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In the aftermath of a disappointing showing in the 1998 midterm elections, Republican party leaders and strategists have been debating what went wrong on November 3, and what the party needs to do differently in the future. Two competing explanations for the election results appear to be emerging from this debate (Berke 1998).According to one explanation, favored by party moderates, Republicans lost ground in 1998 because moderate and independent swing voters were alienated by the party's conservative image and by the partisan tone of the presidential impeachment inquiry. The lesson to be learned from the 1998 elections, according to the proponents of this theory, is that the GOP needs to move toward the center and seek compromises with moderate Democrats.In sharp contrast, some conservatives attribute Republican losses in the midterm elections to their party's failure to energize its partisan and ideological base. In order to be successful, these conservatives argue, the GOP needs to mobilize a larger proportion of its base by taking clear positions on issues and aggressively pursuing a conservative agenda.One way to test the validity of these competing theories is to examine data from the 1998 voter exit polls. These polls were conducted in every state holding a Senate or gubernatorial election except Alaska and Hawaii (CNN 1998).

This paper presents a theoretical model examining the influence of two stylized types of voters: "loyal voters" & "swing voters." The model shows why both types of voters will influence the distribution of benefits by a reelection-seeking incumbent, & it predicts how their influence will vary with the importance of the general election relative to that of the primary: closer competition between parties in the general election, ceteris paribus, increases the influence of swing voters relative to that of loyal voters. County-level data on the allocation of money & jobs by New Deal relief programs confirm the model's predictions. 2 Tables, 2 Appendixes, 30 References. Adapted from the source document.

'EVERY ELECTION GENERATES ITS OWN MYTHS, MYTHS ABOUT WHAT the politicians were saying, about what the electorate thought they were saying, and about what the electorate meant by its votes.' Butler's and Kavanagh's comment on the 1979 election applies with even more force to the outcome in 1997. For when an opposition party secures an unexpectedly large victory, there is a seemingly insatiable demand for explanations which stress the positive appeal of the winners — and a corresponding tendency to understate the significance of disenchantment with the outgoing administration. Such myths become entrenched when, as in 1979 certainly and in 1997 probably, the election does turn out to represent a political turning-point. This article therefore applies a degree of deconstruction to the 1997 election. In the afterglow of Labour's famous victory, it is as well to remember that the campaign was rather humdrum. The outcome was predictable, the lengthy campaign had little impact on Labour's lead and turnout fell significantly. Even if the election does transpire to have initiated major change, there is precious little evidence to suggest that in 1997 (any more than in 1979) a large body of electors was voting with that end in mind. What voters intend, and what elections achieve, are two different things. If there is a lesson to be drawn from the 1997 election, it seems to be rather limited and obvious. When governments are divided and directionless, the pendulum swings.

Examines Republican party strategy following the 1968 presidential election; emphasis on which groups are "swing" voters and which are marginalized as "captured" voters; US. Argues that a competitive two-party system encourages either mobilization or demobilization of certain groups and either their incorporation or restriction in the democratic process.

In one way. Norway's local elections would seem to he a deviant case a protest election with a landslide victory to a recently established neo‐liberalistic party, greater volatility among the voters, and an unusually low turnout. However, the election survey and other electoral statistics reveal a continuation and reinforcement of social and regional trends in voting patterns, trends which have emerged during recent elections.

Explores significance of George W. Bush's emergence as 2000 Republican presidential candidate, and impact of Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on both Republican and Democratic parties, challenging fundamental policy and tenets and electoral consequences for the future. Limits of Democrat "moralism" in international policy, especially if this stance marks them as anti-American among Democratic constituencies and swing voters, and Republican dilemma of preserving commitment to limited government without compromising effectiveness of homeland security.

A review essay on a book by Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental Fairness in Representative Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1994 [see listing in IRPS No. 85]). Guinier's criticism of majority rule & her advocacy of proportional election systems are discussed. The deficiencies of winner-take-all voting in single-member districts include: geographical limitations, disproportionate power to swing voters, gerrymandering, underrepresentation of women & minorities, negative campaigning, & devalued votes. Proportional voting, it is argued, would lower the threshold of exclusion & allow for fair & diverse representation. Guinier advocates cumulative voting as one type of proportional voting that has already been adopted by many boards of directors & several local jurisdictions. M. Greenberg

Tests the impact of three electorate-related factors on discrepancies between the polls & election results: late campaign swing (last minute mind changes), differential turnout, & social desirability bias among nondisclosers. Two Quebec pollsters used the same questionnaire to re-interview a total of 1,483 French-speaking Quebec residents that had been polled prior to the 1998 Canadian general election, which resulted in greater support for the Quebec Liberal Party (PLQ), & less for Parti Quebecois (PQ), than predicted by pollsters. A comparison of pre- & postelection results showed 85% & 76% of those who intended to vote for the PQ & PLQ respectively had done so, which invalidated the late swing hypothesis. The differential turnout factor, as well as the possibility that "undecided" voters more heavily supported the Liberal Party, were also discounted. Although non-French speakers were not surveyed, a huge shift in their vote would not explain the discrepancy between the polls & results. It was concluded that the difference was most likely due to polling methods & coverage issues. 4 Tables, 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 17 References. J. Lindroth

This article explores the reasons why some reform initiatives launched by the Swedish labor movement have succeeded and others have failed. It presents four case studies: two success stories (the pension reform of 1959 and the industrial democracy reforms of the 1970s), and two failures (inheritance taxation in the 1920s and 1940s, and wage-earner funds in the 1970s). The article casts these case studies in an analytical framework that emphasizes three variables. To the extent that they challenge the interests of capital, labor's reform initiatives are likely to precipitate a powerful countermobilization, but the politics of reformism are also shaped by the extent to which labor's initiatives embody a universalistic conception of social justice and/or appeal to the material interests of swing voters.

In this paper we investigate whether there are any tactical motives behind the distribution of grants from central to lower-level governments. We use a temporary grant program that is uniquely suitable for testing theories of vote-purchasing behavior of incumbent governments. The temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects, most importantly in the sovereign decision-making power given to the incumbent central government. We find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study to win votes. In particular, we find strong support for the Lindbeck–Weibull/Dixit–Londregan model, in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters. This result is statistically as well as economically significant. We do not, however, find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfers money to its own supporters.

In this paper we investigate whether there are any tactical motives behind the distribution of grants from central to lower level governments. We use a temporary grant program that is uniquely suitable for testing theories of vote-purchasing behavior of incumbent governments. The temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects, most importantly in the sovereign decision making power given to the incumbent central government. We find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study in order to win votes. In particular, we find strong support for the Lindbeck-Weibull/Dixit-Londregan model in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters. This result is statistically as well as economically significant. We do however not find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfers money to its own supporters.