Suchergebnisse

The study examines a hypothesis explaining the historical impact of socialist agricultural institutions on Chinese rural fertility. The implementation of collective agricultural management and socialization of traditional family relations under various types of socialist rural institutions are shown to have affected Chinese peasants' fertility by changing the "intergenerational wealth flows" situation. To take into account the extraneous effects of economic conditions and family planning policy on rural fertility, statistical models are constructed which compute residual fertility fluctuations unexplained by these factors. By comparing the unexplained fluctuations of rural fertility with institutional changes that in varying degrees weakened the traditional sociopolitical and economic functions of family, we assess our hypothesis on the relation between macro institutional changes and fertility behavior of rural families.

The study examines a hypothesis explaining the historical impact of socialist agricultural institutions on Chinese rural fertility. The implementation of collective agri cultural management and socialization of traditional family relations under various types of socialist rural institutions are shown to have affected Chinese peasants' fertility by changing the "intergenerational wealth flows" situation. To take into account the extraneous effects of economic conditions and family planning policy on rural fertility, statistical models are constructed which compute residual fertility fluctuations unexplained by these factors. By comparing the unexplained fluctuations of rural fertility with institutional changes that in varying degrees weakened the traditional sociopolitical and economic functions of family, we assess our hypothesis on the relation between macro institutional changes and fertility behavior of rural families.

The main objective of this paper aims the distribution of finite resources under the imperatives of collectivist institutions and a governance based on the precepts of socializing the means of society. In the first instance theoretical formulas will be used that propose methodologies for governing the common goods from the ostromian perspective (Ostrom, 2007) and alternatives for overcoming the dilemmas of collective action starting from basic concepts (Hardin, 1968), respectively forms of government that can overcomes the excesses of users of common goods that inexorably lead to the spoiling and depletion of existing resources. Complementary to this preliminary discussion necessary for further operationalization I will use the theoretical model that explains, as an extension, the typology and functionality of natural resources and according to this link between combined theoretical models I will determine what type of asset each institutional form proposed for governing assets mentioned above.The final section will be dedicated to determining which type of institutional alternative, for the governance of common resources, is joined by the socialist ideological approach when talking about the collectivization of agriculture and the institutional form that agricultural associations must take, respectively in which typology could allocate the goods, following the de facto analysis of the agricultural collectivist type organization for the socialist period, in the same way of working – identifying institutional arrangements, typology of goods, in order to identify possible inconsistencies between the normative, declarative ideological model and its implementation in real social space.The study starts from the socialist ideological assumptions regarding the governance of agricultural households and tries to test whether the factual representation of agricultural cooperatives in Romania and implicitly in the general ideological project overlaps and fulfills the theoretical aspirations regarding the collectivization of agriculture. For these it will be considered to formulate research questions and consult the extensive bibliography in the field of agricultural groups proposed by the socialist frame of reference.

The aim of this study was to identify common determinants of the shape of labour market institutions in the group of 25 post-socialist countries during the transition period. The exclusion of countries' fixed effects (with the use of least squares dummy variable — LSDV model) showed that conducted market reforms (especially the privatisation of state-owned companies and enterprise restructuring) have determined the shape of labour market institutions in post-socialist countries. However, the levels of political liberty, protection of property rights, international trade freedom and government expenditures did not occur to have influenced the labour market institutions in these economies.

Cover -- Contents -- List of Tables and Figures -- Acknowledgements -- Notes on Contributors -- Introduction: My Name Is Legion. The Resilience and Endurance of Informality beyond, or in spite of, the State -- Part I: Thinking Informality and Development Writ Large and Small -- 1 Evaluating the Validity of the Contrasting Theoretical Perspectives towards the Informal Economy in Ukraine -- 2 Institutional Transformation and Informality in Azerbaijan and Georgia -- 3 Fighting the Shadows: Lithuania's Informal Workers and the Financial Crisis -- 4 Formal Crutches for Broken Sociality

The use of the market mechanism against the background of socialist institutions is not inconsistent with the values that define a socialist economy. The market as an allocative device neither entails material incentives of a bourgeois sort nor need it result in a radically unequal distribution of wealth and power. And contrary to the theoretically inadequate and empirically mistaken thesis of technological determinism, the market emphasis on efficiency need not result in an authoritarian organization of the workplace, fragmentation of work, or any other manifestations of alienated labor. Market socialism captures the advantages of the market minus its capitalist shortcomings.