How Does Trust Affect Concessionary Behavior in Tax Bargaining?
In: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series No. 2020-15
In: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series No. 2020-15
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In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 5, Heft 4, S. 363-380
ISSN: 1475-6765
ABSTRACTMultinational corporations can play off host governments to minimise their tax payments in the absence of internationally coordinated fiscal policies. Without a supranational enforcement agency, most tax harmonization policies are unstable because one or another signatory always has an incentive to break ranks. This produces a sub‐optimal tax harvest for a group of host governments taken as a whole. This is a collective action problem for host governments which can be stated in the form of a Prisoner's Dilemma supergame. Equilibrium cooperative solutions have been suggested for this game which do not need higher authorities to enforce them. The application of these solutions to the host governments' tax problem is discussed, with the conclusion that under certain conditions self‐policing tax harmonization agreements are possible.
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 5, Heft 4, S. 363-380
ISSN: 0304-4130
MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES CAN PLAY OFF MOST GOVERNMENTS TO MINIMISE THEIR TAX PAYMENTS IN THE ABSENCE OF INTERNATIONALLY COORDINATED FISCAL POLICIES. WITHOUT A SUPRANATIONAL ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, MOST TAX HARMONIZATION POLICIES ARE UNSTABLE BECAUSE ONE OR ANOTHER SIGNATORY ALWAYS HAS AN INCENTIVE TO BREAK RANKS.
In: African affairs: the journal of the Royal African Society, Band 115, Heft 460, S. 575-577
ISSN: 0001-9909
In: African affairs: the journal of the Royal African Society, Band 115, Heft 460, S. 575-577
ISSN: 1468-2621
In: African affairs: the journal of the Royal African Society, Band 119, Heft 475, S. 177-202
ISSN: 1468-2621
Many Sub-Saharan African countries are unable to generate sufficient tax revenues for public purposes. While it is widely accepted that governments' ability to tax is shaped by politics, the precise mechanisms through which this relationship takes place in practice remain elusive. Based on a historical analysis of four major tax reforms in Ghana from the 1850s to the late 1990s, this article captures the various ways in which taxpayers negotiate with the state in an attempt to limit the extent of taxation, especially in cases where state reciprocity falls short of what people expect. Our evidence suggests that, far from being a recent development, effective taxation in Ghana has long depended on the ability of the state to convince taxpayers that tax revenues will be used for the public benefit. A history of misappropriation of tax revenues, overt corruption, and profligacy diminished taxpayers' support for governments' tax efforts. More generally, the article points to the importance of understanding how tax bargaining works in practice and people's perceptions of their governments over the long term to overcome resistance to tax reforms.
In: African affairs: the journal of the Royal African Society, Band 119, Heft 475, S. 177-202
ISSN: 0001-9909
World Affairs Online
In: British journal of political science, Band 48, Heft 2, S. 427-457
ISSN: 1469-2112
Studies of political budget cycles in developing countries have generally sought to inform understanding of short-term fiscal dynamics, but can also offer unique insight into broader political dynamics in developing countries. This article correspondingly employs markedly improved data in order to study the impact of elections on tax collection, and draw broader lessons. It shows that while electionsas a grouphave had no significant effect on tax collection, the subset ofcompetitive electionshas had a significant negative impact on pre-election tax collection; while this effect appears to be largest where incumbents are particularly unpopular. This provides powerful evidence that the impact of elections on political incentives in developing countries is conditioned by the existence of an electorally competitive opposition, while offering preliminary evidence that popular resistance to taxation by unpopular governments may be an important means by which taxpayers may generate pressure for improved governance.
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In: Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2012-02
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In: Scottish journal of political economy: the journal of the Scottish Economic Society, Band 43, Heft 5, S. 549-565
ISSN: 1467-9485
AbstractVariations in company taxes are analysed for a right‐to‐manage model, an efficient bargaining setting and a seniority approach. Taxes cannot be shifted forward by the risk‐neutral firm. Alternative income and bargaining power are allowed to vary with taxes. Employing asymmetric Nash solution it is found that changes in a payroll, revenue or profit tax can have differing implications for labour demand curve models and efficient bargaining solutions. This distinction might provide a novel basis for empirical work. Variations in bargaining power and‐within a labour demand curve setting‐the union's objective function do not change results.
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13143
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6979
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 10557
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In: CRREP working paper 2016-02
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