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1 Introduction -- 2 Acids, bases, and the nature of the hydrogen ion -- 3 The investigation of protolytic equilibria in aqueous solution -- 4 The effect of the solvent on protolytic equilibria -- 5 The thermodynamics of protolytic equilibria -- 6 Acid-base strength and molecular structure -- 7 The direct study of rates of simple proton-transfer reactions -- 8 The indirect study of rates of proton transfer -- 9 Examples of reactions catalysed by acids and bases -- 10 Rates, equilibria, and structures in proton-transfer reactions -- 11 Isotope effects in proton-transfer equilibria -- 12 Kinetic isotope effects in proton-transfer reactions -- Author Index.

This paper presents a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved. The equilibrium is efficient, and the paradoxes associated with fully revealing rational expectations equilibria are precluded without resorting to noise traders. The model admits a reinterpretation in which behavioral traders coexist with rational traders, and it allows us to characterize the amount of induced mispricing.

This work uses various model frameworks to study the evolution of equilibria in an open loop evolving economy in which the model characteristics evolve without any directional restrictions except for continuity. Applying mathematical methods, it is shown that equilibria can always be adapted in a piecewise gradual, non bang-bang way. Furthermore, the analysis provides a complete characterization of the structure of the equilibrium price set of evolving exchange economies. The results allow to derive policy implications for a gradual, frictionless tuning of equilibrium values for open loop evol

This paper studies the long-run effect of the 2002 changeover on restaurant prices in Germany. German restaurant prices increased significantly when the euro was introduced as a new currency but rather than returning to their re-changeover trend, restaurant prices appear to have stabilized on a higher path. This stands in contrast to the prediction of menu costs models or models of confusion-induced price increases as these models can only account for a transitory effect. The persistence of the increase suggests the existence of more than one price equilibrium. This multiplicity of price equilibria is a central part of the explanation proposed in the paper.

"News--or foresight--about future economic fundamentals can create rational expectations equilibria with non-fundamental representations that pose substantial challenges to econometric efforts to recover the structural shocks to which economic agents react. Using tax policies as a leading example of foresight, simple theory makes transparent the economic behavior and information structures that generate non-fundamental equilibria. Econometric analyses that fail to model foresight will obtain biased estimates of output multipliers for taxes; biases are quantitatively important when two canonical theoretical models are taken as data generating processes. Both the nature of equilibria and the inferences about the effects of anticipated tax changes hinge critically on hypothesized tax information flows. Differential U.S. federal tax treatment of municipal and treasury bonds embeds news about future taxes in bond yield spreads. Including that measure of tax news in identified VARs produces substantially different inferences about the macroeconomic impacts of anticipated taxes"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

In many countries, the legal system or social norms ensure that firms are stakeholder oriented. We analyze the advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder-oriented firms that are concerned with employees and suppliers compared to shareholder-oriented firms in a model of imperfect competition. Stakeholder firms are more (less) valuable than shareholder firms when marginal cost uncertainty is greater (less) than demand uncertainty. With globalization shareholder firms and stakeholder firms often compete. We identify the circumstances where stakeholder firms are more valuable than shareholder firms and compare these mixed equilibria with the pure equilibria with stakeholder and shareholder firms only. Finally, we analyze firm financial constraints and derive implications for the capital structure of stakeholder firms.

A comprehensive, self-contained survey of the theory and applications of differential games, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing economics and management problems which are characterised by both multiperiod and strategic decision making. Although no prior knowledge of game theory is required, a basic knowledge of linear algebra, ordinary differential equations, mathematical programming and probability theory is necessary. Part One presents the theory of differential games, starting with the basic concepts of game theory and going on to cover control theoretic models, Markovian equilibria with simultaneous play, differential games with hierarchical play, trigger strategy equilibria, differential games with special structures, and stochastic differential games. Part Two offers applications to capital accumulation games, industrial organization and oligopoly games, marketing, resources and environmental economics

1.Introduction2.The Metalogic of Economic Predictions, Calculations, and Propositions3.Microeconomic Foundations of Cyclical Irregularities or "Chaos"4.Qualitative Effects of Monetary Policy in "Rich" Dynamic Systems5.Decentralized, Dispersed Exchange without an Auctioneer: A Simulation Study6.Approximations of Cooperative Equilibria in Multiperson Prisoners' Dilemma Played by Cellular Automata7.The Complexity of Social Groups and Social Systems Described by Graph Structures.

The paper deals with existence and properties of temporary migration equilibria with an overlapping generations structure in a two-country-world. Individuals are living for two periods. As a young individual they are supposed to be incompletely informed about wage rates and the quality of life they will encounter in both countries during the next period. They supply their labour force in each living period in either of the two countries such that total expected utility (of the wage rate and the quality of life) over the planning horizon is maximized. In the first part of the paper we give sufficient conditions such that there exists a temporary migration equilibrium (in a given period) that is a tuple of migration flows between the two countries and a wage profile such that the labour markets in both countries are balanced simultaneously. In the second part of the paper some interesting properties of migration equilibria are analyzed. Particularly the effects of differing distributions of the quality of life in the two countries and of differing degrees of information of the individuals on migration equilibria are investigated. Furthermore it is shown that incomplete information alone suffices to induce migration flows even between "identical" countries.

Introduction -- On the Works of Professor Koji Okuguchi -- Cournot, a Non-strategic Economist.-Cournot Tatonnement in Aggregative Games with Monotone Best Responses -- Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Aggregative Games: an Expository Treatment -- On the Geometric Structure of the Cournot Equilibrium Set: the Case of Concave Industry Revenue and Convex Costs -- Pure Strategy Equilibria in Finite Symmetric Concave Games and an Application to Symmetric Discrete Cournot Games -- On a Discontinuous Cournot Oligopoly -- Interpreting Markups in Spanish Manufacturing: the Exponential Model -- Privatization Neutrality Theorem and Discriminatory Subsidy Policy -- Cournot Oligopoly Theory for Simple Electricity Markets -- Kant-Nash Equilibria in a Quantity-Setting Oligopoly -- Evolutionary Oligopoly Models of Commercial Fishing with Heterogeneities -- Existence, Uniqueness, and Comparative Statics in Contests -- Two-Group Contests with Communication Within and Between Groups -- On the Nash Equilibrium of Asymmetric Public-Good Contests -- Heterogeneity and Number of Players in Rent-Seeking, Innovation, and Patent-Race Games.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- About the Authors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- List of Symbols -- Preface -- Chapter 1 Introduction and Mathematical Preliminaries -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.1.1 Population Dynamics -- 1.1.2 Prey-Predator Interactions -- 1.1.3 Discrete Generations -- 1.1.4 Diffusion of Population -- 1.1.5 Patchy Environment -- 1.1.6 Epidemiology -- 1.1.7 Eco-Epidemiology -- 1.1.8 Stage-Structure -- 1.1.9 Time Delay -- 1.1.10 Disease Acquired Immunity -- 1.1.11 Vaccine Induced Immunity -- 1.1.12 Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) Through Media Awareness -- 1.2 Mathematical Preliminaries -- 1.2.1 Equilibria of Temporal System -- 1.2.2 Nature of Roots -- 1.2.3 Stability of Equilibrium Points -- 1.2.4 Lyapunov's Direct Method -- 1.2.5 Bifurcation in Continuous System -- 1.2.6 Euler's Scheme for Discretization -- 1.2.7 Stability of Fixed Points in Discrete System -- 1.2.8 Center Manifold in Discrete System -- 1.2.9 Bifurcation in Discrete System -- 1.2.10 Next Generation Operator Method -- 1.2.11 Sensitivity Analysis -- 1.3 Summary -- Chapter 2 Discrete-Time Bifurcation Behavior of a Prey-Predator System with Generalized Predator -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Formulation of Mathematical Model-1 -- 2.3 Discrete Dynamical Behavior of Model-1 -- 2.3.1 Flip Bifurcation -- 2.3.2 Hopf Bifurcation -- 2.4 Formulation of Mathematical Model-2 -- 2.5 Discrete Dynamical Behavior of Model-2 -- 2.5.1 Flip Bifurcation -- 2.5.2 Hopf Bifurcation -- 2.6 Numerical Simulations -- 2.7 Summary -- Chapter 3 A Single Species Harvesting Model with Diffusion in a Two- Patch Habitat -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Formulation of Mathematical Model -- 3.3 The Analysis of the Model -- 3.3.1 Under Reservoir Boundary Conditions -- 3.3.2 Under No-Flux Boundary Conditions -- 3.3.3 The Case of Uniform Equilibrium State

Preface -- Contents -- Part I The Theme -- 1 Introduction -- References -- 2 Social Groups -- References -- 3 Households -- References -- Part II The Basic Framework -- 4 Pure Exchange with Fixed Household Structure -- 4.1 Efficient Household Decisions -- 4.2 Equilibrium Existence -- 4.3 Ramifications -- References -- 5 General Equilibrium with Fixed Household Structure and Production -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Model and First Main Result -- 5.2.1 Technologies and Firm Decisions -- 5.2.2 Allocations and Individual Preferences -- 5.2.3 Property Rights and Household Decisions -- 5.2.4 Feasibility and Optimality -- 5.3 Existence -- 5.3.1 Preferences on Aggregate Household Consumption -- 5.3.2 Equilibrium Existence Result -- 5.4 Ramifications -- 5.4.1 Second Welfare Theorem -- 5.4.2 Core Theory -- 5.4.3 Household Production -- 5.5 Final Remarks -- References -- 6 General Equilibrium with Variable Household Structure -- 6.1 Consumers and Households -- Commodities and Allocations -- 6.2 Preferences and Welfare -- 6.3 Equilibrium Welfare -- References -- 7 General Equilibrium with Endogenous Household Structure -- 7.1 Existence of Equilibria with the Exit Option -- 7.2 Existence of Equilibria with the Exit and the Joining Option -- 7.3 Equilibrium Welfare -- 7.4 Outlook -- References -- 8 Cores -- References -- Part III Other Forms of Group Formation -- 9 Clubs, Matching, etc. -- 9.1 Clubs -- 9.2 Two-sided Matching -- 9.2.1 Existence in the Marriage Market -- 9.2.2 Non-Existence in the Marriage Market -- 9.2.3 Discussion -- 9.3 Other Models of Group Formation -- References -- 10 Related Work -- 10.1 Related Literature -- References -- Part IV Extensions and Applications -- 11 Power in General Equilibrium -- 11.1 The Notion of Power -- 11.2 Changes in Formal Power -- 11.3 Endogenizing Power -- 11.3.1 Power of Voice -- 11.3.2 Power of (Un)Friendliness

1. Introduction -- 2. The Potential Causes of Legislative Stability -- 3. Preference-Induced Equilibriums I: Weak Ideologies Promote Chaos -- 4. Preference-Induced Equilibriums II: Electoral Incentives Promote Chaos -- 5. Structure-Induced Equilibriums: Weak Agenda-Setting Powers Promote Chaos -- 6. Nondictatorship: Paraguay's Weak Executive Promotes Chaos -- 7. Conclusions: Chaos Exists in Paraguay -- 8. What and Who Parties are for -- 9. Paraguayan Party Formation: Coalition-Building Among Narrow-Interest Groups -- 10. The Expected Effects of Parties on Legislative Outcomes -- 11. A Theory of Fractious Parties -- 12. Skewing Chaos: Partisan Benets Without Legislative Stability -- 13. Conclusions.