Suchergebnisse

Many recent discussions on the conduct of monetary policy through interest rate rules have given a very central role to inflation, both as an objective and as an intermediate instrument. We want to show that other variables like employment can be as important or even more. For that we construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model where the economy is subject to demand and supply shocks. We compute closed form solutions for the optimal interest rate rules and find that they can be function of employment only, which then dominates inflation for use in the policy rule. ; De nombreuses discussions récentes sur la conduite de la politique monétaire via des règles de taux d'intérèt ont donné un rôle central au taux d'inflation, à la fois comme objectif ou comme instrument intermédiaire. On veut montrer ici que d'autres variables comme l'emploi peuvent jouer un rôle aussi important sinon davantage. Pour cela on construit un modèle d'équilibre général dynamique stochastique où l'économie est soumise à des chocs d'offre et de demande. On calcule des solutions exactes pour les règles de taux d'intérèt optimales et on trouve qu'elles peuvent s'exprimer en fonction du seul niveau d'emploi, qui apparaît donc comme un meilleur instrument intermédiaire que le taux d'inflation.

Many recent discussions on the conduct of monetary policy through interest rate rules have given a very central role to inflation, both as an objective and as an intermediate instrument. We want to show that other variables like employment can be as important or even more. For that we construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model where the economy is subject to demand and supply shocks. We compute closed form solutions for the optimal interest rate rules and find that they can be function of employment only, which then dominates inflation for use in the policy rule. ; De nombreuses discussions récentes sur la conduite de la politique monétaire via des règles de taux d'intérèt ont donné un rôle central au taux d'inflation, à la fois comme objectif ou comme instrument intermédiaire. On veut montrer ici que d'autres variables comme l'emploi peuvent jouer un rôle aussi important sinon davantage. Pour cela on construit un modèle d'équilibre général dynamique stochastique où l'économie est soumise à des chocs d'offre et de demande. On calcule des solutions exactes pour les règles de taux d'intérèt optimales et on trouve qu'elles peuvent s'exprimer en fonction du seul niveau d'emploi, qui apparaît donc comme un meilleur instrument intermédiaire que le taux d'inflation.

Many recent discussions on the conduct of monetary policy through interest rate rules have given a very central role to inflation, both as an objective and as an intermediate instrument. We want to show that other variables like employment can be as important or even more. For that we construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model where the economy is subject to demand and supply shocks. We compute closed form solutions for the optimal interest rate rules and find that they can be function of employment only, which then dominates inflation for use in the policy rule. ; De nombreuses discussions récentes sur la conduite de la politique monétaire via des règles de taux d'intérèt ont donné un rôle central au taux d'inflation, à la fois comme objectif ou comme instrument intermédiaire. On veut montrer ici que d'autres variables comme l'emploi peuvent jouer un rôle aussi important sinon davantage. Pour cela on construit un modèle d'équilibre général dynamique stochastique où l'économie est soumise à des chocs d'offre et de demande. On calcule des solutions exactes pour les règles de taux d'intérèt optimales et on trouve qu'elles peuvent s'exprimer en fonction du seul niveau d'emploi, qui apparaît donc comme un meilleur instrument intermédiaire que le taux d'inflation.

Many recent discussions on the conduct of monetary policy through interest rate rules have given a very central role to inflation, both as an objective and as an intermediate instrument. We want to show that other variables like employment can be as important or even more. For that we construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model where the economy is subject to demand and supply shocks. We compute closed form solutions for the optimal interest rate rules and find that they can be function of employment only, which then dominates inflation for use in the policy rule. ; De nombreuses discussions récentes sur la conduite de la politique monétaire via des règles de taux d'intérèt ont donné un rôle central au taux d'inflation, à la fois comme objectif ou comme instrument intermédiaire. On veut montrer ici que d'autres variables comme l'emploi peuvent jouer un rôle aussi important sinon davantage. Pour cela on construit un modèle d'équilibre général dynamique stochastique où l'économie est soumise à des chocs d'offre et de demande. On calcule des solutions exactes pour les règles de taux d'intérèt optimales et on trouve qu'elles peuvent s'exprimer en fonction du seul niveau d'emploi, qui apparaît donc comme un meilleur instrument intermédiaire que le taux d'inflation.

We study the tax/subsidy competition between two countries to attract the FDI projects of two firms. We assume that governments lack the capacity to target every potential inward investor such that each can only bid for a single firm. When the characteristics of the two countries are common knowledge, subsidy competition never arises in equilibrium. Both governments may target the same firm if there is uncertainty as to the more profitable location for that firm's plant, such that both governments believe they may win the competition. We also explore how such uncertainty affects the firms' after-tax profits.

Various papers have suggested that Price-Level targeting is a welfare improving policy relative to Inflation targeting. From a practical standpoint, this raises an important yet unanswered question: What is the optimal price index to target? This paper derives the optimal price level targeting index defined over the eight main components of the Consumer Price Index. It finds that such an index places a heavier weight, relative to the expenditure weight, on sectors with slow price adjustments. However, using the expenditure weights instead of the optimal ones results in very small welfare cost.

This paper investigates the long-term impact of price-level targeting on social welfare in an overlapping generations model in which the young save for old age by investing in productive capital and indexed and nominal government bonds. A key feature of the model is that the extent of bond indexation is determined endogenously in response to monetary policy as part of an optimal commitment Ramsey policy. Due to the absence of base-level drift under price-level targeting, long-term inflation risk is reduced by an order of magnitude compared to inflation targeting. Consequently, real bond returns are stabilised somewhat, and consumption volatility for old generations is reduced by around 15 per cent. The baseline welfare gain from price- level targeting is equivalent to a permanent increase in aggregate consumption of only 0.01 per cent, but this estimate is strongly sensitive on the upside.

The recent debate over monetary policy strategies concludes that monetary targeting and inflation targeting in practice lead to very similar patterns of central bank behavior. This raises the question why central banks insist on the strategies they use. In this paper, we develop an answer from political economy. After showing that closed-loop monetary strategies using similar information sets imply similar monetary policy performance, we argue that monetary strategies are helpful in solving internal and external coordination problems for the central bank. We illustrate the point by reviewing the Bundesbank's intrpduction of monetary targeting in the mid-1970s. Monetary targeting was important for the Bank as a signal that the previous monetary regime had been overcome, as a means to define the role of monetary policy vis-a-vis other players in the macro economic policy game, and to structure the internal monetary policy debate. The last section discusses the implications of this view for the new European Central Bank. ; Published in connection with a visit to the IIES

The recent debate over monetary policy strategies concludes that monetary targeting and inflation in practice leads to very similar patterns of central bank behavior. This raises the question why central banks insist on the strategies they use. In this paper, we develop an answer from political economy. After showing that closed-loop monetary strategies using similar information sets imply similar monetary policy performance, we argue that monetary strategies are helpful in solving internal and external coordination problems for the central bank. We illustrate the point by reviewing the Bundesbank's introduction of monetary targeting in the mid-1970s. Monetary targeting was important for the Bank as a signal that the previous monetary regime had been overcome, as a means to defina the role of monetary policy vis-a-vis other players in the macro economic policy game, and to structure the internal monetary policy debate. The last section discusses the implications of this view for the new European Central Bank.

The use of data to inform and run political campaigning has become an inescapable trend in recent years. In attempting to persuade an electorate, micro-targeted campaigns (MTCs) have been employed to great effect through the use of tailored messaging and selective targeting. Here we investigate the capacity of MTCs to deal with the diversity of political preferences across an electorate. More precisely, via an Agent-Based Model we simulate various diverse electorates that encompass single issue, multiple issue, swing, and disengaged voters (among others, including combinations thereof) and determine the relative persuasive efficacy of MTCs when pitted against more traditional, population-targeting campaigns. Taking into account the perceived credibility of these campaigns, we find MTCs highly capable of handling greater voter complexity than shown in previous work, and yielding further advantages beyond traditional campaigns in their capacity to avoid inefficient (or even backfiring) interactions – even when fielding a low credibility candidate.

Strategy in Central War? The design of targeting schema is a strategic task-­that is to say it is an exercise in applied strategic thinking. Strategy is supposed to relate military assets to political purposes. In principle, at least, there can be no argument but that strategic judgment should guide sub-SIOP, SIOP, and post-SIOP targeting plans. In practice there is considerable ground for philosophical dispute.

We evaluate the effectiveness of regional targeting in China's large-scale poverty alleviation program begun in 1986 by analyzing a panel data set of all counties in China for the period 1981–1995. Estimates of models of poor county designation and poverty fund allocation and newly defined targeting gap and targeting error measures show that political factors have affected targeting and that leakage has increased while coverage has improved. Only one of the three main programs is progressive. Growth model estimates find that poor county designation increased incomes per capita by 2.28% per year during 1985–1992 and 0.91% during 1992–1995. These results are relatively robust to redefining control groups using propensity-score matching methods.

This article is the third of four written to line up two extremes in the history of methodology: early 20th century Pragmatism and late-Renaissance militarism, filling in the middle period, focusing on Voltaire and the atmosphere before the French revolution. Pragmatist William James pretended to offer a purely formal method, yet strategized it as a doctrinal attack on the inefficiency of Christianity (according to his (mis)understanding of it). Machiavelli attacked Christianity's practice of justice and meekness as weakness, from his own Classicist, Romanist militaristic empire perspective. Voltaire, in middle Modernity, devised a hermeneutic from an Enlightenment position with a strong Neo-Classicist slant, by representing Ancient Classical tradition as fundamentally tolerant to difference of opinion, and by over-painting any suggestion that early Christians were persecuted for their faith. He represented the Christians of his own days (often rightly so) as unfair, criminal and violent, especially with regard to heterodox opinions. His naturalistic tendencies, contradicting his liberalism (an intolerant propagation of tolerance) must have contributed to the severity of persecution of non-compliant Christians during the 1789 Revolution. Later naturalistic liberalists, such as Dide and Booms, and several anti-Christian sites on the internet, found and find their inspiration (sometimes against his intentions) in Voltaire's criticism of Christianity. ; http://www.koersjournal.org.za/index.php/koers/issue/view/322 ; http://www.koersjournal.org.za/index.php/koers/article/view/2238 ; https://doi.org/10.19108/KOERS.80.3.2238 ; http://dx.doi.org/10.19108/koers.80.3.2238

This article is the third of four written to line up two extremes in the history of methodology: early 20th century Pragmatism and late-Renaissance militarism, filling in the middle period, focusing on Voltaire and the atmosphere before the French revolution. Pragmatist William James pretended to offer a purely formal method, yet strategized it as a doctrinal attack on the inefficiency of Christianity (according to his (mis)understanding of it). Machiavelli attacked Christianity's practice of justice and meekness as weakness, from his own Classicist, Romanist militaristic empire perspective. Voltaire, in middle Modernity, devised a hermeneutic from an Enlightenment position with a strong Neo-Classicist slant, by representing Ancient Classical tradition as fundamentally tolerant to difference of opinion, and by over-painting any suggestion that early Christians were persecuted for their faith. He represented the Christians of his own days (often rightly so) as unfair, criminal and violent, especially with regard to heterodox opinions. His naturalistic tendencies, contradicting his liberalism (an intolerant propagation of tolerance) must have contributed to the severity of persecution of non-compliant Christians during the 1789 Revolution. Later naturalistic liberalists, such as Dide and Booms, and several anti-Christian sites on the internet, found and find their inspiration (sometimes against his intentions) in Voltaire's criticism of Christianity. ; http://www.koersjournal.org.za/index.php/koers/issue/view/322 ; http://www.koersjournal.org.za/index.php/koers/article/view/2238 ; https://doi.org/10.19108/KOERS.80.3.2238 ; http://dx.doi.org/10.19108/koers.80.3.2238

By the end of the Great Moderation, over two dozen central banks were formal inflation targeters, and others, such as the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the Swiss National Bank behaved essentially as inflation targeters even though they were resistant to identifying themselves as such. However, the past three years have seen central banks faced with new challenges, and these have raised questions about the future of inflation targeting as a framework for the conduct of monetary policy. I consider three suggested modifications to this policy framework: incorporating additional goals among a central bank's objectives; raising the average target for inflation; and switching to price level targeting.