O razlozima iseljavanja iz Hrvatske do sada se najčešće pisalo s aspekta politike useljavanja u pojedine države, a manje politike iseljavanja iz domovine. Ovim se radom stoga žele pokazati razvojne faze iseljeničkoga režima u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji/Hrvatskoj, što će se pratiti preko angažmana mjerodavnih institucija u Hrvatskoj s posebnim naglaskom na ulogu Komisije za iseljenička pitanja. U analizi će poslužiti fondovi Hrvatskoga državnog arhiva vezani uz institucije (uprava i javne službe), pisma iseljenika za emisiju Radio-televizije Zagreb "Našim građanima u svijetu", kao i anketni upitnici radnika na privremenom radu u Saveznoj Republici Njemačkoj. Na temelju navedenih izvora želi se dokazati da se vlast u socijalističkoj Hrvatskoj brinula o sudbini iseljenika i povratnika, ali i radnih migranata (gastarbajtera), otvarajući prostor za ono što danas nazivamo javno-privatnim partnerstvom u pružanju usluga migrantima. ; The reasons for emigration from Croatia have thus far been analysed mostly from the aspect of immigration policy, but less often from the aspect of the policies of emigration to individual countries. Therefore, it was not even possible to monitor the continuity of Croatian policy towards the emigration, whose connections with previous periods significantly influenced the phases of emigration and return of the population in the socialist period. Precisely for this reason, the aim of this paper is to present a broader picture of the reaction of socialist Yugoslavia/Croatia to the emigration and the return of the population in the period from 1945 to 1970. This was monitored through the reactions of the government and the administrative apparatus (institutions and legislation), with special reference to the involvement of relevant institutions (administrations and public services) in Croatia, which played a key role in organising activities related to emigration and return. Among them, the Commission for Emigrant Issues stood out the most, having one of the more complex roles related to emigration/return observed through its scope, adopting normative acts, and cooperating with other institutions in Croatia (Croatian Heritage Foundation, Radio-Television Zagreb, Institute for Migration, Section of Social Psychology, University of Zagreb). Of particular interest was the cooperation with the last on the development of an emigrant survey, which was the beginning of sociological, economic, and socio-psychological research on the phenomenon of work outside the homeland (or guest worker experience). Based on the analysis, we prove that the government in socialist Croatia cared about the fate of emigrants and returnees by making room for what we now call public-private partnerships in providing services to emigrants—in other words, that emigration policy played an important role in building a welfare state in Yugoslavia/Croatia. Therefore, the approach to the topic was based on works in the field of social policy, while the analysis was made using the funds of the Croatian State Archives related to institutions (administrations and public services), letters from emigrants for the Radio-Television Zagreb show To Our Citizens in the World, and survey questionnaires for temporary workers in the Federal Republic of Germany.
U radu se prikazuju rezultati istraživanja ustroja i djelovanja Izvršnog vijeća Sabora SRH u ustavnom razdoblju 1963-1974. Rad Izvršnog vijeća prati se kroz četiri mandatna razdoblja: četvrto 27. lipnja 1963.-11. svibnja 1967, peto 11. svibnja 1967.-9. svibnja 1969, šesto 9. svibnja 1969.-7. siječnja 1972. te sedmo 7. siječnja 1972.-8. svibnja 1974. Rezultati istraživanja temelje se na analizi arhivskog gradiva fondova Izvršno vijeće Sabora SRH 1953-1990. i Sabor SRH 1945-1982. u Hrvatskom državnom arhivu, te propisa i drugih akata objavljenih u službenim listovima. U radu se donosi sistematizirani pregled svih članova po mandatnim razdobljima, pregled propisima definirane nadležnosti i unutarnjeg ustroja te analiza obilježja i rezultata rada Izvršnog vijeća u promatranom razdoblju. ; The article presents Executive Council of Parliament of Socialist Republic of Croatia (1963-1974), as one of the central governing institutions, with special interest in its organization, functions and activity. The first chapter gives an overview of the provisions about constitution and procedure of members' election. Four mandate periods were established within which the activity of the Executive Council should be monitored: The fourth mandate from 27th June 1963 till 11th May 1967, the fifth mandate from 11th May 1967 till 9th May 1969, the sixth mandate from 9th May 1969 till 7th January 1972 and the seventh mandate from 7th January 1972 till 8th May 1974. The same chapter brings the list of all members organized according to mandates. The second chapter gives an overview of the functions defined in regulations. The next chapter gives an analysis of its organization, divided in four parts: guidance of Executive Council, working bodies (boards, commissions, workgroups), councils and committees, and administrative and professional service. The last chapter gives an analysis of the activity of Executive Council. It is concluded that the most of the activity concerns the discussion of questions related to economy and finances, organization of central Republic's institutions, republican and regional (local) governing bodies, as well as system of justice, security and home affairs. As well, follow questions related to education, science and culture, health care system and social policy, labour relations, foreign affairs and international relations.
Djelovanje Hrvatskog sabora u komunističkom razdoblju (1945.-1990.) nije cjelovito obrađena tema. Ovim člankom daje se prilog poznavanju njegove organizacije u razdoblju od 1963. do 1974. godine. Detaljno je opisana razgranata struktura i aktivnost njegovih pet vijeća (Republičko, Privredno, Prosvjetno-kulturno, Socijalnozdravstveno i Organizaciono-političko) i radnih tijela, koju ilustrira i broj održanih sjednica. Između ostalog, to je trebalo pokazivati položaj Sabora kao formalno najvišeg tijela vlasti, odnosno centra u kojem se donose najvažnije političke odluke o svim područjima života u Hrvatskoj. U vezi s tim, naznačena je potreba za detaljnom analizom odnosa između formalnog (de iure) i stvarnog (de facto) položaja Sabora u tadašnjem političkom sustavu vlasti, kako bi se odgovorilo na pitanje je li, na koji način i u kojoj mjeri taj položaj bio oslabljen u odnosu na druga državna politička tijela (ponajprije Izvršno vijeće Sabora), odnosno instrumentaliziran od strane središnjih tijela Saveza komunista Jugoslavije/Hrvatske. Rezultati istraživanja prezentirani su kombinacijom tematskog i kronološkog pristupa, a na kraju članka sistematizirani su u obliku tabličnog prikaza. ; The organisation and the activities of the Croatian Parliament in the communist period (1945-1990) is not a fully researched topic. The paper gives a contribution to the knowledge of its organisation in the period from 1963 to 1974. Its branched structure and the activities of its councils and working bodies are described in detail, which is also illustrated by the number of held sessions. By the Yugoslavian constitution adopted in April 1963, also called "the charter of selfmanagement", the name of the state was changed from People's to Socialist, its socialist attributes were emphasized, and selfmanagement was introduced in all segments of the society. By the new republican constitutions, such changes were also carried out in all then-existing Yugoslavian republics, including Croatia. In the forefront were placed »the sovereign rights of the working people and the Yugoslavian nations which they exercise«, inter alia, as representatives of the working people in councils of federal and republican assemblies. It had affected the organisation of the highest formal political institutions of the government, including federal and republican assemblies, which were declared as »the highest state and self-government authorities, under the law and obligations« of federation, i.e. the republic. The declarative constitutional concept on the assemblies as the highest state and self-government authorities implied the shift in their organisation and activities from the traditional legislative bodies and »law factories« towards »the responsible policy holders«. In other words, »becoming the working selfgovernment bodies«, assemblies were meant to become the centres in which »the whole social practice and harmonised politics is gathered«. Thus, for example, by the constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia from April 1963, it was declared that the Parliament (Sabor) can discuss and adopt declarations and resolutions »on all issues of common interest for the Republic [.] laying down values on politics in certain area and the means of its achievement«. The Croatian Parliament's Rules of Procedure from 1965 provided the possibility of convening a General Croatian Conference (Opći sabor Hrvatske), i.e. joint sessions »on all issues of the common interest for the Republic« of all of Parliament's councils with the Central Committee of the Socialist League of Working People of Croatia and the Republican Committee for Croatia of the Association of Trade Unions in Yugoslavia. The main characteristic of the organisation of the Croatian Parliament in the period from 1963 to 1974 was its complex structure. In order to express its working character and central role in the political decision-making process in all spheres of life in Croatia, it was organised as a five-cameral institution. It was the highest number of its chambers in the whole socialist period: until 1953 it was unicameral, in the period 1953-1963 bicameral, and in the period 1974-1990 a three-cameral institution. Those five chambers were: the Republican Council, the Economic Council, the Educational and Cultural Council, the Social and Health Council and the Organisational and Political Council. The Republican Council had 120 representatives, directly elected by the municipal assemblies and citizens. The other four councils had 80 representatives each, elected by the municipal assemblies among the workers across the working areas within the competence of each council. Except the Presidency of Parliament and its five councils, during the whole period 110 different permanent or temporary working bodies were established. Of that total, there were 27 joint working bodies of Parliament as a whole; the Republican Council had 20, the Economic Council 14, the Educational and Cultural Council 15, the Social and Health Council 18, and the Organisational and Political Council 16 permanent or temporary working bodies. The Parliament's councils and working bodies held in total 3 960 sessions, i.e. 360 per year. By comparison, in the period 1947-1953 during which it was organised as a unicameral body, the Parliament and its working bodies held in total 220 sessions (around 30 per year). In the period 1953- 1963 during which it was organised as a bicameral body, the Parliament and its working bodies held in total 1224 sessions, i.e. around 120 per year. More detailed data on the number of sessions held in the analysed period are listed in the table at the end of this paper. The table also includes a systematic overview of all working bodies which were described earlier in this paper, llustrating at the same time the dynamics of changes in their establishment and elimination. Some authors describe the Parliamentary institutions in the communist states with the metaphor rubber stamp legislatures, meaning the institutions with small practical power in the political decisionmaking process, which automatically put a stamp on the legislative proposals of their governments, i.e. communist parties as the real owners of the political power. Some of the researches singled out as exceptions the Polish Sejm and the Yugoslavian Federal Assembly (in the frame of the political system established by the Yugoslavian constitution from 1974). That opens a new research topic about whether the Croatian Parliament in the period 1963-1974 was also "a paradoxical institution" or an exception. In other words, the relation between the formal (de iure) and the real (de facto) position of Croatian Parliament in the political system of that time should be more closely researched, as well as to find whether its position was weakened, in what way and to what extent by the comparison with other state political institutions (notably the Executive Council of Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Croatia), i.e. instrumentalized by the central bodies of the League of Communist of Yugoslavia/Croatia.
The understanding and clarification of important social events as themes must be derived from the hermeneutic code of the epoch. The millennial threshold was marked by processes of integration and particularisation, which were observed, as constitutive principle or principle of legitimate refutation, also in the bringing down of socialist orders and the establishment of supranational associations. Thus a discussion of the (empirical) position and (normative) status of ethnic minorities must as well be positioned in a universal European context, in which the predominant role is played by liberal theory and liberal practice. In societies going through transformation from ideological to legal state, answers to multi-ethnic needs must be sought in the patterns of liberal philosophy, taking into account (a) the delusion of Western theory that the change of regime brings about a spontaneous springing up of liberal institutions from the socialist ruins, and (b) the possible disproof of the assertion that the recognition of collective rights of ethnic minorities violates the liberal principle of universal equality of citizens as abstract members of the state. On the other hand, it is necessary to understand and acknowledge the historical heritage when solving the issue of ethnic minority rights in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, since the issue was absorbed in their authoritarian past by the ideological supranational programme. All the falsity of the "state of peoples and ethnicities" was fully exposed at the outset of transition, when the regime crisis arose coupled with the crisis of state identity. The states which divided themselves and seceded did fall apart exactly along the lines of the ethnic components. It is precisely in view of the described experience (along with the "surplus of violence" syndrome) that the post-Yugoslavian consolidation necessarily requires institutional guarantee and practical recognition of particular ethnic identities. Adapted from the source document.
The understanding and clarification of important social events as themes must be derived from the hermeneutic code of the epoch. The millennial threshold was marked by processes of integration and particularisation, which were observed, as constitutive principle or principle of legitimate refutation, also in the bringing down of socialist orders and the establishment of supranational associations. Thus a discussion of the (empirical) position and (normative) status of ethnic minorities must as well be positioned in a universal European context, in which the predominant role is played by liberal theory and liberal practice. In societies going through transformation from ideological to legal state, answers to multi-ethnic needs must be sought in the patterns of liberal philosophy, taking into account (a) the delusion of Western theory that the change of regime brings about a spontaneous springing up of liberal institutions from the socialist ruins, and (b) the possible disproof of the assertion that the recognition of collective rights of ethnic minorities violates the liberal principle of universal equality of citizens as abstract members of the state. On the other hand, it is necessary to understand and acknowledge the historical heritage when solving the issue of ethnic minority rights in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, since the issue was absorbed in their authoritarian past by the ideological supranational programme. All the falsity of the "state of peoples and ethnicities" was fully exposed at the outset of transition, when the regime crisis arose coupled with the crisis of state identity. The states which divided themselves and seceded did fall apart exactly along the lines of the ethnic components. It is precisely in view of the described experience (along with the "surplus of violence" syndrome) that the post-Yugoslavian consolidation necessarily requires institutional guarantee and practical recognition of particular ethnic identities. Adapted from the source document.
The discussion about the character & actual role of the parliament in Croatia does not easily differentiate political & scientific opinions, which is in accord with the experiences of advanced democracies. The author considers a scientific debate possible, however, if it is fundamental in the comparative method, & formulates three comparative starting points for such a debate. First, the historical role of the parliament as a symbol of Croatian statehood must be considered. The author considers that in the second half of the 19th century, the power of the governor (ban) was significantly more important in the preservation of Croatian sovereignty than the parliament. Second, a critical grading of the socialist theories on the rule of representative assembly is necessary. These have considerable influence on policy & theoretical discussion in postsocialist countries. Third, caution must be used in approaching Western-style parliamentarism, where the seat of power is in the executive, & the parliament plays only a minor control function. The author suggests that discussion about the Croatian parliament concentrate on increasing constitutional & functional possibilities & roles; eg, through institutions of parliamentary investigations, interpellations, & ombudsman. Adapted from the source document.
The cleavages at the EU level can be defined by means of two dimensions: the first dimension is the left-right conflict & the second is the national-supranational conflict. Between the left & the supranational dimension there are political actors who advocate the policy of regulated capitalism while along the right-national dimension there are the partisans of the neoliberal approach. While the first think that the strengthening of the EU institutions is justified (the supranational level) & they champion the legislation that emphasizes the social-democratic dimension, the neoliberals promote the deregulation of economic activities at the EU level & the strengthening of the roles of national governments. Ideologically, the sympathizers of the regulated capitalism are represented by social-democratic & socialist parties, while the neoliberal model enjoyers the support of a wide array of populist, Christian-democrat, liberal & conservative political parties. Since the 1988 reform, the EU regional policy has been increasingly seen as a vehicle of the supporters of the regulated capitalism. At the same time, the regional policy facilitates a number of interactions based on the cooperation of the supranational, national & regional bodies. Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.
U legitimiranju komunističke vlasti u Hrvatskoj/Jugoslaviji nakon Drugog svjetskog rata važnu ulogu imale su i tradicionalne institucije zakonodavne, izvršne i sudbene vlasti. Njihovo oblikovanje u Federalnoj Državi/Narodnoj Republici Hrvatskoj započelo je 1943. te je nastavljeno do donošenja Ustava NRH 18. siječnja 1947., kojim dobivaju ustavnu potvrdu. U odnosu na njihove ustavne pozicije, u dosadašnjim istraživanjima poslijeratnog političkog sustava u Hrvatskoj zaključeno je da su stvarnu vlast i monopol odlučivanja imala najviša tijela KPJ, tj. KPH. Pri tome stvarni položaj i uloga središnjih državnih tijela u funkcioniranju političkog sustava vlasti u Hrvatskoj nakon 1945. do sada nisu sustavno istraženi te se ovim radom daje doprinos na tom području. Prezentiraju se rezultati istraživanja organizacije i djelovanja Sabora NRH u sustavu vlasti u Hrvatskoj u razdoblju formalnog federalizma i stvarnog centralizma (1945. – 1953.). Postavljeno je više istraživačkih ciljeva: odnos između njegova formalnog ustavnog (de iure) i stvarnog (de facto) položaja u sustavu vlasti, ustroj, sastav, zakonodavna djelatnost i druge funkcije, odnosi s KPH/SKH i republičkim institucijama vlasti, te utjecaj njegova djelovanja na svakodnevni život stanovništva. Njegova organizacija i djelovanje uspoređeni su s organizacijom i djelovanjem Narodne skupštine FNRJ, institucija zakonodavne vlasti drugih jugoslavenskih republika, te drugih država u kojima je bila uspostavljena komunistička vlast, ponajprije Ruske Sovjetske Federativne Socijalističke Republike (RSFSR) i Saveza Sovjetskih Socijalističkih Republika (SSSR). Postavljeno je nekoliko hipoteza koje su istraživanjem i potvrđene: ustavni položaj vrhovnog tijela državne vlasti u Hrvatskoj Sabor NRH nije ostvarivao u praksi; bio je organiziran po uzoru na Narodnu skupštinu FNRJ; njegova zakonodavna djelatnost nije uključivala stvarnu raspravu, već samo formalno normiranje prethodno definiranih političkih ciljeva i ideja KPH/SKH; u Saboru NRH nije bilo pluralizma političkoga mišljenja; građani su se obraćali Saboru NRH prvenstveno s ciljem ostvarivanja osobnih prava, ponajprije socijalnih. Osnovne metode korištene u istraživanju su kritička analiza izvora i komparativna metoda. Rezultati su prezentirani kombinacijom tematskog i kronološkog pristupa, a u pojedinim poglavljima sistematizirani su u obliku grafičkih i tabličnih prikaza. Doktorskim radom daje se doprinos boljem poznavanju institucija i političkog sustava vlasti FD/NRH u razdoblju 1945. – 1953. Istraživanje može biti poticaj sličnim istraživanjima i u drugim bivšim jugoslavenskim republikama. Omogućuje se usporedba s političkim sustavima vlasti u drugim europskim državama u kojima je bila uspostavljena komunistička vlast. ; The important role in legitimising the communist system of government in Croatia/Yugoslavia after the Second World War was played by the traditional institutions of legislative, executive and judicial government. Their organization in Federal State / People's Republic of Croatia began in 1943, and continued until the Constitution of the People's Republic of Croatia adoption on 18th January 1947, which gave them constitutional confirmation. As the supreme state governing institutions were declared People's Republic of Croatia's Parliament and its Presidium; Government of the People's Republic of Croatia was declared as the supreme executive and administrative governing institution, and Supreme Court of the People's Republic of Croatia was declared as the supreme judicial institution. In relation to their constitutional position, in previous researches of post-war political system in Croatia, was concluded that the real authority and decision-making monopoly had the highest body of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, ie. Communist Party of Croatia. In doing so, the actual position and the role of republic governmental institutions in the communist system of government in Croatia after 1945 haven't been systematically researched, and this doctoral thesis makes a contribution in this scope. The doctoral thesis presents the results of researching the organisation and activity of People's Republic of Croatia's Parliament during the period of formal federalism and actual centralism (1945 – 1953). The aim is to explain the realation between the constitutional and actual position of the Parliament in the communist system of government, its structure, composition, legislative activity, relations with the Communist Party of Croatia/League of Communists of Croatia and republic governmental institutions, as well as the influence of its activities on everyday lives of the population. Parliament's organisation and activity is also compared to the organisation and activity of the National Assembly of Yugoslavia, as well as with legislative institutions of the former Yugoslavian republics and other European states with established communist rule, primarily Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). A number of hypotheses are confirmed by research: the constitutional position of the supreme state governing institution, Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia didn't achieve in practice; it was organized on the model of the National Assembly of Yugoslavia; its legislative activity didn't include the actual debate, but only a formal adoption and promulgation of pre-defined political goals and ideas of the Communist Party of Croatia/League of Communist of Croatia; in People's Republic of Croatia'a Parliament, there wasn't pluralism of political opinion; citizens addressed the Parliament, primarily with the aim of solving personal problems, especially social. Main methods used in research were critical analysis of resources (notably original, unpublished archival documents) and comparative method. The research results are presented by a combination of thematic and chronological approach. In certain chapters, they are systematized in the form of graphical and tabular overviews. Doctoral thesis is structured as follows. In the first, introductory chapter are explained the research topic, main goals, hypotheses and scientific contribution, methodology, as well as literature and resources used in the research. The chapter gives an overview of the previous researches relevant to the topic, and the classification of legislatures in such researches. The second chapter gives an overview of the Yugoslav/Croatian communist system of government and the position of legislatures in this system in theory. There are explained the main characteristics of the then revolutionary ideology of the ruling Communist Party, as well as formal constitutional provision. They are compared with the main characteristics of the Soviet communist system of government. It also gives an overview of the classical Marxist theory about the state, government and legislatures, and demonstrates how it was used in the writings and speeches of Yugoslav theoreticians and politicians. The third and fourth chapter give an overview of the People's Republic of Croatia's Parliament organization and activity in practice, divided into two chronological periods: until the adoption of the People's Republic of Croatia's Constitution in January 1947, and thereafter up in 1953. The fifth, concluding chapter, summarizes the main research results. Chapter six contains several appendixes: the results of parliamentary elections in Croatia 1946, 1947 and 1950; a list of councilors, ie. representatives in State Anti-fascist Council for the National Liberation of Croatia and in People's Republic of Croatia's Parliament 1943 – 1953; a list of members of the Presidium of the Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia 1945 – 1953; a list of representatives from Croatia in Constituent Assembly of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia / National Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia 1945 – 1953; a list of laws adopted by the National Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia 1946 – 1953; a list of tables and figures used in doctoral thesis). Seventh chapter contains a list of sources and literature used in the research. Doctoral thesis contributes to better understanding of institutions and the political system of government in Croatia in the period 1945 – 1953. Comparative approach in the presentation of research results, gives a contribution to knowledge of the political system of government and central governing institutions in the former Yugoslavia, as well in the other former Yugoslavian republics. At the same time, it can be a impulse for similar researces in those states. It also enables comparation with the political systems of government and legislatures in other European states with established communist rule. Through the analysis of the influence of its activities on everyday lives of the population, it gives contribution to the history of everyday life in communist Croatia and Yugoslavia.
Slovenian state assembly can be categorized as one of those new parliaments in Central & Eastern Europe that were not only beneficiaries of democratization but also major actors in the transition from the former socialist into a democratic system. It was in the forefront of the modernization of the entire legislature in the second stage of Europeization & played a major role in the process of EU accession. The state assembly as a new parliament has undoubtedly reached a satisfactory level of institutional & organizational competence. The problem is, however, its genuine subjective or "cultural capacity." The lack of such capacities among the delegates in the process of EU accession was occasionally manifested in a huge disparity between the lip service to the EU membership & its values & the real understanding of the functioning of its institutions & goals. On numerous occasions there was a marked contrast between the idealized perceptions about how after the EU accession everything was going to be simpler & the pessimistic predictions about "drowning" in the EU. The Slovenian parliamentary elite has not yet fully grasped the reality that the so called "internal" issues have largely become the European issues or that the European issues have already become "national" issues. On the other hand, too little attention is paid to the question of how demanding the participation of the Slovenian parliament in the circumstances of the full membership really is. The representatives will be exposed to a much more intensive flow of information from the EU institutions & the reaction time will get shorter. This will mean that the delegates will increasingly respond "reactively" instead of "actively." The conclusion is that the state assembly at the commencement of its fourth mandate & following Slovenia's EU accession is not yet fully qualified to participate via the government in the process of EU decision-making from the perspective of a swift grasp of vital information & taking stands; neither is it in the position to properly monitor the government. Also, the state assembly is not conversant enough in translating the European politics into the Slovenian setting since it lacks the necessary experience, knowledge & routine in operating in the new circumstances of multilevel decision-making. Due to this lack of precedents, the real hard work is only beginning. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.
Rad je razmatra pitanja uspostavljanja i razvijanja pedagoškog pluralizma u obrazovnoj politici i praksi u Srbiji u razdoblju od sredine 20. stoljeća do danas. Pod pedagoškim pluralizmom podrazumijevamo uvažavanje i afirmaciju različitih pedagoških koncepcija i pristupa u razvijanju teorije i prakse obrazovanja, odnosno njegovanje različitih teorijskih orijentacija u području obrazovanja, kao i omogućavanje i ostvarivanje alternativnih rješenja glede organizacije i funkcioniranja školskog i nastavnog rada u odnosu na dominantni model školovanja. U vrijeme jugoslavenskog socijalističkog sustava, koga karakterizira nepostojanje demokratskog političkog poretka i odsustvo njegovanja pluralističkih stavova i vrijednosti, izostao je i pedagoški (i školski) pluralizam. Povoljniji uvjeti za razvoj pedagoškog i školskog pluralizma u Srbiji stvoreni su u post-socijalističkom razdoblju. Nakon 90-tih godina 20. stoljeća otvorena je mogućnost osnivanja privatnih odgojno-obrazovnih ustanova, a od nedavno i vrtića i škola posebne pedagoške orijentacije (tj. alternativnih škola). Također, u proteklom razdoblju realiziran je veći broj projekata, programa i obuka usmjerenih ka unaprjeđenju kvalitete nastavnog i školskog rada, u okviru kojih se mogu prepoznati ideje i koncepti karakteristični za reformne pedagoške pokrete. Međutim, dojam je da se inicijative i napori kojima se podupire pluralizam u obrazovanju, a koji dolaze od znanstvene i stručne javnosti, kao i od prosvjetnih vlasti, odnose uglavnom na demokratizaciju i unaprjeđivanje kvalitete obrazovanja unutar javnog sustava školstva, a ne na promoviranje i podršku privatnom obrazovanju i/ili alternativnim pedagoškim koncepcijama u njihovom izvornom obliku. ; The paper addresses the issue of introducing and fostering pedagogical pluralism in the education policy and practice in Serbia from the mid-20th century onwards. Pedagogical pluralism implies the appreciation and affirmation of different pedagogical conceptions and approaches aimed at developing education theory and practice, i. e. the promotion of different theoretical orientations in the field of education, as well as the implementation of alternative solutions to the organisation and functioning of school work and teaching that differ from the prevailing education model. During the Yugoslav socialist system characterized by the lack of a democratic political order and pluralistic attitudes and values, there was no room for pedagogical (and school) pluralism either. More favourable conditions for the development of pedagogical and school pluralism in Serbia were created in the post-socialist period. After the 1990s, possibilities opened up for privately founded educational institutions, and since recently – kindergartens and schools with special pedagogical orientation (alternative schools). A significant number of projects, programmes and trainings were also implemented in the previous period aimed at enhancing the quality of school work and teaching conveying the ideas and concepts typical of reform pedagogy movements. However, it seems that the initiatives and efforts encouraging pluralism in education undertaken by the academic community and the education authorities are directed more at fostering the democratisation of education and improving its quality inside the public school system and less at promoting and supporting private education and/or alternative pedagogical approaches in their original form.
Izrada civilnih topografskih karata tradicionalno nije bila u nadležnosti institucija u Bosni i Hercegovini. Takve karte izrađivane su u Vojno geografskom institutu u Beogradu – vojnoj instituciji Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije. Međutim proizvodnja tzv. osnovnih državnih karata bila je u nadležnosti državnih geodetskih (kartografskih) instituta. Osnovne topografske karte (u Federaciji Bosne i Hercegovine - FBiH) nisu ažurirane više od 20 godina. Stoga je odlučeno da je umjesto ažuriranja postojećih karata, potrebno izraditi nove topografske karte uz pomoć dostupnih izvora i novih tehnologija. U radu se daje prijedlog za stvaranje nove metodologije izrade osnovne topografske karte u mjerilu 1: 5000 i 1: 10000. Potrebno je naglasiti da je Federalna uprava za geodetske i imovinsko-pravne poslove Bosne i Hercegovine (FGU) inicirala stvaranje osnovnih pretpostavki suvremenog razvoja u području katastra i kartografije donošenjem strategije razvoja katastra i topografskih modela, modela podataka katastra nekretnina i distribucija podataka putem geoportala FGU itd. ; Production of civilian topographic maps is, traditionally, not common in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such maps were produced by the Military Geographical Institute in Belgrade – military institution of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (ex-YU). However, production of the so-called basic state maps was reserved for civil surveying (cartographic) institutes. Basic topographic maps (in Federation Bosnia and Herzegovina - FB&H) have not been updated for more than 20 years. Due to that fact, it has been concluded that, instead of updating the existing maps, it is necessary to develop new metrology for creating topographic maps by using the available sources and new technologies. This paper provides a proposal for creating a new methodology for developing basic topographic maps at 1:5000 and 1:10000 scales. It is also necessary to emphasise that the Federal Administration for Geodetic and Property Affairs (FGA) initiated the creation of fundamental assumptions for contemporary development in the fields of cadastre and cartography. So, the FGA adopted the development strategies, cadastre and topographic models, established the real estate cadastre database and geoportals, etc.
The author holds that the constitutional theory today is put to the test in three areas. The first is the problem of the relationship between transnational regimes & government institutions. Constitutional/legal theory is faced with the question how the norms concerning transnational regimes can acquire the dignity of legal norms via "constitutionalization." The second challenge is posed by transnational regimes sui generis such as the EU's legal system. The third concerns the process of EU's expansion. For the author, a constitution is both an instrument & a symbol; ie, it is doubly coded. On the one hand, it leans on practice & instrumental implementation, & on the other on the world of representation. There are different types of constitutions. Type one are manifests, largely solely symbolically coded. Type two are the constitutions in the form of contracts, structured more in the form of a legal relationship between discrete actors than a monolithic symbolic corpus. Type three are programmatic or planned constitutions, & they are associated with the rise & fall of socialist societies. They identify the already politically defined developmental goals. And finally, there are the so-called constitutions-cum-laws. These are a result of a regular legislative process that enables people in the capacity of presumed agents of sovereignty to debate constitutions & accept them. The author's opinion is that the transition of Central- & East-European countries is a transition from the simple-coded with the primacy of the symbolic to the double-coded constitutions. This transition is not smooth. The first difficulty lies in "transplanting" constitutional solutions to different social/historical contexts. The second relates to the anticonstitutional mentality that prevails in these societies. Despite everything, the constitutional balance in Central & Eastern Europe is satisfactory on the whole. The constitutions of these countries are interesting because of three symbolic aspects. The first refers to the constitution formation processes in which these societies ceased to be objects of authoritarian rulers. The second aspect regards the search for new forms of identity & unity. The third aspect refers to the attempts to banish tyranny from politics & social life by means of legal chains. 35 References. Z. Dubiel
U radu se na temelju tadašnje i recentne (domaće i strane) literature te prostornih planova istražuje međuodnos turističkoga i prostornoga planiranja u Hrvatskoj i Jugoslaviji 1960-ih. Analitičko-interpretativnom metodom proučava se međuodnos tadašnjega društveno-političkog sustava, politika prema turizmu i prostoru, društvenoga planiranja, tijela uprave, institucija specijaliziranih za planiranje, turističkoga prometa, izrađenih prostornih planova, intenziteta izgradnje smještajnih kapaciteta i dr. Zaključuje se da su turističko i prostorno planiranje međusobno bili povezani društvenim planovima razvoja, a rezultati djelovanja u prostoru ovisili su o brojnim, često i nepredvidivim društveno-političkim čimbenicima. U praksi je provedba planova dodatno usložnjena jer su oni često djelovali apstraktno i kontradiktorno u političkom sustavu koji je imao ograničenu sposobnost za provedbu kvalitetnih, ali ponekad i utopijskih ideja. ; Based on the contemporaneous and recent (domestic and foreign) literature and spatial plans, this paper examines the relationship between touristic and spatial planning in Croatia and Yugoslavia in the 1960s. The relationship is determined using the analytical-interpretative method of the then socio-political system, tourism and spatial policy, social planning, administrative bodies, institutions specialised for planning, tourist traffic, produced spatial plans, the intensity of building accommodation capacity, etc. In the first period after the end of the war, tourism developed in an uncontrolled manner because it was not the subject of coordinated socio-economic and spatial plans. Due to a growing interest for the inflow of foreign currencies from foreign tourists, tourism gradually gained significance and was regularly given priority in development plans. The new approach to spatial planning was most visible in the developed methodology of spatial plan production and the hotel architecture and constructed hotel complexes. Since the Croatian coast had the longest Adriatic shoreline in the then Yugoslavia, the longest tradition of tourism, and was the flagship among the republics in tourism development projections and the spatial planning of tourism (because of the developed methodology of plan production), the largest number of touristic spatial plans during the socialist period were made for the Croatian Adriatic coast (on multiple levels), and the greatest investments were made in building hotel capacity there. Despite the initial idea of developing tourism and equal accommodation options for all, the new tourism planning model transformed away from this basic idea and gave priority to exponential economic growth. This new approach to tourism was most visible through the establishment of a new network of organisations and institutions for planning tourism and tourism planning in a broader spatial context rather than only on the level of individual investments. All factors regarding the implementation of social plans could not have been taken into account because all the administrative and reorganisation factors as well as the dramatic events of the socio-political and economic system as a whole that took place in the 1990s could not have been predicted. The proper methodological steps for continued and coordinated planning in the 1960s introduced significant changes into the system of touristic and spatial planning. After the implementation of the plans began, the complexities of planning (numerous unpredictable factors) that influenced their realisation became apparent. The practice of planning was further complicated because plans often acted in an abstract and contradictory manner in a political system that had a limited capacity for realising quality—and in some cases utopian—plans.
Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.
