Brendiranje gradova, pod kojim većina autora smatra procese upravljanja identitetom i imidžom, predstavlja strateški odgovor na nove zahtjeve umrežena svijeta, ekonomske trendove, informacijske i socijalne potrebe stanovništva. Teorijske perspektive i primjeri iz prakse naglašavaju važnost "upravljanja" urbanim identitetima kroz konceptualne postavke brendiranja kako bi se povećala konkurentnost gradova u sljedećim sferama: turistička potražnja, optimalna iskoristivost resursa (ulaganja, privlačenje novih stanovnika…), revitalizacija urbanih prostora i jačanje identiteta grada. Uporabom tehnika i alata brendiranja stvaraju se preduvjeti za optimalnu iskoristivost konkurentskih prednosti nekoga grada u odnosu na ostale, pri čemu komunikacijske prakse gradskih sustava i podsustava predstavljaju infrastrukturalnu platformu za provedbu navedenoga procesa. Aktualni teorijski koncept koji je okrenut identitetskomu modelu temelji se na holističkome pristupu upravljanja brendom s naglaskom na povećano uključivanje mjesnoga stanovništva u stvaranje urbanih politika. Orijentiranost prema jačanju gradskoga identiteta inkluzivnim pristupom konceptualne postavke brendiranja uvodi u sferu suvremenoga gradskog menadžmenta temeljena na načelima dobroga upravljanja, naglašavajući pritom važnost dijaloških procesa između različitih interesnih skupina i nužnost širega razumijevanja kulture u smislu strateškoga alata za urbani razvoj. Stoga se rad bavi teorijskim aspektima, metodama i primjenom strateškoga upravljanja komunikacijom u procesu brendiranja gradova. Autor polazi od pretpostavke da u procesu razvijanja brenda, pored analize trenutnoga imidža vanjskih javnosti, ključnu ulogu ima komunikacijska kompetencija dionika u stvaranju mehanizama za dijaloške procese između interesnih javnosti unutar grada kako bi se postigao većinski konsenzus o uporištima živućega identiteta grada. Oslanjajući se na saznanja vodećih autora iz ovoga područja i analizu primjera iz prakse, u radu se predstavljaju osnovni koraci procesa izgradnje gradskoga brenda. ; City branding, vast majority of authors consider as the process of identity and image management, represents a strategic answer to new demands of the networked world, economic trends, information and social needs of the population. Theoretical perspectives and practical examples emphasize the significance of urban identities "management" through conceptual settings of branding in order to increase competitiveness of cities in the following spheres: touristic demand, optimal efficiency of resources (investments, attracting new inhabitants…), revitalization of urban spaces and strengthening of the city identity. Preconditions for optimal efficiency of competitive advantages of a certain city in relation to other are created by using branding techniques and tools, while communication practices of city systems and subsystems represent infrastructural platform for implementation of the mentioned process. Current theoretical concept related to identity model is based on the holistic approach to the brand management with the emphasis on increased involving of the local population in creating urban policies. Orientation towards strengthening city identity by inclusive approach to conceptual setting of branding introduces the contemporary city management sphere based on the principle of good management while emphasizing the significance of dialogue processes between different interest groups and necessity of wider understanding of culture within the meaning of strategic tool for urban development. Therefore the paper deals with theoretical aspects, methods and implementation of strategic management of communication in the process of city branding. Author begins with the hypothesis that in the process of brand development, besides the analysis of the current public image, communication competence of stakeholders has the key role in creating mechanisms for dialogue processes between interest public groups within the city in order to achieve greater consensus on the strongholds of the living city identity. Relying on the findings of leading authors from this area and analysis of the practical examples, the paper presents basic steps in the process of creating city brand.
Today, crises strike corporations, political & government institutions & a plethora of organizations, as well as individuals. In this paper the authors analyze the types & the causes of crises, & strategies as crisis response. Some crises trigger off major & irreparable damage, & some can result in improved credibility (crisis as opportunity). Due to the significance of crises, today's management pays a lot of attention to crisis communication. Crises have, or at least ought to have, a strategic position in the life of organizations. Crises & crisis communication can be understood by means of using strategies as a crisis response. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.
The policy of pressure on Croatia as an illustrative -- although not isolated -- example has not inspired empirical & theoretical studies of this phenomenon. The discussion has remained at the level of everyday political discourse, even "coffee-house politics." Due to its extreme topicality, as well as its theoretical "solvency," the author has attempted with this essay to come up with a theoretical definition of the concept of pressure & to demonstrate on the Croatian example its goals, scope, dynamics, & future prospects & outcomes. Among the existing approaches, the author has chosen the "politico-economic approach" which defines the policy of pressure as a specific form of political communication between the "center" & the "periphery" in Wallerstein's "world system." The example of Croatia serves the author as an ideal-type model of such communication through a combination of political science & sociological analysis. In his opinion, & due to certain favorable contingencies, Croatia is the nearest to the ideal type of such communication. Due to a lack of systematic empirical data, the discussion naturally remains at the theoretical-hypothetical level, & should be understood as an invitation to further discussion & as an incentive for more extensive empirical research. However, since this is a very dynamic phenomenon, the question is: is the author's argumentation still valid today as it was at the time when the essay was written? There have been two changes: (1) the war on Kosovo which proves the author's hypotheses; & (2) a certain "thaw" in the relations between the international community (particularly USA) & Croatia (it is still unclear whether this change concerns the fundamental strategic trends or is solely a "politico-meteorological" phenomenon (the alteration of colder & warmer periods). This is why the author did not deem any alterations in the text necessary; one should wait & in the meantime expose the (hypo)theses to some critical scrutiny. 12 References. Adapted from the source document.
In this paper we are presenting the results of a scientific research on the changes in the characteristics of terrorism in the information age, relating to the influences of network technologies, results of the information revolution, the paradigm of terrorism. Perceiving the terrorism in a wider context as a conflict, Arquilla, Ronfeldt & Zanini have found two particularly interesting aspects of the influence of the information revolution on its characteristics: one, information revolution is favoring & strengthening network forms of organization, & is at the same time enabling the realization of their comparative advantages over hierarchical forms & two, the conduct & outcome of conflicts will increasingly depend on information & communication technologies. Exploring the influence on organizational forms, they have formulated a hypothesis on evolution of the hierarchical forms into network forms of organization; chain network, star network & all-channel network, substantiating the evolution of terrorism towards netwar. Netwar refers to an emerging mode of conflict at societal level, in which the protagonists use network forms of organization & related doctrines, strategies & technologies of the information age. The choice of the opus operandi of the netwar by the terrorist organization depends on the doctrinal paradigms that formulate their goals & strategies, which can be defined as the coercive diplomacy paradigm, the war paradigm & the new-world paradigm. The particular problem is that all three paradigms offer room for cybotage with the goal of disruption & destruction of information infrastructure. Based on the above stated premises we have researched "new" terrorism characteristics at organizational, doctrinal, strategic & technological levels. The study has confirmed the evolution of terrorism towards netwar & the emerging of "new terrorism," hence the counter terrorism activities will needed to be adapted at the organizational, strategic & technological levels respectively. Given methodology also represents a research model for the terrorism phenomenon which could be applied at a multidisciplinary approach to the antiterrorist activities. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.
Promjenom paradigme visokoga obrazovanja (VO) u globalnom kontekstu javna se sveučilišta sve više okreću razvoju internacionalnih aktivnosti. Internacionalizacija može predstavljati komparativnu prednost sveučilišta, koja razvijena kroz specifičnu inovativnu stratešku odrednicu (nišu), može postati osnova sveučilišne politike koja se provodi i implementira u različitim policy arenama. Što je sveučilište inovativnije u izboru i razvijanju ove specifične niše, ono ima veće razvojne mogućnosti te postaje kompetitivnije. Cilj je ovoga doktorskoga rada istražiti utjecaj globalizacije na internacionalizaciju javnih europskih sveučilišta. Pritom se u glavnoj tezi rada tvrdi da se promjenom paradigme visokoga obrazovanja u globalnom kontekstu javna sveučilišta sve više okreću razvoju internacionalnih aktivnosti (npr. Knight, 2008; Teichler, 2009; Kehm, 2003; Van der Wende, 2001) ali pritom odabiru različite specifične strategije (niše) internacionalizacije, dok se u postavljenoj hipotezi kaže da razlike između nacionalnih konteksta i načina na koji države upravljaju financijskom i ekonomskom krizom utječu na razlike u strategijama internacionalizacije pojedinih javnih europskih sveučilišta. Nacionalni kontekst pritom obuhvaća različitosti u tradiciji, kulturi i povijesnoj ulozi države u kojoj sveučilište djeluje, što sve utječe na razlike u nacionalnim strategijama internacionalizacije i strategijama koje u ovom području razvijaju javna sveučilišta. Budući da u literaturi ne postoji opće prihvaćena definicija globalizacije, internacionalizacije i europeizacije u području visokoga obrazovanja, niti suglasje o njihovom međusobnom odnosu te indikatorima koji ih determiniraju, provođenju komparativne analize triju studija slučaja u svrhu istraživanja utjecaja globalizacije na internacionalizaciju javnih europskih sveučilišta u ovom je doktorskom radu prethodilo empirijsko istraživanje putem delfi metode među stručnjacima širom svijeta. Minimalne definicije triju pojmova i indikatori globalizacije i internacionalizacije u području VO-a, dobiveni empirijskim istraživanjem provedenim putem delfi metode na temelju konsenzusa među ekspertima, poslužili su kao osnova komparativne analize triju studija slučaja (tri sveučilišta – Beč, Lausanne, Granada; u trima državama – Austrija, Švicarska, Španjolska), koja je provedena na temelju istraživačkog modela posebno osmišljenog za potrebe ovoga doktorskoga rada. Na temelju uvida dobivenih komparacijom triju studija slučaja u radu je utvrđen utjecaj globalizacije na internacionalizaciju javnih europskih sveučilišta, čime je potvrđena glavna teza ovoga doktorskoga rada. Također, analizom je utvrđeno i da su različiti nacionalni sustavi VO-a i specifične VO institucije na različit način odgovorili na promjene nastale djelovanjem faktora s globalne i međunarodne razine, koje se vezuju uz zadnji val globalizacije. Sukladno tome, moguće je reći i da su različitosti u prilagodbi ovim promjenama utjecale i na različitost sveučilišnih politika internacionalizacije te na različitost strateških dokumenata koje su u ovom području razvila tri analizirana sveučilišta. S obzirom na činjenicu da se nacionalni kontekst u hipotezi vezivao uz različitosti u tradiciji, kulturi i povijesnoj ulozi države, zbog čega je u analizi trebalo provjeriti je li moguće utvrditi poveznice između specifičnih strateških odrednica (niša) internacionalizacije u ovom području na Sveučilištu u Beču s tradicijom i politikom Austro-Ugarske Monarhije, na Sveučilištu u Lausanni s politikom neutralnosti, a na Sveučilištu u Granadi sa španjolskom kolonijalnom politikom prema Sjevernoj Africi, na temelju analize ovakva izravna poveznica u službenim dokumentima nije utvrđena. Ipak, kroz intervjue i boravak u trima sveučilišnim sredinama, utvrđeno je da je specifične strateške odrednice internacionalizacije moguće vezivati uz pojedine karakteristike koje se mogu smatrati povijesnim, kulturalnim i tradicijskim 'ostacima' ili tekovinama spomenutih koncepata, koji su danas, pretvoreni u nova, suvremena obilježja, ipak prisutni u samoj srži triju sveučilišta. Zaključno, kroz uvide dobivene komparativnim istraživanjem putem istraživačkog modela utvrđen je utjecaj financijske i ekonomske krize na sveučilišta u Španjolskoj, što je onda bilo moguće povezati i s provedbom sveučilišne politike u području internacionalizacije te aktivnostima i inicijativama Sveučilišta u Granadi u okviru strategije internacionalizacije, što se posebno očituje kroz izrazitu okrenutost programima za koje postoji osigurano financiranje na EU razini (npr. Erasmus+ program). Suprotno tome, uvidima nije utvrđeno postojanje utjecaja financijske i ekonomske krize na strategije internacionalizacije Sveučilišta u Beču i Sveučilišta u Lausanni te na njihovo djelovanje u ovom području. ; Although according to the opinion of many researchers universities have been among the most globalised institutions (Marginson and Considine, 2000: 8) historically, in last decades universities have had to adapt to many changes under the pressure of the last wave of globalisation (e.g. increased competitiveness, high importance of rankings, new forms of international activities, use of new communication technologies in teaching and learning, etc.). The processes that universities use to adapt to the pressure of globalisation tend to include: new strategic determinants and policies, new organisational and governance models in order to achieve greater competitiveness and better rankings results, the search for alternative and additional sources of financing due to the decrease in public funding allocation, the development of new concepts and activities with an international dimension, the establishment of new partnerships, the development of various models for international collaboration, etc. (for example, see publications by Frølich, Gornitzka, Kehm, Knight, Maassen, Neave, Stensaker, Teichler, Van der Wende, etc.). The aim of this PhD thesis is to explore the impact of globalisation on the internationalisation of European public universities. This primarily includes verifying the main thesis that by changing the paradigm of higher education (HE) in the global context, public universities are increasingly turning to the development of international activities (eg. Knight, 2008; Teichler, 2009; Kehm, 2003; Van der Wende, 2001), but they choose different internationalisation strategies. Internationalisation can be a comparative advantage of the university which, developed through specific innovative strategic orientation (niche), becomes the framework for the official university policy implemented in different political arenas and communicated to stakeholders at all levels. This niche can be based on tradition, culture and the historical role of the state in which the university operates. More the university becomes innovative in the selection and development of this niche, it gets better development opportunities and it can achieve greater global competitiveness. Therefore, this project is secondly oriented on verifying the hypothesis that differences between national contexts xi (tradition, culture and historical role of the state) and the ways in which countries manage the economic and financial crisis, affect the different selection of internationalisation strategies of European public universities. Since scientific understanding of internationalisation have changed over time, this term is today widely understood as a broad umbrella term that covers many dimensions, components, approaches and activities (de Wit and Hunter, 2015: 45). However, in the literature there is no specific answer what is exactly globalisation in HE, what are the pressures of globalisation in HE field, what do we mean by the internationalisation of universities and where and how does Europeanisation fit in. Literature has offered various definitions of these three terms and their mutual relations (for example, see publications by Altbach, de Wit, Knight, Marginson, Rhodes, Robertson, Scott, Stromquist, Sawir, Teichler, Van der Wende), and the researchers in the field of HE adopted various approaches to its operationalisation (see Knight, 2008; Teichler, 2004, 2009; Marginson i Van der Wende, 2007; de Wit, 2010, etc.) Although this PhD project is dealing with the impact of globalisation on the internationalisation of European public universities, a theoretical concept of Europeanisation is also included in the theoretical framework. The Bologna process, which highly promotes internationalisation policies and efforts, as well as other European initiatives in HE, some researchers consider to be linked with the Europeanisation in HE and therefore all three terms are analysed and discussed in this project. There are two gaps in literature that this PhD project addresses: the problem with the lack of generally accepted definitions of globalisation, internationalisation and Europeanisation and their mutual relations in HE, as well as their indicators; and the lack of projects which use analysis of the role of the context in HE field in order to explore differences between individual national (and subnational) policies. This PhD thesis had three main objectives: (1) to explore the impact of globalisation on the internationalisation of European public universities; (2) to analyse the factors that determine and redefine the characteristics of internationalisation of universities and factors that indicate the degree of policy change in strategies of HE institutions and national HE policies; (3) to explore the differences in national contexts and ways in which countries 'filter' globalisation pressures and the impact of financial and economic crisis, which affects the characteristics of national HE policies and university strategies in the field of internationalisation. In order to fulfil these goals, triangulation of literature review and empirical research was used. Therefore, in this PhD project, two empirical researches were conducted: a Delphi method research and a comparison of three case studies.
Opći cilj istraživanja prikazanog u ovom radu jest teorijsko i empirijsko razmatranje različitih modela urbanog upravljanja na primjeru urbano-okolišnog sektora Grada Zagreba, pri čemu se posebna pažnja daje mogućnostima i preprekama za integrirano urbano upravljanje, s fokusom na koordinaciju i participaciju. Tema je razrađivana kroz različite teorijske pristupe s namjerom holističkog obuhvata područja istraživanja. Tipologija urbanog upravljanja koju su razvili DiGaetano i Strom (2003) koristi se za analizu i interpretaciju tipova upravljanja u urbano-okolišnom sektoru Grada Zagreba. Vezano specifično uz integrirano upravljanje, istraživanjem je obuhvaćena horizontalna integracija, kao dimenzija integriranog upravljanja, odnosno njezina dva aspekta: a) segment integriranog urbanog upravljanja koji pretpostavlja intenzivniju i kvalitetniju suradnju i koordinaciju formalnih aktera unutar gradske uprave; te, b) participacija neformalnih aktera u procesu donošenja odluka i kreiranja javnih politika. Aspekt koordinacije formalnih aktera interpretiran je u ovom radu temeljem teorije koordinacije javnih politika, pri čemu se preuzimaju sukcesivne razine ostvarivanja koherentnosti u oblikovanju javnih politika koje je razvio Peters (2004). U dijagnostičke svrhe utvrđivanja suradnje različitih gradskih tijela u urbano-okolišnom sektoru u ostvarivanju zajedničkih ciljeva korišten je i Metcalfeov (1994) pristup analizi izmjere kapaciteta koordinacije javnih politika. Što se tiče participacije neformalnih aktera, u interpretaciji se koristi tipologija razine participacije koju je izradila Arnstein (1969) kao i klasifikacija jednosmjernih i dvosmjernih participativnih metoda od Anokye (2013). U kontekstu ovog istraživanja razmatra se i redistribucija moći između formalnih i neformalnih aktera izražena kao odnos snaga u kojem su u poziciji moći formalni akteri, a neformalni akteri svojim djelovanjem dovode u pitanje granice i raspodjelu moći (Arnstein, 1969). Istraživanje je dizajnirano kao studija slučaja urbanog upravljanja u Gradu Zagrebu korištenjem metode polu-strukturiranog intervjua i fokusne grupe uz pregled relevantnog normativnog i strateškog okvira. Istraživanjem je utvrđen hibridni tip upravljanja u urbano-okolišnom sektoru, specifičnije, korporativno-klijentelistički tip urbanog upravljanja. Uočene specifičnosti u modelu upravljanja odnose se na nepovjerenje neformalnih aktera u tijela lokalne samouprave što je dodatno naglašeno uvjerenjem kako lokalna samouprava počiva na principima klijentelizma i pomanjkanja odgovornosti te sektorskom i piramidalnom sustavu upravljanja s koncentracijom moći u samome vrhu gradske vlasti. Navedeno je u suprotnosti sa integriranim modelom upravljanja koje pretpostavlja ostvarenje moći kroz pozitivan kontekst "power with" (Gaventa, 2009), odnosno, ostvarenje moći kroz suradnju i konsenzus, partnerstvo i procese kolektivnog djelovanja. Koordinacija odabranih gradskih ureda unutar urbano-okolišnog sektora svrstana je, sukladno Petersu (2004) na najnižu razinu negativne koordinacije, te sukladno Metcalfeu (1994), na četvrtu razinu koja isto spada u negativnu koordinaciju s obzirom na manjkavosti koje se očituju u: preklapanjima u obavljanju poslova, pri čemu se ističe nedostatak adekvatne koordinacije aktivnosti i projekata (izostanak strukturirane koordinacije) odnosno komunikacije (različite informacije, različite vizije, različite i nepovezane aktivnosti, nedostatak adekvatne baze podataka koju bi mogli koristiti svi uredi i sektori), kako unutar ureda i sektora (naglasak na nepostojanje adekvatne horizontalne koordinacije), tako i među sektorima (nepostojanje adekvatne međusektorske koordinacije), ali i spram civilnog sektora (u vezi programa i aktivnosti od zajedničkog interesa). Naposljetku, razina participacije u urbano-okolišnom sektoru prema Arnsteininoj gradaciji participacije spada u kategoriju tokenizma. Općenito, građane se ne potiče na preuzimanje aktivne uloge prilikom donošenja relevantnih odluka u domeni djelokruga lokalne samouprave kao ni na ostvarivanje partnerstva sa formalnim akterima. Sukladno klasifikaciji metoda participacije prema Anokye (2013), utvrđeno je prisustvo dominacije jednosmjernih uz ponešto dvosmjernih metoda participacije u kategoriji tokenizma. Navedeno upućuje na instrumentalni pristup (Hordijk, 2015) u participaciji neformalnih aktera koji, iako su uključeni u procese odlučivanja, nisu ravnopravni političkim akterima. Na tragu Arnsteininog (1969) poimanja moći, rezultati istraživanja s jedne strane ilustriraju moć kao asimetričnu (centraliziranu) odnosno hijerarhijsku (podređenost većine i zapovijedanje manjine) strukturu koju karakterizira koncentracija moći u samome vrhu upravljačke strukture (Ured Gradonačelnika), a što kod nekih formalnih kao i kod neformalnih aktera stvara osjećaj bespomoćnosti. S druge strane, nalazi ilustriraju moć kao procesnu, što je vidljivo kroz primjere suradnje među akterima koji ukazuju kako neformalni akteri višom razinom participacije u nekim slučajevima dovode uvriježene hijerarhije u pitanje. Međutim, pritom je isključivo riječ o partnerstvu, ali ne i o delegiranju moći ili pak građanskom nadzoru koje Arnstein svrstava u najviše razine građanske moći. ; The general purpose of the research presented in this thesis is to theoretically and empirically consider different models of urban governance based on the example of the environmental sector of the City of Zagreb. Particular attention is given to the opportunities and barriers to integrated urban governance with a focus on participation. The research engages with different theoretical approaches with the intention to have a holistic approach to the subject of research. The typology of urban governance developed by DiGaetano and Strom (2003) is utilized for the analysis and interpretation of types of governance present in the environmental sector of the City of Zagreb. Specifically with regard to integrated governance, the research encompasses horizontal integration – as a dimension of integrated governance – and particularly its two aspects: a) the dimension of integrated urban governance which implies more intensive and enhanced cooperation and coordination between formal actors within the city administration; and b) informal actors' participation in the decision making process and the process of creating public policies. The coordination of formal actors' is interpreted through public policies coordination theory by way of adopting successive levels of coherence implementation when shaping public policies as developed by Peters (2004). Metcalfe's (1994) approach to the analysis of public policies capacity coordination is also utilized as a diagnostic tool with the aim of determining the level of cooperation among the different city offices within the environment sector. With regard to capturing the participation of informal actors, the study utilizes Arnstein's (1969) typology of the level of participation, as well as the one-way and two-way classification of participation methods developed by Anokye (2013). In the context of this study, the redistribution of power between formal and informal actors is conveyed as a struggle between formal actors being in the position of power, and informal actors who through their activities question the boundaries and distribution of power. The research was designed as a case study of urban governance in the City of Zagreb. Semi-structured interviews and focus groups were conducted, and relevant legal and strategic documents were analyzed. The research has identified a hybrid governance model, more precisely, a corporate-clientelist model of urban governance. The governance model's specificities are reflected in the informal actors' distrust of local level administration, further emphasized through the conviction that the local administration relies on a clientelist agenda, lack of responsibility, and sectorial and pyramidical system of governance whereby the power resides in the highest echelons of city government. The highlighted findings are contrary to the model of integrated governance that presupposes empowerment through a positive context of "power with" (Gaventa, 2009), through cooperation and consensus, partnership and collective actions. The coordination of examined city offices within the sector of environment is categorized, according to Peters (2004), as the lowest level of negative coordination, and, according to Metcalfe (1994), on the fourth level, which also represents negative coordination, given the noted shortcomings: overlaps in activities conducted and specifically lack of adequate levels of coordinating activities and projects (lack of structured coordination), lack of communication (different information, different visions, different and disconnected activities, lack of an adequate database to be used by all offices and sectors), both within offices and sectors (lack of adequate horizontal coordination) as well as between sectors (lack of adequate inter-sectorial coordination), but in relation to the civil sector (with regard to programs and activities of common interest). Finally, the level of participation in the environment sector, in accordance with Arnstein's participation gradation, falls into the category of tokenism. Overall, citizens are not encouraged to assume active roles in the local administration's decision-making process or realize partnerships with formal actors. Based on Anokye's (2013) classification of participation methods, the study identifies the dominance of one-way participation methods and a handful of two-way participation methods in the tokenism category. This points to an instrumental approach (Hordijk, 2015) to the participation of informal actors', who, although involved in the decision-making process, are not equal to political actors. Drawing on Arnstein's (1969) understanding of power, the study illustrates, on one hand, power as asymmetrical (centralized) and hierarchical (subordination of majority, command of minority), characterized by the concentration of power at the top of the local government structure (Mayor's office), which, in turn, creates a feeling of helplessness both among certain formal as well as informal actors. On the other hand, the study results illustrate that power can also be understood as a process which is exemplified with instances of cooperation between actors showing that informal actors when achieving a higher level of participation bring established hierarchies into question. However, this is strictly reserved for partnership, and not for the delegated power or citizen control which are ranked by Arnstein as the highest levels of citizens' power.
Opći cilj istraživanja prikazanog u ovom radu jest teorijsko i empirijsko razmatranje različitih modela urbanog upravljanja na primjeru urbano-okolišnog sektora Grada Zagreba, pri čemu se posebna pažnja daje mogućnostima i preprekama za integrirano urbano upravljanje, s fokusom na koordinaciju i participaciju. Tema je razrađivana kroz različite teorijske pristupe s namjerom holističkog obuhvata područja istraživanja. Tipologija urbanog upravljanja koju su razvili DiGaetano i Strom (2003) koristi se za analizu i interpretaciju tipova upravljanja u urbano-okolišnom sektoru Grada Zagreba. Vezano specifično uz integrirano upravljanje, istraživanjem je obuhvaćena horizontalna integracija, kao dimenzija integriranog upravljanja, odnosno njezina dva aspekta: a) segment integriranog urbanog upravljanja koji pretpostavlja intenzivniju i kvalitetniju suradnju i koordinaciju formalnih aktera unutar gradske uprave; te, b) participacija neformalnih aktera u procesu donošenja odluka i kreiranja javnih politika. Aspekt koordinacije formalnih aktera interpretiran je u ovom radu temeljem teorije koordinacije javnih politika, pri čemu se preuzimaju sukcesivne razine ostvarivanja koherentnosti u oblikovanju javnih politika koje je razvio Peters (2004). U dijagnostičke svrhe utvrđivanja suradnje različitih gradskih tijela u urbano-okolišnom sektoru u ostvarivanju zajedničkih ciljeva korišten je i Metcalfeov (1994) pristup analizi izmjere kapaciteta koordinacije javnih politika. Što se tiče participacije neformalnih aktera, u interpretaciji se koristi tipologija razine participacije koju je izradila Arnstein (1969) kao i klasifikacija jednosmjernih i dvosmjernih participativnih metoda od Anokye (2013). U kontekstu ovog istraživanja razmatra se i redistribucija moći između formalnih i neformalnih aktera izražena kao odnos snaga u kojem su u poziciji moći formalni akteri, a neformalni akteri svojim djelovanjem dovode u pitanje granice i raspodjelu moći (Arnstein, 1969). Istraživanje je dizajnirano kao studija slučaja urbanog upravljanja u Gradu Zagrebu korištenjem metode polu-strukturiranog intervjua i fokusne grupe uz pregled relevantnog normativnog i strateškog okvira. Istraživanjem je utvrđen hibridni tip upravljanja u urbano-okolišnom sektoru, specifičnije, korporativno-klijentelistički tip urbanog upravljanja. Uočene specifičnosti u modelu upravljanja odnose se na nepovjerenje neformalnih aktera u tijela lokalne samouprave što je dodatno naglašeno uvjerenjem kako lokalna samouprava počiva na principima klijentelizma i pomanjkanja odgovornosti te sektorskom i piramidalnom sustavu upravljanja s koncentracijom moći u samome vrhu gradske vlasti. Navedeno je u suprotnosti sa integriranim modelom upravljanja koje pretpostavlja ostvarenje moći kroz pozitivan kontekst "power with" (Gaventa, 2009), odnosno, ostvarenje moći kroz suradnju i konsenzus, partnerstvo i procese kolektivnog djelovanja. Koordinacija odabranih gradskih ureda unutar urbano-okolišnog sektora svrstana je, sukladno Petersu (2004) na najnižu razinu negativne koordinacije, te sukladno Metcalfeu (1994), na četvrtu razinu koja isto spada u negativnu koordinaciju s obzirom na manjkavosti koje se očituju u: preklapanjima u obavljanju poslova, pri čemu se ističe nedostatak adekvatne koordinacije aktivnosti i projekata (izostanak strukturirane koordinacije) odnosno komunikacije (različite informacije, različite vizije, različite i nepovezane aktivnosti, nedostatak adekvatne baze podataka koju bi mogli koristiti svi uredi i sektori), kako unutar ureda i sektora (naglasak na nepostojanje adekvatne horizontalne koordinacije), tako i među sektorima (nepostojanje adekvatne međusektorske koordinacije), ali i spram civilnog sektora (u vezi programa i aktivnosti od zajedničkog interesa). Naposljetku, razina participacije u urbano-okolišnom sektoru prema Arnsteininoj gradaciji participacije spada u kategoriju tokenizma. Općenito, građane se ne potiče na preuzimanje aktivne uloge prilikom donošenja relevantnih odluka u domeni djelokruga lokalne samouprave kao ni na ostvarivanje partnerstva sa formalnim akterima. Sukladno klasifikaciji metoda participacije prema Anokye (2013), utvrđeno je prisustvo dominacije jednosmjernih uz ponešto dvosmjernih metoda participacije u kategoriji tokenizma. Navedeno upućuje na instrumentalni pristup (Hordijk, 2015) u participaciji neformalnih aktera koji, iako su uključeni u procese odlučivanja, nisu ravnopravni političkim akterima. Na tragu Arnsteininog (1969) poimanja moći, rezultati istraživanja s jedne strane ilustriraju moć kao asimetričnu (centraliziranu) odnosno hijerarhijsku (podređenost većine i zapovijedanje manjine) strukturu koju karakterizira koncentracija moći u samome vrhu upravljačke strukture (Ured Gradonačelnika), a što kod nekih formalnih kao i kod neformalnih aktera stvara osjećaj bespomoćnosti. S druge strane, nalazi ilustriraju moć kao procesnu, što je vidljivo kroz primjere suradnje među akterima koji ukazuju kako neformalni akteri višom razinom participacije u nekim slučajevima dovode uvriježene hijerarhije u pitanje. Međutim, pritom je isključivo riječ o partnerstvu, ali ne i o delegiranju moći ili pak građanskom nadzoru koje Arnstein svrstava u najviše razine građanske moći. ; The general purpose of the research presented in this thesis is to theoretically and empirically consider different models of urban governance based on the example of the environmental sector of the City of Zagreb. Particular attention is given to the opportunities and barriers to integrated urban governance with a focus on participation. The research engages with different theoretical approaches with the intention to have a holistic approach to the subject of research. The typology of urban governance developed by DiGaetano and Strom (2003) is utilized for the analysis and interpretation of types of governance present in the environmental sector of the City of Zagreb. Specifically with regard to integrated governance, the research encompasses horizontal integration – as a dimension of integrated governance – and particularly its two aspects: a) the dimension of integrated urban governance which implies more intensive and enhanced cooperation and coordination between formal actors within the city administration; and b) informal actors' participation in the decision making process and the process of creating public policies. The coordination of formal actors' is interpreted through public policies coordination theory by way of adopting successive levels of coherence implementation when shaping public policies as developed by Peters (2004). Metcalfe's (1994) approach to the analysis of public policies capacity coordination is also utilized as a diagnostic tool with the aim of determining the level of cooperation among the different city offices within the environment sector. With regard to capturing the participation of informal actors, the study utilizes Arnstein's (1969) typology of the level of participation, as well as the one-way and two-way classification of participation methods developed by Anokye (2013). In the context of this study, the redistribution of power between formal and informal actors is conveyed as a struggle between formal actors being in the position of power, and informal actors who through their activities question the boundaries and distribution of power. The research was designed as a case study of urban governance in the City of Zagreb. Semi-structured interviews and focus groups were conducted, and relevant legal and strategic documents were analyzed. The research has identified a hybrid governance model, more precisely, a corporate-clientelist model of urban governance. The governance model's specificities are reflected in the informal actors' distrust of local level administration, further emphasized through the conviction that the local administration relies on a clientelist agenda, lack of responsibility, and sectorial and pyramidical system of governance whereby the power resides in the highest echelons of city government. The highlighted findings are contrary to the model of integrated governance that presupposes empowerment through a positive context of "power with" (Gaventa, 2009), through cooperation and consensus, partnership and collective actions. The coordination of examined city offices within the sector of environment is categorized, according to Peters (2004), as the lowest level of negative coordination, and, according to Metcalfe (1994), on the fourth level, which also represents negative coordination, given the noted shortcomings: overlaps in activities conducted and specifically lack of adequate levels of coordinating activities and projects (lack of structured coordination), lack of communication (different information, different visions, different and disconnected activities, lack of an adequate database to be used by all offices and sectors), both within offices and sectors (lack of adequate horizontal coordination) as well as between sectors (lack of adequate inter-sectorial coordination), but in relation to the civil sector (with regard to programs and activities of common interest). Finally, the level of participation in the environment sector, in accordance with Arnstein's participation gradation, falls into the category of tokenism. Overall, citizens are not encouraged to assume active roles in the local administration's decision-making process or realize partnerships with formal actors. Based on Anokye's (2013) classification of participation methods, the study identifies the dominance of one-way participation methods and a handful of two-way participation methods in the tokenism category. This points to an instrumental approach (Hordijk, 2015) to the participation of informal actors', who, although involved in the decision-making process, are not equal to political actors. Drawing on Arnstein's (1969) understanding of power, the study illustrates, on one hand, power as asymmetrical (centralized) and hierarchical (subordination of majority, command of minority), characterized by the concentration of power at the top of the local government structure (Mayor's office), which, in turn, creates a feeling of helplessness both among certain formal as well as informal actors. On the other hand, the study results illustrate that power can also be understood as a process which is exemplified with instances of cooperation between actors showing that informal actors when achieving a higher level of participation bring established hierarchies into question. However, this is strictly reserved for partnership, and not for the delegated power or citizen control which are ranked by Arnstein as the highest levels of citizens' power.
Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastala je u početcima otvorene velikosrpske agresije na Hrvatsku, ali i usred krize strateško-obrambene koncepcije. Tuđmanova politika čekanja i kupovanja vremena te izbjegavanja frontalnog i općeg sukoba s JNA, doveli su do javnog kritiziranja njegove obrambene politike od strane oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. U okolnostima sveobuhvatne agresije i, prema nekim navodima, očekivanja raskola u hrvatskoj politici, sredinom srpnja počela je rekonstrukcija postojeće Vlade. Novi mandatar Franjo Gregurić okupljao je kadrove za sastavljanje Vlade, a u tom razdoblju javila se ideja o potrebi proširenja Vlade i nekim nestranačkim kandidatima pa i predstavnicima oporbe. U samo dva-tri dana pregovora postignut je nacionalni konsenzus i potpisan Sporazum saborskih stranaka, čime je stvorena Vlada demokratskog jedinstva. Vlada se sastojala od devet parlamentarnih stranaka, od kojih je osam imalo svoje predstavnike u Vladi. Unatoč činjenici da je 1990-ih godina u Hrvatskoj na snazi bio polupredsjednički sustav koji je predsjedniku Republike davao prilično široke ovlasti, Vlada je na području obrambene i vanjske politike pokazivala određeni stupanj samostalnosti. Prema nekim tvrdnjama Vrhovno državno vijeće je ograničavalo slobodu djelovanja Vlade tako da se za svog jednogodišnjeg mandata Vlada trebala često boriti za veću samostalnost i slobodu djelovanja. S druge strane, Vlada je imala potpunu slobodu u unutarnjim poslovima, primjerice u njezinoj politici prema prognanicima i izbjeglicama, kao i u gospodarskoj politici. Unatoč tvrdnjama o "nestanku" oporbe u vrijeme te višestranačke vlade, s obzirom na to da su potpisivanjem Sporazuma o Vladi demokratskog jedinstva saborske stranke od oporbenih formalno postale koalicijske, dostupni izvori navode na drukčiji zaključak. Naime, predstavnici pojedinih oporbenih i ujedno koalicijskih stranaka od listopada 1991. godine često su kritizirali neke odluke vlasti, koje su se posebno odnosile na vanjsku politiku. Predmet njihovih kritika bile su ujedno Vladine i Tuđmanove uredbe sa zakonskom snagom. Vlada je posljednjih šest mjeseci svog mandata bila izložena pritiscima oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. Međunarodno priznanje Hrvatske i priprema za nove parlamentarne i predsjedničke izbore uzrokovali su pritiske na Vladu demokratskog jedinstva, što se prije svega očitovalo u odlascima određenih nestranačkih i oporbenih ministara, a kasnije dovelo i do velike travanjske rekonstrukcije Vlade u kojoj je u znatnoj mjeri promijenjen njezin sastav u korist HDZ-a. Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastavila je djelovati do kolovoza, kad je nakon novih parlamentarnih izbora formirana nova, jednostranačka HDZ-ova vlada. ; After the democratic elections in Croatia in the spring of 1990 and the victory of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the new Croatian Government faced the Serbian insurgency which expressed approval for the Milošević's Greater-Serbian policy. The insurgency was supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) that had disarmed Croatia just after the elections in May 1990. In the summer of 1991, the Yugoslav crisis aggravated. Previous occasional and sporadic conflicts between Croatian police forces and the Serbian insurgents escalated into the open aggression of Serbia, Montenegro and JNA against Croatia. In such conditions, Croatian leadership was conflicted about the defense policy. The disagreement caused the appearance of some fractions in the parliament parties, especially in HDZ. Some participants of Croatian politics in the early 1990s today assert that there were at least two main fractions in HDZ – the "moderate" one that supported Tuđman's policy based on avoiding head-on conflict with JNA, and the "radical" one that wanted to declare JNA and Serbia the aggressors on Croatia and to fight back. Some claim that the "radical" fraction even wanted to bring down Tuđman and replace him with someone else. There isn't enough evidence to verify such statements. It probably was the case of dissatisfaction with the situation on the battlefield. Some write about wide discontent and criticism of Tuđman regarding his defense policy, which was evident at the meetings of the main Board of HDZ in the middle of July, Supreme State Council in the end of July and parliamentary session in the beginning of August 1991. Regarding the attitude towards Tuđman, there is a widespread and simplified opinion that his party turned its back on him and that the opposition expressed him support. Exactly the opposite, the opposition, especially heads of the parties Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLS), Croatian democratic party (HDS), and Croatian People's party (HNS) expressed equal, or even more severe, criticism of Tuđman's defense policy. In that kind of atmosphere, the reconstruction of the Government resulted in the national consensus – Democratic Unity Government was formed. It was the third democratic Government and the first multiparty Government after the democratic elections. It is an example of a Grand coalition formed during the war in many countries. The main goal of the new Government was to create more effective defense policy that would gather all the necessary political and military structures and establish the unified command structure. That resulted in entering of the Crisis Staff into the Government and forming of the General Staff of the Croatian Army. In the first two months of its mandate, the Government proposed and adopted measures for emergency readiness in order to organize life in the crisis areas. One of those measures included the blockade of the JNA barracks which Tuđman approved September 13 1991. With the blockade, the previous measured and careful attitude of the Croatian leadership towards JNA shifted from passive to active. One part of the research discussed the role of the Government in defense of the cities of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. Regarding Vukovar, there are some controversies embodied in widespread claims that Croatian leadership "betrayed" and "sacrificed" Vukovar by not sending enough weaponry and ammunition. However, available sources, primarily transcripts and records of the Government sessions, suggest that Vukovar was the priority in the supply of weaponry and ammunition. Furthermore, some members of the Government and other representatives of the Croatian leadership visited Vukovar and Eastern-Slavonian battlefield. In the context of all the crisis areas on the Croatian battlefield, Vukovar was the most dominant topic at the Government sessions. At the session held November 17, the Government adopted a series of decisions pertaining to the protection of Vukovar civilians. In the appeals to the international organizations, Vukovar and Dubrovnik were the two most mentioned cities. As was the case with Vukovar, the Government sent weaponry and other military equipment, transported humanitarian aid to Dubrovnik and appealed for help. It is worth mentioning convoy "Libertas" which supplied humanitarian aid to the surrounded Dubrovnik and broke the naval blockade. Also, some Government members came by the convoy to Dubrovnik to show their support. At the end of November 1991, Government sent three of its ministers to Dubrovnik where they had to represent the Government and facilitate its operation in Southern Dalmatia, maintain contacts with the international organizations, negotiate with the JNA representatives and maintain communication with the Croatian Army. The three ministers Davorin Rudolf, Petar Kriste and Ivan Cifrić were situated in Dubrovnik during its heaviest attack and the day after they agreed to a truce with the JNA representatives. The Government supported the negotiations between the city military and civil representatives and JNA because it wanted to procrastinate with the attacks and buy some time to strengthen the military and international position of Croatia. On the other hand, the Government and Tuđman strongly opposed to intentions of "demilitarization" of Dubrovnik which would surrender its arms to the JNA under the supervision of representatives of the international community, i.e. surrender of the city to the aggressor. Second most important task of the Government was the struggle for international recognition. The establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed all the problems of the political structures that young democratic state had to face. Such problems refer to lack of experience as well as technical and financial resources. The Government cooperated with the European Community and the United Nations. Although, Tuđman was the designer of the Forreign Affairs and the Government often had to put into action his decisions, during the Conference of peace in Hague it showed some differentiation, such as declaring it would abort the attending of the Conference unless JNA left Croatia. After the arms embargo in September 1991, the Croatian Government deprived of the right of representation of Croatia in the UN Budimir Lončar and Darko Šilović, due to their role in instigating the decision of the UN regarding embargo. The Government Memorandum, addressed to ministerial Council of the EC in November 22, stated that economic sanctions of the Roman declaration of November 8 would affect mostly Croatia. Such view showed a certain degree of independence of the Democratic Unity Government. The Government accepted the Vance plan but argued the methods of its implementation. The activity of the Government in Forreign Affairs reflects in numerous official and unofficial meetings and encounters with various politicians and statesmen. The main task of the Government members was to appeal to stop the war and recognize Croatia, but they also had to struggle against Serbian propaganda which spread lies about rehabilitation of Ustasha and Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and portrayed president Tuđman and the Croatian Government as anti-Semitic. In that context, some think that the Croatian Government and leadership in general, provided insufficient to the international public. In this research, I also analyzed social politics of the Democratic Unity Government, that is, politics towards Croatian displaced persons and refugees as well as Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees during 1991 and 1992. At the very beginning of the aggression against Croatia, new Croatian Government had to face refugee crisis. Forcible relocations of the Croatian civilians, among which some moved into safe areas in Croatia, while others left the country, induced Government to, with the term "refugee", which refers to those persons who had to emigrate their own country, introduce another one – "displaced persons", which referred to those civilians who hadn't left Croatia, only were displaced to some other territory within the country. Government also adopted some measures to secure accommodation for the displaced persons and refugees by emptying hotels and resorts and founding of the Office for the displaced persons and refugees in November 1991. Funds for the displaced persons and refugees Government secured mostly from the state budget, while all requests for financial help from the international community were unsuccessful. Consequently, in that period Croatia funded also Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees from its budget, while the international community helped only with humanitarian help. In this chapter the Government activity in prevention of persecution of the civilian population was discussed through several examples. In that aspect, its activities were mostly limited to addressing the international community. In the case of Ilok, from where in October 1991 approximately 10.000 people were banished, Government founded the Commission of the Parliament and Government to try to stop the persecution, but it failed to achieve its goal, since the persecution had already begun. After the fall and occupation of Vukovar in November 1991, the Government organized evacuation of approximately 15.000 people, but it was carried out only partially. The Government didn't have control over the war zone, which means that its opportunities for safe and efficient evacuation were highly limited. One of the main plans for the displaced persons and refugees was Government's Return Program, which began its realization only after the end of the war and peaceful reintegration of Podunavlje in 1998. Economic politics of the Democratic Unity Government was reflected in its independence from Serbia. Following measures and decisions of the previous Croatian Government, on the day of its establishment, Democratic Unity Government broke off economic relations with Serbia, however only partially. Those companies with strong business ties with some companies in Serbia, had liberty to continue their cooperation. The export to Serbia and Montenegro was limited only to some "strategic" raw materials and products, such as petroleum. The Government also introduced its own currency, hrvatski dinar (HRD). One of the main achievements of the Government was that it avoided the transit to "war economy", in spite of the increased military spending. Since priority of the Croatian Government was determined by war, its activities gravitated towards repair of the enormous war damage in transport, utility and residential infrastructure. In the end of 1991 the Government established the Ministry of Reconstruction, while in the first half of 1992 the Government composed the Reconstruction Program and its Financial Plan that was adopted by the Croatian Parliament in June 1992. Nevertheless, because of the status quo imposed by the UNPROFOR, located on the occupied territories in Croatia, the reconstruction of the country began after the war had ended in 1995. Analyzed activities of the Government in the Defense policy, Foreign Affairs, as well as its Social and Economic policy raise the question of the Government's independence regarding Tuđman and Croatian Parliament. Considering the semi-presidential system, the Government was the executive authority of the president of the Republic and Croatian Parliament. Government also had legislative powers authorized by the Parliament, because in the wartime a great number of important decisions had to be made in a very short amount of time. The Government was not only the executive body of the President, but it also functioned as his close associate. That manifests mostly through the measures for emergency readiness in August and September 1991. Sometimes, the Government had to step out of its Constitutional powers if developments on the battlefield required it to, for example regarding the decisions about Vukovar, November 17 1991. Regarding activities of the Government in the researched areas, it can be concluded that Democratic Unity Government had a high level of autonomy, taking into account the existing semi-presidential system. Nevertheless, the powers of the Government were limited in the Defense policy and Forregin Affairs, while on the other hand, it had complete autonomy in Internal Affairs, in this case, in its Social and Economic politics. An issue that requires special consideration in this research regards the opposition in Croatia during the mandate of the Democratic Unity Government. Some claim that with forming of the multiparty Government, the opposition in Croatia "disappeared". The remark is understandable considering that all the parliament parties signed the Agreement of Democratic Unity Government, which marked their transition from the opposition to coalition partners. But, did the opposition really "disappeared" form Croatian political life? Numerous public appearances of various representatives of opposition parties and parties in general, indicate otherwise. Activity of the opposition at the Parliament sessions from October 1991 to May and June 1992 shows agility of the opposition life in Croatia. From the beginning of the Democratic Unity Government in August till October, the opposition parties didn't raise any questions in public about some decisions of the Croatian leadership, but from October began severe criticism towards Tuđman and the Government. Discontent was expressed primarily to the acceptance of the Carrington's arrangement in Hague. Criticism of Foreign Affairs arose also after the acceptance of the Vance plan. In the last six months of its mandate, the Government was exposed to various pressures from the opposition and from one part of the HDZ, which reinforced especially after the international recognition at the beginning of 1992. Some opposition and nonpartisan ministers left the Government, whereas in April 1992 there was the reconstruction of the Government which changed significantly the personnel composition of the Government, resulting in the increase of the HDZ members. It was obvious that it was not the exact same Government from the beginning of August 1991 and that its end was near. In the new elections held August 2 1992, the HDZ defeated its opponents and ten days later, new, One-party Government was formed. Establishment and presented activities of the Democratic Unity Government is the proof of the democratic system in Republic of Croatia at the beginning of 1990s and counter-argument for theses about Tuđman's authoritarian style of rule. A multiparty Government, whose prominent members were opposition representatives, couldn't have been formed in an undemocratic or authoritarian system. Forming of the Grand Coalition merely one year after HDZ had won the elections, provides a valuable contribution to the study of Tuđman's policy, shows larger picture of the Croatian leadership and opens the door for further research of Croatian political life in the early 1990s.
