Suchergebnisse

Jinping is assumed to be China's strongest leader since Deng Xiaoping - even since Mao, some argue. It might therefore be expected that Xi Jinping, at the top of a one-party state, has the power and ability to reform China. This article analyses how structural constraints limit Xi Jinping's power and freedom of action using his ability to implement a new course for the country's economic policy as case. To avoid being caught in the middle-income trap, China must adjust its investment and export-driven model to a more innovation, consumer and welfare-based development model. We use the school of historical institutionalism as framework, and examine how (i) path dependency, (ii) informal structures, norms and values, (iii) institutional autonomy, and (iv) institutional capacity in different ways limit and constrain the power and ability of Xi Jinping to implement a successful restructuring of the country's economic model. Adapted from the source document.