Tariffs, Preferential Tariff Arrangements and Tariff Escalation
In: Fishing for Coherence; The Development Dimension, S. 157-160
In: Fishing for Coherence; The Development Dimension, S. 157-160
In: Yugoslav survey: a record of facts and information ; quarterly, Band 38, Heft 3, S. 85-102
ISSN: 0044-1341
World Affairs Online
In: Eastern European economics: EEE, Band 46, Heft 5, S. 47-56
ISSN: 1557-9298
In: The Canadian journal of economics: the journal of the Canadian Economics Association = Revue canadienne d'économique, Band 56, Heft 1, S. 133-163
ISSN: 1540-5982
AbstractAfter successive rounds of tariff reductions by GATT/WTO members, non‐tariff measures (NTMs) have increasingly become the focal point of multilateral trade negotiations. It remains an open question whether the liberalization in tariff rates has subsequently been weakened or even erased by increases in NTMs. Using a product‐level global panel of WTO members over the period 1996–2019, this paper systematically examines the empirical link between various tariff measures and the imposition of NTMs. I find that bound or applied tariff reductions do not correlate much on their own with NTM incidence. The relevant trade policy margin for detecting a tariff–NTM nexus is instead tariff overhangs, the difference between WTO members' bound and applied tariff rates. Countries impose more NTMs when their sectoral applied tariffs are close to their respective bound rates, indicating that small tariff overhangs signal limited legal trade policy flexibility.
SSRN
Working paper
In: The Canadian journal of economics: the journal of the Canadian Economics Association = Revue canadienne d'économique, Band 33, Heft 4, S. 1069-1090
ISSN: 1540-5982
In this paper some coherent explanations are suggested for tariff reductions and substitution of non‐tariff barriers for tariffs, taking into account both organized special interests and unorganized consumer interests. The focus is on how the presence of informed consumers affects the political equilibrium choice of trade policy. Three effects are identified that interact with each other as an incumbent government substitutes a NTB for a tariff, and, among other things, it is found that an increase in foreign competition will not cause the government to substitute NTBs for tariffs, but a rise in the government's valuation of political contribution might do so. JEL Classification: F13, D72Ce mémoire propose des explications cohérentes de la réduction des droits de douane et de la substitution de barrières non‐tarifaires (BNT) pour les droits de douane dans un cadre d'analyse qui tient compte des groupes d'intérêt organisés et de la désorganisation des groupes de consommateurs. L'analyse insiste sur l'impact de consommateurs informés sur les choix politiques qui sous‐tendent la politique commerciale. Le mémoire identifie trois effets (effet de bienêtre social, effet de lobbying, effet d'information) qui jouent au moment où un gouvernement substitue une barrière non‐tarifaire à un droit de douane. On montre, entre autres choses, qu'un accroissement de la concurrence étrangère n'engendre pas de substitution de BNT pour un droit de douane, mais qu'un accroissement de la valeur accordée aux contributions électorales peut fort bien avoir cet effet.
In: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/coo.31924014490266
Reproduced from type-written copy. ; Some pages numbered as leaves. ; At head of title: United States Tariff commission. ; Mode of access: Internet.
BASE
In: Miscellaneous series
Taxes on import, or tariffs, are a common policy used to achieve many ends from protecting domestic industries to raising revenue. Tariffs, by their nature, are a very contentious issue. They have been used as something of an economic weapon which countries wield against each other to achieve domestic economic goals or to encourage desired behaviors of foreign nations. Tariffs, like any tax, create some economic loss but tariffs are unique in that the loss is born in part by foreign producers and the domestic country may well face net economic gains by imposing a tariff. This paper considers the dynamic created by the incentives countries have to impose tariffs on one another through the use of a two-country two-good model. This paper considers the results predicted by the model over a variety of scenarios found in the real world including a large-small country relationship and a rich-poor government relationship. These results are compared to real world data to provide insight to some of the trade patterns seen globally. Finally the model results are discussed in a game-theoretic framework and strategic options are considered to provide for the socially optimal level of tariffs.
BASE
In: Foreign affairs, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 459
ISSN: 0015-7120