Suchergebnisse

Euroopan komissio luotiin jotta se voisi ajaa yhteisöjen intressiä. Sen vuoksi siitä päätettiin tehdä itsenäinen. Mutta koska Euroopan Unionin vaikutus jäsenmaissaan on hyvin vahvaa, myös talouden kannalta, haluavat jäsenmaat vaikuttaa komissioon mahdollisimman paljon. Tämän vuoksi komission itsenäisyys vaarantuu. Perustamissopimukset koettavat hoitaa ongelman luomalla komissiolle joita-kin suojamekanismeja. Mutta ovatko ne riittäviä? Vaikuttaa siltä, että komissioon pystytään vaikuttamaan liikaa sen jokapäiväisessä työssä. Tämä vaikuttaminen alkaa jo komission nimittämisvaiheessa ja jatkuu koko ajan komission pohtiessa uuden lainsäädännön tarvetta ja komission valmistellessa uutta lainsäädäntöä. Komission lakiehdotelman sisältöön vaikuttavat usein paljonkin muut instituutiot, jäsenvaltiot sekä intressiryhmät. Tämä johtaa siihen, että komissio ei täysin pysty toteuttamaan yhteisöjen in-tressiä. Monin eri tavoin komission päätöksiin voivat vaikuttaa yksittäisten tai use-ampien jäsenmaiden edut, vaikka tarkoitus olisi ajaa yhteisöjen etua. The European Commission was created so that it could work to fulfil the Community Interest. Therefore it was decided to be an independent institution. But because the European Union affects its Member States very deeply, not least in budgetary ways, the Member States seem to want to influence the Commission as much as possible. Therefore the independence of the Commission is at stake. The Treaties try to deal with the problem by setting some protective mecha-nisms on the Commission. But is it enough? It seems that the Commission gets in-fluenced too much in its everyday work. This influencing starts already at the nomi-nation of the Commissioners, continues all the while when the Commission is decid-ing if new Community legislation is needed and while it drafts new legislation. The substance of the drafts are often influenced very much by the other institutions, Member States and interest groups. What this means is that the Commission can't fulfil its task at seeking the best of the Communities. In many different ways the decisions of the Commission may further the good of one or some interested parties instead of the Community In-terest.

During the past two decades, the United Nations Women, Peace and Security Agenda has expanded considerably to cover a wide range of themes and actors. Despite its global diffusion, it has been criticised for its slow implementation and is claimed by some to be mere rhetoric. In line with results-based management, indicators have become key tools in securing monitoring and evaluation of the agenda. This article provides new insights about the concrete use of indicators and responds to the following research questions: How does the use of indicators correspond to the goal of providing monitoring and evaluation data? How can we explain the occurrence of means-ends decoupling? The article examines the country-level use of indicators in Nigeria. The data is collected as part of an indicator ethnography conducted in Nigeria during the spring of 2020. Indicator culture has spread widely, creating an illusion of rationality and effectiveness. Resources, time and money are allocated to operationalization, without questioning the indicator logic itself. The Nigerian case reflects symbolic implementation, where actors maintain well-developed indicator frameworks and monitoring committees without evidence about its actual utility. Over the past four years, not a single monitoring report has been produced. The absence of reporting can be explained through capacity and resource challenges, but also as local actors counteract externally set norms and forms of numerical rationality. Theoretically, the article is based on sociological new-institutionalism and builds on previous feminist peace research. ; Peer reviewed