Structure-Induced Equilibria and Perfect-Foresight Expectations
In: American journal of political science, Band 25, Heft 4, S. 762
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: American journal of political science, Band 25, Heft 4, S. 762
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 36, Heft 16, S. 1-30
ISSN: 0092-5853
USING THE CONCEPT OF STRUCTURE-INDUCED EQUIILIBRIUM, THIS ESSAY DEVELOPS A SIMPLE BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF ROLL CALL VOTING. THE MAIN RESULTS ARE (1) IF SOME COMMITTEES ARE PREFERENCE OUTLIERS RELATIVE TO THE LEGISLATURE AS A WHOLE, THEN ROLL CALL DATA ARE LIKELY TO BE ARTIFICIALLY UNIDIMENSIONAL. (2) THE UNIDIMENSIONAL BIAS PERSISTS EVEN AS THE DIMENSIONALITY OF THE POLICY SPACE BECOMES LARGE. (3) EVEN IF COMMITTEES ARE PREFERENCE OUTLIERS, IT MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DISCOVER THIS FACT BY LOOKING ONLY AT ROLL CALL VOTES.
In: American journal of political science, Band 36, Heft 1, S. 1
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 36, Heft 1, S. 1, 31, 36
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 25, Heft 4, S. 762-779
ISSN: 0092-5853
THIS PAPER EXTENDS THE WORK ON STRUCTURE-INDICED EQUILIBRIA BY EXPLICITLY CONSIDERING VOTERS' EXPECTATIONS. THE STANDARD ASSUMPTION OF MYOPIC EXPECTATIONS IS CONTRASTED WITH THE ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTION OF PERFECT-FORESIGHT EXPECTATIONS.
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 36, Heft 2, S. 462
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: American journal of political science, Band 36, Heft 2, S. 462
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: Public choice, Band 37, Heft 3, S. 503-519
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 52, Heft 3, S. 222-244
ISSN: 0048-5829
IN THIS STUDY THE STRUCTURE-INDUCED EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH FOR MODELING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IS EXTENDED TO ALLOW FOR THE ADDED STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF EXECUTIVE VETO AND LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDE. A MULTIDIMENSIONAL MODEL IS PRESENTED FOR A BUDGETARY PROCESS INVOLVING THREE ACTORS - A LEGISLATURE, AN APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE, AND AN EXECUTIVE. IN ORDER TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE ROLE OF THE VETO AND OVERRIDE POSSIBILITIES, SIMPLIFYING ASSUMPTIONS ARE MADE WITH REGARD TO OTHER ASPECTS OF THE AGENDA FORMATION PROCESS. IN PARTICULAR, THE COMMITTEE HAS MONOPOLY AGENDA POWER, A CLOSED AMENDMENT CONTROL RULE IS OPERATIVE, AND PERFECT-FORESIGHT EXPECTATIONS ARE HELD BY THE COMMITTEE AND THE EXECUTIVE. GIVEN THESE ASSUMPTIONS, UTILITY MAXIMIZATION BY THE SEVERAL ACTORS GENERATES A BUDGET OUTCOME CHARACTERIZED AS A STRUCTURE-INDUCED EQUILIBRIUM. THE GENERAL MODEL IS ILLUSTRATED GEOMETRICALLY WITH A TWO-DIMENSIONAL EXAMPLE, PERMITTING BUDGET OUTCOMES TO BE ANALYZED FOR VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF VETO RULES AND OVERRIDE PROVISIONS. THE ANALYSIS DEMONSTRATES THAT BUDGET OUTCOMES ARE SENSITIVE TO ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS OF VETO RULES AND OVERRIDE PROVISIONS. IN THE ILLUSTRATION, EXECUTIVE VETO POWER IS SHOWN TO VARY DIRECTLY WITH BOTH THE PERMISSIVENESS OF THE VETO RULE AND THE STRINGENCY OF THE OVERRIDE PROVISION. SIMILAR RELATIONSHIPS, HOWEVER, ARE NOT FOUND TO EXIST FOR TOTAL BUDGET EXPENDITURES.
In: Public choice, Band 52, Heft 3, S. 227-244
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 30, Heft 4, S. 755
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: American journal of political science, Band 30, Heft 4, S. 755
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 31, Heft 4, S. 940
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: American journal of political science, Band 31, Heft 4, S. 940
ISSN: 1540-5907