second route to the anti-egalitarian conclusion. This route combines the self-ownership thesis with a contention that is especially advanced by G. A. Cohen. This is the contention that the anti-egalitarian conclusion can be inferred from the self-ownership thesis without the aid of additional controversial premises. Cohen advances this contention, not because he wants to support the anti-egalitarian conclusion, but rather because he wants to emphasize the need for one to reject the self-ownership thesis if one is to reject the anti-egalitarian conclusion. In Part II of this essay, I support this second route to the anti-egalitarian conclusion by reinforcing Cohen's special contention while rejecting his challenges to the self-ownership thesis. Cohen's special contention is reinforced by way of an explanation of why the redistributive state must trench upon some people's self-ownership rights. One important challenge to the self-ownership thesis is answered through the articulation of a new & improved Lockean proviso. Another challenge offered by Cohen is answered by arguing that the philosophical costs of denying the self-ownership thesis are as great as the self-ownership libertarian maintains. Thus, I defend both of the key elements of self-ownership libertarianism: the self-ownership thesis & the anti-egalitarian conclusion. Adapted from the source document.
In: The journal of political philosophy, Band 17, Heft 4, S. 399-417
ISSN: 0963-8016
In: The Egalitarian Conscience, S. 88-101
In: Libertarianism without Inequality, S. 11-40
"It would be strange to hear people saying 'It's my self.' The self per se isn't normally a contested possession. By contrast, what is normal, and so familiar that most readers can probably remember asserting such a thing themselves once upon a time, is the assertion 'It's my life.' How we live our lives can be, and often is, contested."
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In: Politics, philosophy & economics: ppe, Band 1, Heft 2, S. 237-276
ISSN: 1741-3060
Part I of this essay supports the anti-egalitarian conclusion that individuals may readily become entitled to substantially unequal extra-personal holdings by criticizing end-state and pattern theories of distributive justice and defending the historical entitlement doctrine of justice in holdings. Part II of this essay focuses on a second route to the anti-egalitarian conclusion. This route combines the self-ownership thesis with a contention that is especially advanced by G.A. Cohen. This is the contention that the anti-egalitarian conclusion can be inferred from the self-ownership thesis without the aid of additional controversial premises. Cohen advances this contention, not because he wants to support the anti-egalitarian conclusion, but rather because he wants to emphasize the need for one to reject the self-ownership thesis if one is to reject the anti-egalitarian conclusion. In Part II of this essay, I support this second route to the anti-egalitarian conclusion by reinforcing Cohen's special contention while rejecting his challenges to the self-ownership thesis. Cohen's special contention is reinforced by way of an explanation of why the redistributive state must trench upon some people's self-ownership rights. One important challenge to the self-ownership thesis is answered through the articulation of a new and improved Lockean proviso. Another challenge offered by Cohen is answered by arguing that the philosophical costs of denying the self-ownership thesis are as great as the self-ownership libertarian maintains. Thus, I defend both of the key elements of self-ownership libertarianism, the self-ownership thesis and the anti-egalitarian conclusion.
In: Social Philosophy & Policy, Forthcoming
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In: Human Rights Review, April 2010
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Working paper
In: The journal of political philosophy, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 65-78
ISSN: 0963-8016