SUBSIDIARITY
In: The journal of political philosophy, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 190-218
ISSN: 0963-8016
THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY REGULATES AUTHORITY WITHIN A POLITICAL ORDER, DIRECTING THAT POWERS OR TASKS SHOULD REST WITH THE LOWER-LEVEL SUB-UNITS OF THAT ORDER, UNLESS ALLOCATING THEM TO A HIGHER-LEVEL CENTRAL UNIT WOULD ENSURE HIGHER COMPARATIVE EFFICIENCY OR EFFECTIVENESS IN ACHIEVING THEM. IN THIS ESSAY, THE AUTHOR SUMMARIZES ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY. HE SKETCHES THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DEBATE WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION WHERE, RATHER THAN REDUCING AND REMOVING FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL CONFLICTS, THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY INCREASES AND SHAPES SUCH TENSIONS. THEN HE DELINEATES ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY AND ITS POSSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL ROLE. THE ALTERNATIVES HAVE STRIKINGLY DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS REGARDING THE OBJECTIVES OF THE POLITY, THE DOMAIN AND ROLE OF SUB-UNITS, AND THE ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY TO APPLY THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY ITSELF. FINALLY, HE ASSESSES FIVE ALTERNATIVE NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS OF CONCEPTS OF SUBSIDIARITY AND ILLUSTRATES THEM WITH REFERENCE TO THE EUROPEAN UNION.