On April 25, 2013, UN's Security Council established a 12,600-strong peacekeeping force for Mali. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) is to take over and continue the security and stabilization task that the French-led military operation in cooperation with UN's African-led International Support Mission to Mali, AFISMA, initiated in January 2013. The aim of this report is to present a number of long- and short-term perspectives for the recently initiated peace- and state-building process in Mali by focusing on the historical, structural and political causes of the crisis in Mali. Understanding these causes and handling their derived conflict potentials provide a minimum of prerequisites for establishing long-term peace. The report is structured according to four intertwined conflict potentials: Mali's fragile state, the status and background of the Tuareg rebellion, the organized crime and the regional cooperation. .
Nordområdene har vært på den norske utenrikspolitiske agendaen i 15 år. Mye har endret seg i denne perioden. Det som preger debatten i 2020, er forestillinger om stormaktpolitikk og rivalisering i nord. Samtidig hevdes det fra de arktiske hovedstedene at regionen er preget av samarbeid, og at de arktiske statene har fellesinteresser som gjør konflikt lite sannsynlig. Hvordan kan to så ulike oppfatninger om Arktis opptre samtidig? I dette bidraget foretar vi en lagdeling mellom tre ulike nivåer av sikkerhetspolitikk i og om nordområdene og Arktis. Dette tydeliggjør hvordan regionen kan være preget av både samarbeid og rivalisering på samme tid. Samarbeid og rivalsering vektes ulikt avhengig av tid og sted, men de er ikke gjensidig utelukkende.
Abstract in English:Great Power Politics and Increased Tension? The Art of Differentiating Analyses in the ArcticThe High North has been on the Norwegian foreign policy agenda for 15 years. Much has changed over this period. What characterizes the debate in 2020 are notions of great power politics and rivalry in the north. At the same time, Arctic states claim that the region is defined by cooperation and that the Arctic states have common interests that make conflict unlikely. How can two such different perceptions of the Arctic exist simultaneously? In this contribution, we separate between three different levels of security policy in and around the High North and the Arctic. This helps clarify how the region can be characterized by both cooperation and rivalry at the same time. Cooperation and rivalry differ depending on time and place, but they are not mutually exclusive.
Ukrainekrisen har forstyrret det ellers velfungerende samarbejde i Arktis, og det er blevet vanskeligere at samarbejde om både militære, diplomatiske og økonomiske forhold. Dog er krisens betydning mere begrænset, end man kunne have frygtet. Ruslands vigtige interesse i arktisk olie og gas gør, at Moskva har ført en mindre aggressiv politik i det høje nord. I stedet er det særligt Vesten, der har bragt krisen til polarregionen ved at inddrage regionen i sine sanktionspakker, og det kan betyde, at Rusland skifter kurs i fremtiden. I så fald vil Rusland ikke søge en direkte militær konfrontation, men i stedet udnytte politiske svagheder i den vestlige alliance ved hjælp af provokationer, obstruktion af samarbejde og suverænitetskrænkelser. Rigsfællesskabet bør fortsætte sin samarbejdsorienterede politik i Arktis. Praktisk samarbejde og åbne kommunikationskanaler til Moskva vil gøre det muligt at afspænde situationen og undgå, at misforståelser og enkeltstående episoder fører til en unødig eskalering. Samtidig bør Rigsfællesskabet dog forberede sig på, at Rusland kan skifte kurs i Arktis i det omfang, at disse forberedelser ikke underminerer den samarbejdsorienterede politik. ; The Ukraine crisis has made it more difficult to cooperate over military, diplomatic, and economic matters in the Arctic, but the impact of the crisis is less severe than it could have been. Oil and gas exploration and exploitation in the Arctic is central to Russia's grand strategy and it makes Russia more dependent on the other states in the Arctic, and thus more prone to cooperate in the region. Instead, it is mainly the West that has brought the crisis to the High North by including the region in its sanction packages. It may become rational for Russia to change to a more aggressive course in the Arctic. Russia will not seek a military confrontation in that case, but will instead exploit political weaknesses in the Western alliance through provocations, obstructions of cooperation, and violations of sovereignty. The Kingdom of Denmark (Denmark, the Faeroe Islands, and Greenland) should continue its cooperation-oriented policy in the Arctic. Practical cooperation and open channels of communication enable Denmark and the Western states to lower tensions and to avoid that a single incident or misunderstanding escalates the situation. The Kingdom of Denmark should concurrently prepare for how to handle a more assertive Russia in the Arctic, insofar as these preparations do not undermine its cooperation-oriented policy in the High North.
Vestens umiddelbare reaksjon på Talibans maktovertakelse i Afghanistan i august 2021 har stort sett vært den samme som da Taliban kom til makten første gang i 1996. Vestlige stater og FN valgte den gang å isolere regimet, nekte diplomatisk anerkjennelse og etter hvert innføre strenge sanksjoner. Humanitær bistand var tillatt, men ikke samarbeid med Talibans statlige organer og ikke kanalisering av bistand via staten. Det er derfor grunn til å vurdere Vestens nåværende respons i lys av historien. Sanksjons- og isoleringspolitikken på 1990-tallet ga ikke forventede resultater og virket for det meste mot sin hensikt. Er det grunn til å tro at en lignende politikk i dag vil være mer effektiv? Hvis ikke, hva er konturene av et bredere og strategisk mer balansert engasjement? Abstract in EnglishThe Road Ahead – Confrontation or Creative Compromises?The immediate reaction of Western states to the Taliban's seizure of power in Afghanistan in August 2021 was broadly speaking the same as when the Taliban first came to power in 1996. Western states and the UN chose at that time to isolate the regime, deny it diplomatic recognition and gradually impose strong sanctions. Humanitarian assistance was allowed, but not program cooperation with Taliban authorities and state institutions, and no assistance was to be channelled via the Taliban-controlled state. The results are highly relevant today. In the 1990s, the sanctions-and-isolation policy did not bring about the desired results, and in important respects were counter-productive. Are there reasons to believe that similar policies today will be more effective? This article outlines the contours of a broader and strategic more balanced engagement.
The region of Southeast Asia is faced with a complex set of challenges stemming from political, economic and religious developments at the national, regional and global level. This paper sets out to examine trade-, foreign- and security policy implications of the issues confronting the region. In ASEAN, the Southeast Asian countries are continuing their ambitious attempts at further integration. Plans outlining deeper security and economic communities have been adopted. However, huge differences in political systems, economic development and ethnic/religious structures are hampering prospects of closer cooperation. The highly controversial conflict case of Burma/Myanmar is testing the much adhered-to principle of non-interference and at the same time complicating relations with external powers. Among these, the United States and China are dramatically strengthening their interests in the region. American influence is not least manifesting itself in light of the war against terrorism, which the region is adapting to in different ways and at different speeds. By contrast, the European Union does not seem to answer Southeast Asian calls for further engagement. A flurry of bilateral and regional trade agreements is another prominent feature of the economic landscape of the region. This is to a certain degree a reflex ion of impatience with trade liberalization in the WTO and within ASEAN itself. Structures of economic cooperation are under rapid alteration in Southeast Asia. The paper analyses the above-mentioned developments with a view to assessing the prospects of future stability, economic development and integration in and among ASEAN countries. It is concluded that although the scope for increased economic benefit and political harmonization through ASEAN integration alone is limited, the organization could still prove useful as a common regional point of reference in tackling more important policy determinants at national and global level.
Av historiska, ekonomiska och säkerhetspolitiska orsaker är Finland ett "minst sannolikt fall" (least likely case) vad gäller oro över kinesiska investeringar. Finland har inom EU haft det högsta relativa handelsberoendet av Kina. Sedan år 2016 är Finland även ett av de EU-länder som fått mest investeringar från Kina absolut sett. Finland, som inte är NATO-medlem, har oproblematiska relationer till Kina och en öppen ekonomi, som ännu för några år sedan välkomnade kinesiska investeringar. Landet har också en ovanligt lång obruten tradition av inhemsk lagstiftning om utländska investeringar som sedan 1992 kan betecknas som liberal. Under de senaste två åren har det emellertid bland policyeliten och i den allmänna diskussionen skett en drastisk förändring i synen på kinesiska investeringar som närmast kan betecknas som en gestalt shift. En påföljd av detta är att behovet av en bättre helhetsbild om kinesiska investeringar har identifierats. Informationsutbyte och koordinering mellan olika myndigheter har förbättrats på många sätt. Samtidigt har man även fördjupat nordiskt myndighetssamarbete och informationsutbyte om relevant lagstiftning och praxis inom området. Även om samarbete kring utländska investeringar inte ingick i Stoltenberg-rekommendationerna år 2009, så kan man se det som ett naturligt led i intensifierat nordiskt säkerhetssamarbete.
Abstract in English:The Canary That Fell Silent. Finland's Gestalt Shift on Chinese InvestmentsFor a mixture of historical, economic and security policy reasons Finland can be regarded as a least likely case with regard to apprehensiveness over Chinese investments. Within the EU, Finland has had the highest relative trade dependence on China. Since 2016, Finland is also one of the EU member states that have attracted the most Chinese investment in absolute terms. Finland, which is not a NATO member, has unproblematic relations with China and an open economy that up until a few years ago welcomed Chinese investments. The country also has an unusually long unbroken tradition of domestic legislation regarding foreign investments, which since 1992 can be characterised as liberal. However, during the last two years, there has been a drastic change in views on Chinese investments, both among the policy elite and in the public debate. This change can be regarded as a veritable gestalt shift. As a corollary, a need for a better overview of Chinese investments has been identified. Information exchange and coordination between various governmental departments has been improved in several ways. Simultaneously, cooperation and information exchange between relevant Nordic authorities regarding relevant legislation and praxis has also deepened. Although the 2009 Stoltenberg recommendations did not encompass cooperation on foreign investments, this can be seen as a natural leg in intensified Nordic security cooperation.
I akademia skrives det ofte at stater deltar i institusjoner så lenge dette sammenfaller med deres interesser på ethvert tidspunkt. Implikasjonen av dette er at stater som Kina kanskje vil avvise internasjonale institusjoner så fort de føler at institusjonene ikke er nyttige. Jeg vil hevde at Kina lar sine interesser formes av institusjonene ut over hva ytre rammevilkår vil tilsi. For å belyse dette argumentet tar artikkelen for seg en casestudie med utviklingen av Shanghai-samarbeidsorganisasjonen (SCO) og Kinas holdninger i denne prosessen. Spesifikt vil artikkelen trekke linjer fra forhandlingene mellom Kina og Sovjetunionen over grensespørsmål på 1980-tallet frem til grunnleggingen av SCO på 2000-tallet. Ved å sammenligne en rasjonell tilnærming med en historisk vil artikkelen hevde at den historiske er mer relevant for å forstå Kinas holdninger. Artikkelen argumenterer at en historisk tilnærming har potensial som et nyttig verktøy, og at den bør undersøkes mer innen IR-faget.
Abstract in EnglishEfficient tools or historical frameworks? China's attitude to international institutionsIn academia, it is common to assume that states participate in institutions insofar as this serves their interests at any given time. The implication is that states like China may reject international institutions as soon as they no longer consider them useful. The author argues that China lets its interests be shaped by the institutions beyond what structural factors imply. To shed light on this argument, this article conducts a case study of the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and China's attitudes to this process. Specifically, the article will draw connections from negotiations between the China and the Soviet Union over border disputes in the 1980s to the foundation of the SCO in the 2000s. By comparing a rational approach with a historical one, the article argues that the historical approach is more relevant to understand China's attitudes. It further argues that a historical approach has potential as a useful tool and should be examined further in IR.
In: Vestenskov , D (red.) 2014 ' 10 YEARS AFTER NATO MEMBERSHIP : An anniversary in the shadow of a crisis ' Forsvarsakademiets Forlag , FAK , s. 1-112 .
"10 years after NATO Membership. An Anniversary in the Shadow of a Crisis", indeholder artikler fra politiske aktører, diplomater og forskere, der alle bidrog til til konferencen af samme navn, hvor den 10-året for baltisk medlemskab af NATO var omdrejningspunktet. Udover den danske forsvarsminister, er den estiske og litauiske forsvarsminister og NATO's vicegeneralsekretær blandt bidragyderne. Konferencens formål var at fejre, inddrage og diskutere 10 års forsvarspolitisk NATO-samarbejde i Østersøområdet. Den internationale udvikling i Europa betød at konferencens dagsorden i stedet for kom til at stå i skyggen af krisen i Ukraine, og det anspændte europæiske forhold til Rusland. Dette afspejledes ikke kun på selve konferencen, men har også sat et dybt fodaftryk på publikationen, der dels belyser det forsvarspolitiske samarbejde mellem Danmark og de baltiske stater, dels tegner et billede af hvordan den russiske aggression på Krimhalvøen blev italesat af de repræsenterede landes Forsvarsministre samt fra hovedkvarteret i NATO. Konferencen blev afholdt tidligere i år i København, og var et resultat af et tæt samarbejde mellem Forsvarsakademiet, Forsvarsministeriet og ambassadørerne for Estland, Letland og Litauen i Danmark. ; Since the recognition of their independence in 1921, the three Baltic States Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have enjoyed a special status in Danish foreign policy that has continued into present-day times. Being one of the few countries that never officially recognized the Soviet annexation in 1940, Denmark became an early advocate in relation to Baltic membership of NATO in the wake of the Cold War. Defence cooperation, such as the joint contribution to the missions in the Balkans in the early 1990s, as well as the present air policing mission, first initiated in 2004, has been an important part of the political relationship. A conference celebrating and evaluating the first ten years of NATO membership was quite naturally a high-level event to be placed in Copenhagen. As progress with planning the conference proceeded, the international security community suddenly faced a crisis in Crimea, when separatists, with Russian support, gradually took control of the Crimean Peninsula. In only 24 days, what had initially been demonstrations and protests evolved into a complete Russian annexation, through a very dubious local democratic election, where independence from Ukraine, as well as affi liation to Russia, was declared with 96% of voters in favor of joining Russia. These events naturally had a massive impact on this conference, which resulted in an anniversary in the shadow of a crisis. This turn of events forced a new discussion upon the member states of NATO: What is the main purpose of the Alliance? This question became a focal point for the conference, as well as the articles presented here.
In: Mandrup , T 2009 , ' South Africa and the SADC Stand-by Force ' , Scientia Militaria : South African Journal of Military Studies , bind 37 , nr. 2 , s. 1-24 .
The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.
Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.
Den här artikeln identifierar och analyserar tre olika reaktioner, i artikeln benämnda »strategisk respons», på amerikansk strategisk återhållsamhet sedan 2017 och mot bakgrund av Brexit: »Liberal övervintring», »Ett starkare Europa» och »En bredare koalition». Analysen kopplar strategisk respons, strategiskt aktörskap och strategisk autonomi och leder till två slutsatser: För det första att Brexit snararare har gynnat än hindrat det europeiska säkerhets- och försvarssamarbetet, såväl inom ramen för EU som mellan EU och stater som står utanför EU, däribland Storbritannien. För det andra att den framväxande säkerhetsordningen innebär nya och annorlunda förutsättningar för det säkerhets- och försvarspolitiska samarbetet i Europa, inte minst i Norden.
Abstract in English:American Strategic Restraint and European Strategic Response: Three Forms of Strategic Response Post-BrexitThis paper describes and analyses three types of European strategic response since the year 2017 by European governments and the EU in response to US strategic restraint and conditioned by Brexit. The three types of response we label "liberal wintering", "a stronger Europe" and "a broader coalition". The paper links strategic response to strategic agency and strategic autonomy leading on to two main conclusions: First, that Brexit has done more to promote than to restrain the development of European common security and defence, both within the EU and when involving nations outside of the EU, such as the UK. Second, that the new broader European security and defence structures open the door to new forms of cooperation, for example between the Nordic countries.
Siden 2003 har regeringerne i Norge, Danmark, Sverige, Finland og Island arbejdet med at udvikle og implementere nationale strategier for cyber- og informationssikkerhed. Strategierne omfatter mange forskellige områder; f.eks. institutionel kapacitetsopbygning, uddannelses- og forsvarspolitik, internationalt samarbejde etc. Denne artikel skitserer landenes forskellige strategier per august 20181 for statens rolle i samfundets cyberresiliens, dvs. de kritiske samfundsfunktioners evne til at modstå og overkomme negative effekter af hændelser med udspring i cyberdomænet. Endvidere skitserer artiklen de udfordringer, som regeringerne har konstateret, at opgavefordeling og ansvarsplacering har givet, samt hvordan implementeringerne af strategierne reflekterer disse erkendelser. Her har den finske regering vist sig mest konsekvent ved at placere ansvaret for implementeringen af cyberresiliens centralt i en magtfuld organisation og udstyre den med konkrete styringsredskaber og en stor, velintegreret kontaktflade til den private del af Finlands kritiske infrastruktur.
Abstract in English
Since 2003, the governments of Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland have developed and implemented national strategies for cyber and information security. The strategies include several topics such as organisational and human resource capacity building, defence policy, international cooperation, etc. This article gives a thumbnail sketch of the countries' strategies for the state's role in societal cyber resiliens (the ability to resist and overcome negative effects of events emanating from the cyber domain). It then shortly describes the experienced challenges with distribution of tasks and responsibilities, and how the implementation of the strategies reflect attempts to overcome them. It concludes that the Finnish government has gone furthest by placing responsibility for implementation centrally in an influential organisation and giving it a centrally developed common matrix for assessing progress and a well-established formal network within the private segment of Finland's critical infrastructure.
Sentralforvaltningen her til lands har de siste tiårene blitt internasjonalisert. Globale spørsmål legger beslag på stadig større ressurser i staten, men samordningen mellom departementene har ikke utviklet seg i samme takt. Norsk utenrikspolitikk ligger derfor ikke bare fast, den ligger også spredt. Komplekse globale utfordringer (terror, klimaendringer, pandemier, biodiversitet, cybertrusler, migrasjon m.v.) krever et langt tettere samarbeid for blant annet å reversere økt fragmentering – i en offentlig sektor hvor vi er satt opp med sterke fagdepartementer og svake samordningsmekanismer. Samtidig innvarsler byggingen av det nye regjeringskvartalet endringer i måten norsk (utenriks)politikk vil bli gjennomført på. Forholdet mellom fagspesialister og diplomatiske generalister blir tettere og vil utfordre den diplomatiske rollen og selvforståelsen på nye måter. Diplomatiets kjerneoppgaver vil endres. Blant annet vil langt bedre koordinering bli en hovedutfordring for utenrikspolitikken. Artikkelen trekker derfor opp noen problemstillinger og forslag som innspill til debatten,
Abstract in English:Track IV: The Future of DiplomacyOver the past decades, Norwegian ministries have become more internationalized. Global issues take up ever more of their time and resources, but cross-sectorial coordination has been lagging behind. Norwegian foreign policy is therefore fragmented. Complex global challenges (terrorism, climate change, pandemics, biodiversity, cyber threats, migration, etc.) call for much closer inter-ministerial cooperation to reverse increased fragmentation – in a public sector where sectorial responsibilities are strong and coordination mechanisms few. The new block housing most of the offices of the Government in central Oslo is a signal change for how Norwegian foreign policies will be conducted in the years ahead. Sector specialists and diplomatic generalists will move closer together, working under the same roof, and this will challenge the classic diplomatic role and the way diplomats look at themselves. Our core tasks will change. Improved coordination will move to the forefront of the work we do. The article presents an idea or two for a much-needed debate.