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Since the start of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, the Nordic states have sought to advance their defence cooperation "beyond peacetime" to also encompass operational military cooperation in crisis and armed conflict. Relations between the two Nordic non-NATO members, Sweden and Finland, have formed a vanguard, encompassing bilateral operational planning beyond peacetime. While no formal security policy guarantees have been exchanged, Sweden and Finland have created strong expectations that they will lend each other support in a crisis. In short, while no formal alliance treaty exists, the two states have nevertheless become closely aligned. In 2020, Sweden and Finland joined NATO member Norway in signalling their intention to strengthen their trilateral defence relationship. The following year, NATO members Norway and Denmark signed a similar agreement with Sweden. The goal of these documents was to coordinate their national operational plans – their "war plans" – and perhaps develop some common operational plans. In this article, it is argued that these agreements fall short of a formal military alliance, but that they represent an alignment policy between the Nordic states.

It is well established in International Relations that the modem state & the state system originated at the Peace of Westphalia (1648). In this article, the author argues that there is little evidence to support such an understanding, neither in the texts of the treaties nor in the political situation before or in the wake of 1648. Rather, the Peace of Westphalia can in many ways be understood to be a step backwards from a modem understanding of sovereignty (cuius regio, eius religio: whose region it is, his religion it is), which to some extent was represented in the Peace of Augsburg (1555). International Relations' understanding of the Peace of Westphalia is based on a mythical understanding of historical processes. Furthermore, the author argues, International Relations should abandon the mythical watershed which 1648 represents. However, instead of searching for another myth to explain the origin of its main object of study, one should instead re-conceptualise the discipline in a new & more dynamic way, taking into account the heterogeneous character of the international system. 60 References. Adapted from the source document.

Handbook on Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic: The High North Between Cooperation and Confrontation, edited by Joachim Weber, is part of the Springer series Frontiers in International Relations. Published in 2020, the anthology comes at a turbulent time in Arctic geopolitics, when the traditional supremacy of the Arctic littoral states has started to be challenged by lurking interests of non-Arctic stakeholders, and global anthropogenic challenges, such as climate change, keep raising questions as to the future of security and geopolitical balance in the region. The handbook comprises a compelling read with diverse areas of discussion that give an insightful exploration of the most pressing issues relevant to Arctic geopolitics. The multidisciplinarity of approaches employed in this volume and the variety of relevant topics covered have the potential to mark a turning point in international scholarship on geopolitical studies.

Surveys cooperative roles of the Nordic states in connection to the expansion of the European Union. Overlap between membership in NATO & the EU makes development issues of critical importance for the Nordic states. Aside from taking part in some of the general challenges currently encompassed in the EU agenda, such as the improvement of transatlantic relations & the development of the EU Constitution, the Nordic states should also strive, it is suggested, to play a key role in the EU's expansion to include Baltic states. Nordic investment in environmental development in Russia & the Baltic region, Baltic interest in Nordic policy, & other factors position the Nordic states to be effective role players in the EU expansion. While certain initiatives in this arena have been met with success, a diminished visibility in EU decision making is nonetheless feared. Several suggestions are here made that approach the need to more effectively advance cooperation between both dominant EU powers & newcomers alike. C. Brunski

2014 marked important milestones for Afghanistan. It gained a new political leadership by a democratic election, the NATO International Stabilisation Force (ISAF) was withdrawn, and the country took the initiative to a wider and more trusting cooperation with its neighbor Pakistan (RFE/RL 2014). 2015 is a crucial year. We will get an indication of whether Afghanistan can stand on its own and if the (partial) military extraction was wise, and to what extent the new administration is viable. Adapted from the source document.

It is well known that the US-Russian dialogue was 'reset' in 2009 under US President Obama and his Russian counterpart Medvedev although it is doubtful whether this symbolic commitment really created conditions for better, or closer, intergovernmental relations. In the following, I analyse how signs of renewed cooperation emitted by the respective political leaderships reflected on multilateral fora in which both the United States and Russia are represented, with a particular emphasis on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN Security Council. The overall impression is that US-Russian diplomatic collaboration in 2009-2011 remained limited and focused on fewer issues, but that both sides deliberately avoided 'disturbing' each other's priority interests. A specific observation from the OSCE is that Russia's diplomatic initiatives were better prepared than previously and in the future may carry greater weight, at least on the European mainland. Unlike the United States, which acts through the Security Council when it believes that it can forge a coalition to pursue a particular objective, in 2009-2011 Russia's UN diplomacy still remained defensive. Adapted from the source document.

Between the Second World War and the fall of the Berlin Wall Germany showed great aversion towards using military force for other purposes than territorial defense and held a multilateral balance between France and the United States with their respective ambitions EU and NATO. After the Wall fell, the German security policy started to change and German politicians increasingly argued for military use as a legitimate instrument in international politics. Among the driving forces for this process has been the change in European strategic culture as Europe is looking towards an integrated foreign and security policy, which may even go against German interest. L. Pitkaniemi

Investigations carried out over the course of the last decade have revealed that during much of the Cold War, Sweden espoused a Janus-like policy in which there stood an open non-alignment & neutrality doctrine alongside a secret arrangement to cooperate with Western powers in the event of a Soviet invasion or a European war. This article focuses on what is here suggested to be a series of attempts to rewrite or edit this particular phase of Swedish political history, given the incompatibility of the two stances that Sweden assumed during this period. The author treats some of the highly controversial Swedish policies concerning alignment with the West, in particular with the United States & NATO. References. C. Brunski