Suchergebnisse

Cilj je ove studije dvostruk: prvo, želimo istražiti poseban identitet koji se pojavio kao posljedica mnogih promjena povezanih s Europskom unijom (mobilnost, IKT, rastući broj različitih EU programa i novih EU politika); drugo, želimo testirati ulogu društvenih medija u građenju ovog novog identiteta koji mi nazivamo EUens. Provodeći dubinske intervjue s 25 EUensa, pronašli smo kako pojedine kategorije koje su obično smatrane važnim faktorima u građenju europskog identiteta, kao što su klasa i politički stavovi, ne igraju važnu ulogu u građenju europskog identiteta među pripadnicima naše grupe. Drugo, rezultati našeg istraživanja pokazuju kako društveni mediji imaju potencijal da postanu važan pokretač europskog identiteta. ; The goal of this study is twofold: firstly, we want to explore specific identity that has been emerging as a consequence of many EU-related changes (e.g. development of transport, ICT, increasing number of different EU programs and new EU policies); secondly, we want to test the role of social media in building this new identity that we call EUens (European Union citizens). Conducting in-depth interviews with 25 EUens we find that some issues which are commonly seen as important factors in European identity construction, such as class and political attitudes, do not play any significant role in constructing European identity for members of our group. Secondly, our analysis suggests that social media have potential of becoming important driver of European identity.

Ovaj rad nastoji istražiti koje su odrednice europskih programa volontiranja za mlade koje pridonose izgradnji europskog identiteta i europske solidarnosti. Europski programi volontiranja mehanizam su povezivanja i osnaživanja mladih europskih volontera. Kroz aktualni program Europske snage solidarnosti mladi neosporno rade na svojim vještinama. Ipak, naglasak je na preventivnom ili kurativnom, a uvijek solidarnom djelovanju. Volontiranje je usmjereno na krizu zajednice i tako dotiče mnogobrojne dimenzije ekspresije europskog identiteta. Proces provedbe volonterskih programa za mlade prolazi višestruku koordinaciju između europske i nacionalne razine. Uredba Europske unije temelj je za provedbu programa, koji uvelike djeluje po načelima europske Strategije za mlade, čime se pokazuje da legislativna i provedbena strana europskih programa volontiranja zajednički djeluje na koncepciju europskog identiteta. Istraživanje putem intervjua sa stručnjacima, provedeno za potrebe ovog rada ukazuje na brojne sličnosti i komplementarnost koncepata koji čine odrednice europskih programa volontiranja i europskog identiteta, poput osjećaj pripadnosti zajednici, međunarodnih bliskih, prijateljskih odnosa, zajedničkih aktivnosti, kao i standardizacije te regulacije politika za mlade na europskoj razini. Dijeljenje iskustava mladih Europljana koji su odrednice europskih programa volontiranja za mlade i europskog identiteta praktično povezali i primjenili u vlastitim životima može imati dugoročno pozitivne učinke na budućnost EU. ; This paper seeks to explore what are the determinants of the European youth volunteering programs that contribute to the building of the European identity and European solidarity. European volunteering programs are the mechanism for connecting and empowering young European volunteers. Through the current program, the European Solidarity Corps, young people are indisputably working on their skills. However, the emphasis is on preventative or curative, but always solidarity action. Volunteering has focused ...

U ovom se radu promišlja i analizira odnos individualnog i socijalnog/grupnog identiteta na primjeru suvremene Bosne i Hercegovine. Ukazuje se na tjeskobu i nelagodu pojedinaca i grupa koji grade svoj grupni identitet na obilježjima i vrijednostima druge kulture kojoj zapravo ne pripadaju. Na taj način, pojedinac se fzički nalazi u svojoj zemlji/državi, a pod utjecajem politike i obrazovne politike, duhovno živi u nekom drugom okruženju. Takvi pojedinci najčešće postaju apatridi2, a da toga nisu svjesni, niti oni niti kreatori takve obrazovne politike. Oni se obrazovanjem udaljavaju od vlastite zajednice i kulture u kojoj žive i deklariraju pripadnicima neke druge kulture s kojom ih veže najčešće samo jedan od zajedničkih nazivnika, npr. religija. Na drugoj strani, pojedinci u BiH koji sebe svrstavaju u kategoriju ostali, ne grade svoj identitet isključivo na vjerskoj i nacionalnoj osnovi, oni ne teže biti što različitiji niti ekskluzivniji od ostalih svojih sunarodnjaka, oni svoje odnose s drugima utemeljuju na sličnostima i oni ne poimaju svoj identitet utemeljen isključivo na pripadnosti jednom od konstitutivnih naroda, iako im je to na neki način Ustavom zadano. Grupaciju ostali čine deklarirani patrioti BiH, čvrsto utemeljeni na svojoj zemlji, u svojoj domovini i nastoje graditi i oblikovati kompleksni bosansko-hercegovački socijalni identitet. Ova inverzija u kojoj se iz Ustavom defniranih konstitutivnih naroda zbog krize identiteta regrutiraju apatridi, i gdje ostali, iako im Ustav uskraćuje mnoga prava, postaju istinski patrioti, je jedinstven primjer koji, postoji samo u BiH i koji je uz sve druge okolnosti snažno potaknut obrazovnim sustavom. ; Tis paper considers and analyzes the relationship between individual and social / group identity on the example of modern Bosnia and Herzegovina. It points to the anxiety and discomfort of individuals and groups that build on its identity on the characteristics and values of other cultures which does not belong. In this way, the individual is physically located in your country / state, and under the influence of policy and education policy, the spiritual lives in another okruženju.Takvi individuals usually become stateless, without being aware of it, neither they nor the creators of such educational policies. Tey are educated away from their own communities and cultures in which they live, and declare themselves members of another culture that binds them most ofen only one common denominator, for example, Religions. On the other hand, individuals in BiH who himself into the category of others, do not build your identity solely on religious and national basis, they do not tend to be as diverse or more exclusive than the rest of their countrymen, they do their relationships with others founded on the similarities and they do not perceive their identity is based solely on the origin of these peoples, although it is in some way the Constitution default. Other group consists of BiH patriots declared, frmly established on their land, in their home country and seek to build and shape the complex Bosnian-Herzegovinian social identity. Te inversion in which the Constitution defned the constituent peoples due to identity crisis recruited stateless, and where else, if their constitution denied many rights, they become true patriots, is a unique example of that, there is only in BiH and that is with all the other circumstances strongly driven by educational system. ; Dieses Papier ist der Auffassung, und analysiert die Beziehung zwischen individuellen und sozialen / Gruppenidentität auf dem Beispiel der modernen Bosnien und Herzegowina. Es weist auf die Angst und Beschwerden von Einzelpersonen und Gruppen, die auf ihrer Identität auf die Eigenschafen und Werte anderer Kulturen, die nicht gehört zu bauen. Auf diese Weise wird die individuelle körperlich in Ihrem Land / Staat befndet, und unter dem Einfluss von Politik und Bildungspolitik, die spirituellen Leben in einem anderen okruženju.Takvi Individuen in der Regel werden Staatenlose, ohne es zu wissen, weder sie noch die Schöpfer solcher Bildungspolitik. Sie sind weg von ihren eigenen Gemeinschafen und Kulturen, in denen sie leben, erzogen und erklären sich Angehörige einer anderen Kultur, die sie bindet meist nur einen gemeinsamen Nenner, zum Beispiel. Die Religionen. Auf der anderen Seite, Menschen in Bosnien und Herzegowina, der sich in die Kategorie der anderen, nicht Ihre Identität zu bauen ausschließlich auf religiöse und nationale Basis, sie nicht dazu neigen, so vielfältig und exklusiver als der Rest ihrer Landsleute zu sein, haben sie ihre Beziehungen mit anderen auf die Ähnlichkeiten gegründet und sie nicht wahrnehmen ihre Identität beruht ausschließlich auf den Ursprung dieser Völker basiert, auch wenn es in irgendeiner Weise die Verfassung Standard. Andere Gruppe besteht aus BiH Patrioten erklärt, auf ihrem Land fest etabliert, in ihrem Heimatland und zu versuchen, zu bauen und gestalten die komplexen bosnisch-herzegowinischen soziale Identität. Die Umkehrung, in der die Verfassung defniert die Volksgruppen aufgrund von Identitätskrise rekrutiert Staatenlose, und wo sonst, wenn ihre Verfassung verweigert viele Rechte, wahre Patrioten werden sie, ist ein einzigartiges Beispiel dafür gibt es nur in Bosnien und Herzegowina, und das ist mit all den anderen Umständen stark vom Bildungs angetrieben Systems.

Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.

Critical reception welcomed Lidija Dimkovskaʾs novel A Spare Life (2012) as an allegory of political and social events in ex-Yugoslavia in the last decades of the twentieth century. The essay sets aside the allegorical perspective of the novel and focuses on the analysis of the state of exile as a key point of identification of the novel's main character, conjoined twin Zlata. The analysis is based on the concepts of desire, otherness and fear of the unknown through which main characters (mostly women) of the novel are represented, as well as on manners of their internalization of socially promoted standards and stereotypes from the perspective of Julia Kristeva's theory of oneself as a stranger.

Cilj je rada ustanoviti je li u Europskoj uniji i Republici Hrvatskoj došlo do smanjenja broja građana koji se identificiraju kao građani Europske unije te koji elementi utječu na dinamiku kreiranja europskoga identiteta. Razlog se istraživanja tematike vidi u rastu populističkih narativa u Europskoj uniji koji su npr. vodili izlasku Velike Britanije iz Europske unije. Međutim, za razliku od uobičajenih politoloških analiza koncepta europskoga identiteta u radu se nastoji dati uvid u interdisciplinarni okvir proučavanja. U prvome se dijelu rad donosi pregled teorija kolektivnoga identiteta u psihologiji i antropologiji. Psihološke se teorije identiteta interpretiraju socijalnom i kulturalnom psihologijom. Antropološke se teorije identiteta dijele na ranije i postmoderne antropološke interpretacije. Fokus je rada na interpretiranju kategorije europskog identiteta, proizvoljno odabranim elementima psihologije i antropologije. Metodološki dio rada obuhvaća analizu i interpretaciju statističkih podataka na temelju niza longitudinalnoga istraživanja Eurobarometer Standard. Kod analize podataka pravi se razlika između razine Europske unije i razine Republike Hrvatske. Rezultati provedene analize upućuju na rast hibridnoga oblika identiteta koji se sastoji od nacionalnoga identiteta na prvome mjestu i europskoga identiteta na drugome mjestu. Isto tako, građani Europske unije smatraju da im je identitetski bliža lokalna razina države, grada ili sela. Konačno, elementi koji kreiraju dinamiku razvoja europskoga identiteta nisu isti za sve građane Europske unije te ovise o široj društveno-političkoj situaciji. ; The main goal of this article is to establish whether in the European Union and Croatia there has been a decrease in the number of citizens who identify themselves as citizens of the European Union, and what are the elements that contribute to the dynamics of creation of the European identity. The reason for exploring this particular topic is the growth of populist narratives in the European Union that potentially led to the UK's exit from the European Union. However, unlike the usual political analysis of the concept of European identity, the article tries to provide an interdisciplinary insight. The first part of the article provides an overview of the theories of collective identity in psychology and anthropology. Psychological identity theories are interpreted through social and cultural psychology. Anthropological theories of identity are divided into earlier and postmodern anthropological interpretations. The focus of the article is on interpreting the European identity through arbitrarily selected psychological and anthropological elements. The methodological part of the paper covers the analysis and interpretation of statistics based on the Eurobarometer Standard series of longitudinal surveys. When analyzing data, a distinction is made between, on one hand, the European Union and, on the other hand, the country of Croatia. The results of the analysis indicate the growth of a hybrid form of identity consisting of national identity in the first place and European identity in the second place. Furthermore, citizens of the European Union consider that their local, national or rural, level is closer to their identity. Finally, the elements that govern the dynamics of European identity development are not the same for all EU citizens and depend on the wider socio-political situation.

U radu autorica prati početak procesa izrastanja bosanskohercegovačke sociokulturne politike 60-ih i početkom 70-ih godina XX. stoljeća, čiji su inicijatori i protagonisti – političko rukovodstvo Bosne i Hercegovine i njemu bliska inteligencija – imali za cilj unutar idejno-političkih restrukturiranja koja su zahvatila Jugoslaviju u tom razdoblju i u kojem su republike, kao društveni i politički entiteti, zadobile puni legitimitet, političkom tijelu Bosne i Hercegovine, kao faktor njegove stabilnosti, osmisliti kulturni identitet. Fokus rada je na razvoju, idejnim metamorfozama i analizi diskursa kojim se nastoji utemeljiti zaseban jezični identitet bosanskohercegovačkoga društva i republike kao temelj njegova kulturnoga identiteta i emanacija njegove povijesne društvene osobitosti. Autorica u radu donosi prikaz povijesnoga konteksta iz kojega izrasta bosanskohercegovačka sociokulturna politika, tj. jezična politika kao njezin najvažniji segment, prikaz partijskih foruma te organizacijskih formi javnih rasprava preko kojih se utemeljuje, razvija i (pre)oblikuje idejni govor o bosanskohercegovačkoj društvenoj i kulturno-povijesnoj zasebnosti. ; In the 1960s, Bosnia and Herzegovina was a peripheral Yugoslav republic, lacking a distinctive cultural identity. In fact, advocates of Serbian-Croatian cultural unity perceived it as a mini Yugoslavia, the central part of the so-called Serbian-Croatian cultural space, in which the process of cultural rapprochement and integration of the Serbia and Croatian nations was to occur. The political leadership that came to power in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1960s wanted to change this ideological perception of their republic and establish its distinctive cultural identity as a support to its political identity and socio-political stability. Therefore, in the mentioned period, the cultural intelligentsia was encouraged towards a systematic, organised, and institutional production of discourse on the historical, cultural, literary, and linguistic identity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the national identity of Muslims. All of this represents the inception of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian socio-cultural policy, whose important segment was literary-linguistic policy, initiated with the publication of the 'Declaration' and 'Suggestion', which intensified the Serbian-Croatian cultural dispute in Yugoslavia and highlighted the concept of national cultural unity. In this way, Bosnia and Herzegovina was threatened with destabilisation and social and cultural disintegration. Therefore, the republican leadership initiated the process of forming literary-linguistic principles, the most important of which was the existence of only one language in the Republic that was shared by all nationalities living inside its borders, and of standardising the Bosnian-Herzegovinian norm in public space. Public discussions about the linguistic identity of Bosnia and Herzegovina were organised (e.g. the 'Symposium on Linguistic Tolerance'), a language institute was established as an institutional starting point for the scientific grounding of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian standard language expression and a discourse about it was developed, the publication of orthography manuals was planned, etc. The dynamics of Bosnian-Herzegovinian linguistic policy followed the dynamics of the Croatian linguistic and cultural separation. After the end of the Croatian Spring, a certain impasse regarding the realisation of this policy ensued, partially due to the repositioning of the power relations of the conceptual forces, thanks to which the linguistic centralists who advocated Serbian-Croatian unity regained their influence. The Council of Mostar, which was organised with the goal of evaluating the achieved results, pointed to the fact that, in the 1967–1973 period, the linguistic policy of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian leadership had had a very weak impact on the socio-political reality of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as on the creation of a separate cultural identity of the central Yugoslav republic.

U radu se izlažu rezultati istraživanja (re)konstrukcije etničkih/nacionalnih identiteta pojedinih manjinskih zajednica u Republici Hrvatskoj uvjetovanih promjenama društveno-povijesnog konteksta (u razdoblju kad se Hrvatska nalazila u sastavu SFRJ, potom u razdoblju demokratskih promjena, Domovinskog rata, i samostalne RH). Koristi se kvalitativni pristup koji s jedne strane uključuje propitivanje službenog kategoriziranja i klasificiranja nacionalnih manjinskih zajednica unutar Ustava SFRJ i Ustava RH, teorijsko-pojmovnih objašnjenja i njihovoj implementaciji u definiranju identiteta, te empirijski dio koji obuhvaća dubinske intervjue maksimalne varijacije s pripadnicima različitih nacionalnih manjinskih zajednica koji žive na širem području RH. Naglašava se kako određene institucionalizirane klasifikacijske sheme ili povijesni trenutak mogu nametnuti ili dovesti do promjenjivosti strategija, položaja i uloge određenih manjinskih zajednica. Osim službenih definicija i institucionaliziranih klasifikacijskih shema kojima se neposredno pripisuju određena identitetska svojstva pojedinoj grupi, društveni identiteti mogu biti i rezultat slobodnog izbora, prinude, strategijske igre samih pojedinaca/članova određene grupe ili resurs podložan mobilizaciji u ostvarivanju političkih ili ekonomskih ciljeva. Kroz ova dva pristupa analizi identiteta nacionalnih manjinskih zajednica u RH pojašnjavamo ne samo procesualni i dinamični karakter identiteta nego i njegovu promjenjivu i situacijsku prirodu. ; This paper presents research results concerning the (re)-construction of the ethnic / national identities of particular minority communities in the Republic of Croatia, as shaped by fluctuations in the social and historical context (over the period when Croatia was part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, thereafter in the periods of democratic transformation, the Homeland War, and the independent Republic of Croatia). We take a multi-method approach, on the one hand exploring the official categorization and classification of national minorities within the Constitution of the FRY and the Constitution of the RC, whilst also examining theoretical and conceptual explanations and their implementation in defining identity. The empirical part includes in-depth interviews with members of different ethnic minority communities living across the territory of present-day Croatia. The paper emphasizes how certain institutional classificatory schemes or historical moments may be imposed or lead to volatility as concerns the strategies, positions and roles of certain minority communities. In addition to the official definition and institutionalized classificatory schemes that are directly attributed to the specific identity characteristics of each group, social identities can be the result of free choice, coercion, strategy games played by individuals / members of certain groups themselves or resources mobilized in order to achieve political or economic goals. Through considering these two approaches to the analysis of national minority identities in present-day Croatia, we elaborate not only the procedural and dynamic character of identity but also its variable and situational nature.

Cilj rada je pružiti uvid u specifične izazove vezane uz međunarodno posvojenje te ukazati na situacije kršenja prava djeteta u kontekstu međudržavnog posvojenja. Iako se međunarodnom posvojenju pribjegava tek u okolnostima kada djetetu nije moguće pružiti skrb u državi porijekla, nerijetko u tom procesu dolazi do zloupotrebe instituta međunarodnog posvojenja. Posebice u vremenima kriza kao što su ekonomske i političke krize, ratovi i prirodne katastrofe, kada su zakonske kontrole oslabljene. Nadalje, stvarnost međunarodno posvojene djece karakterizira proživljavanje mnogih gubitaka, emocionalnih i kulturalnih, te je velik izazov s kojim se susreću međunarodni posvojenici formiranje identiteta kao kombinacije kulturalnog nasljeđa države iz koje potječu i države u koju se dijete posvaja. Kako će taj proces teći uvelike ovisi o posvojiteljima i njihovom prihvaćanju različitosti, te spremnosti i vještinama komuniciranja o djetetovoj povijesti i porijeklu, ali i o podršci sustava socijalne skrbi koji ima važnu ulogu u zaštiti prava djeteta. ; The aim of this paper is to provide insight in the specific challenges of international adoption, and to point to situations of violation of the rights of the child in the context of international adoption. Although international adoption is used only in circumstances where a child cannot be cared for in a country of origin, in that process abuses of this institute often occur. Especially in times of crisis such as economic and political crises, wars and natural disasters when legal controls are weak. Furthermore, the great challenge facing all international adoptees is the formation of identity as a combination of the cultural heritage of the country of origin and the country they actually live in. How will this process going on depend not only on adoptive parents and their acceptance of diversity, their willingness to communicate about child history and origin and communication skill they have, but also on the support of the social welfare system, which have an important role in protecting the rights of the child.

The author analyzes the reasons for critical reconsideration of contemporary globalization theories at the beginning of the 21st century. An attempt at a paradigm transformation of the social, political and cultural development shows that the possible end of globalization -- as (1) a neoliberal ideology, (2) social paradigm of world development and (3) modernization strategy of transformation of the global age -- points out how the complex concept of culture is pertinent for all the relevant end-of-globalization theories. Now that culture has become both means and end of identity in a global age, we are left with the task to consider why the postmodern concept of culture, has in its plural meanings, been deconstructed in a biopolitical nexus of power. Theories of a turning point at all levels, at which a relation to space and time is established in the global world, point out to the comprehensive transformation of humanity and its social and cultural environment. Through analysis of the complexity of culture (Urry), biopolitics as the end of identity and three attempts at a critique of globalization as the end of history in the works of Wallerstein, Harrison and Rosenberg, the author concludes that culture as an empty hologram of power is not an alternative to globalization, but only its self-organizing system of ideological hegemony. Adapted from the source document.

The author analyzes the reasons for critical reconsideration of contemporary globalization theories at the beginning of the 21st century. An attempt at a paradigm transformation of the social, political and cultural development shows that the possible end of globalization -- as (1) a neoliberal ideology, (2) social paradigm of world development and (3) modernization strategy of transformation of the global age -- points out how the complex concept of culture is pertinent for all the relevant end-of-globalization theories. Now that culture has become both means and end of identity in a global age, we are left with the task to consider why the postmodern concept of culture, has in its plural meanings, been deconstructed in a biopolitical nexus of power. Theories of a turning point at all levels, at which a relation to space and time is established in the global world, point out to the comprehensive transformation of humanity and its social and cultural environment. Through analysis of the complexity of culture (Urry), biopolitics as the end of identity and three attempts at a critique of globalization as the end of history in the works of Wallerstein, Harrison and Rosenberg, the author concludes that culture as an empty hologram of power is not an alternative to globalization, but only its self-organizing system of ideological hegemony. Adapted from the source document.

In this article the traditional and modern elements of the identity of Serbs in Croatia are analysed. The author identifies the following key elements or markers of this identity: Christian Orthodox faith, use of Cyrillic alphabet, social and political preferences and values, concern for the status of their ethnic community, loyalty to specific organisations that represent their community, and memories of the Second World War, i.e. loyalty to Partisans. This article presents results of in-depth interviewing of a large number of ethnic Serbs from different regions of Croatia. The author concludes that following the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Serb identity in Croatia has been through an ambivalent process. On one hand, there is a process of re-traditionalisation and 'reviving of identity', which had been neglected in the times of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, due to the war of the 1990s, Serb ethnic community in Croatia has been significantly reduced, and there are new fears - especially of the trend of assimilation. Many Serbs have left Croatia and will not return. Thus, it is possible that the Serb community is facing disappearance. Adapted from the source document.

Krajem 8. stoljeća na prostoru današnje Hrvatske te Bosne i Hercegovine pojavljuju se prvi predmeti karolinške provenijencije. Njihova se zastupljenost sve više intenzivira u sljedećim desetljećima, a najzastupljeniji su nalazi oružja i ostalih elemenata ratničke opreme koji potječu mahom iz grobova. Pojedina se groblja i grobovi svojim bogatstvom i kontekstom ističu te predstavljaju primjer u pogrebnom obredu koji slijede i drugi lokaliteti. U ovome se radu proučava aktivna uloga koju su ti predmeti imali u pogrebnim obredima, ali i u definiranju društvenih odnosa uopće, u kontekstu borbe za vlast i konstrukcije identiteta lokalne elite u vrijeme formiranja prvih kneževina u dalmatinskome zaleđu i definiranja odnosa s Franačkim Carstvom. ; Towards the end of the 8th century the first artefacts of Carolingian provenance start to appear in the territories of present-day Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their quantity becomes steadily greater in the following decades, with weapons and other elements of warrior equipment, found mostly in graves, prevailing in number. Certain cemeteries and graves, outstanding in their richness and context, were setting the example for burial rites which were then followed at other sites. In this paper the active role of these objects is considered, the role which they played in burial rites, and also in defining social relations in general, in a context of power struggle and the construction of the identity of the local elite in the time of formation of the first polities in the Dalmatian hinterland and of defining relations with the Frankish Empire