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Forside; Titelside; Kolofon; Indhold; Forord; Indledning; Kapitel 1 Fort Grønland; Kapitel 2 Begrebet atomer i Grønland; Kapitel 3 Byen under isen; Camp Century i billeder; Kapitel 4 Nyheder fra Grønland; Kapitel 5 Søren Spejder i Camp Century; Kapitel 6 Amerikansk militærforskning på indlandsisen; Kapitel 7 Kold krig og klimaforskning; Kapitel 8 Et foreløbigt farvel til Camp Century; Kapitel 9 Arven efter Camp Century; Noter; Benyttede arkiver; Anvendt litteratur; Billedkilder; Indeks.

Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.

Selv om norske myndigheter ligger på verdenstoppen i digitalisering av offentlige tjenester, står landets forsvar fremdeles «på stedet hvil». I kjernen av problemet finner vi en styringsmodell der 14 ulike forsvarsgrener og selvstendige driftsenheter kjemper om makt og innflytelse. Dette gjelder særlig i spørsmålet om hvem som skal ha ansvar og myndighet når Forsvarets IKT-systemer skal knyttes sammen for å øke cyberberedskapen. Hvordan kan vi beskrive, forklare og forstå de digitale problemene som Forsvaret står oppe i? Nyere forskning gir ikke klare svar, blant annet fordi de fleste studiene er opptatt av å studere utfordringene som kommer utenfra og inn mot Norge. Spørsmålet om hvorfor Forsvaret ikke klarer å forsvare seg mot cyberangrep, eller hvorfor etaten ikke holder tritt med resten av samfunnet, forblir derfor ubesvart. Ved å bruke instrumentelle og kulturelle perspektiver fra organisasjonsteorien finner vi store huller i forsvarsevnen på grunn av intern fragmentering og rivalisering.
Abstract in English:National Defence in a Digital Crisis?Even though the Norwegian authorities are world leaders in digitalization of public services, its armed forces are falling behind. In its essence, the problem lies in a management model with 14 different services striving for power and influence. This is particularly so when it comes to whom should have supreme authority as information and communication technology (ICT) systems are standardised across the force. How can we describe, explain and comprehend this digital complexity? Contemporary research does not provide clear answers, much due to over-emphasis on external cyberthreats. The question of why Norway's armed forces are incapable of providing a proper defence against cyberthreats therefore remains unanswered. By means of instrumental and cultural theories, we find grave deficiencies due to internal rivalry and organisational fragmentation.