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There is a story evidently true, about a conversation between the brothers Reinhold and H. Richard Niebuhr as they were returning from a joint lecture at Princeton University sometime in early 1941. The two brothers had gone quite separate ways on what was then referred to as "the interventionist issue" (in Europe), and the debate continued in the car. H. Richard bemoaned the way in which nations had come to deal with each other—by way of lying, cheating, coercion, hatred, fear, aggression and so on. As he talked Reinhold became more and more restless until at last he burst forth: "Yes, but Helmut, don't you know that's how nations have always treated each other!"

The article reviews different antitheodicies in response to Toby Betenson's article "Anti-Theodicy". Antitheodicies involve rejecting the position that God or meaning exist only, if evils have justifying morally sufficient reasons. The article builds on Betenson's division into moral and conceptual antitheodicies and his characterization of antitheodicies as a metacritique of the problem of evil. Moral antitheodicies are problematic, as they do not address the key conceptual issues and might end up in question-begging or moralism. Dissolving the problem of evil requires a conceptual antitheodicy that exposes its presuppositions as speculative metaphysics. Religious conceptual antitheodicies help to focus on different ways of sense-making that do not fall into theodicism.

"" 8 Vindicatio Dei: Evil as a Result of God�s Free Choice of the Best""""9 Leibniz�s Dilemma on Predestination1""; ""10 Justice, Happiness, and Perfection in Leibniz�s City of God1""; ""11 Monads and the Theodicy: Reading Leibniz""; ""12 Leibniz�s Theodicy as a Critique of Spinoza and Bayle�and Blueprint for the Philosophy Wars of the 18th Century""; ""Bibliography""; ""Index ""

Throughout all of Rousseau's works there is tension between argumentation and feeling, speculation and intuition, reason and conscience. Reason binds men when they think correctly, but divides them and opposes one to the other when they place it at the service of self-interest, of ambition and of the will to prevail. Conversely, the universality of conscience is immediate and transparent: it transmits the truth of the existence of God, of the freedom of men, of the distinction between good and evil, as well as of the universal principles that are at the roots of human action and of the virtues honoured by all human societies, despite the differences of particular legislations. Mankind possesses an innate and intuitive conscience of the fundamental principles by which its conduct must be inspired. Were we to consider human actions only according to the criterion of physical need, of causality and of movement, vices and virtues would disappear and terms like morality and honesty would have no meaning. But each one of us perceives from within that this is not the case. We feel that moral good and evil are more real than anything else, without any need whatsoever to prove it. To obey the conscience one has of good and of evil without human mediation means to reject the dogmatic formalism of religions as well as the vanity of philosophical disputes. Every human being, however, is inserted into a national community. What should the state's attitude be vis-à-vis religion? Rousseau indicates two paths. The first consists in establishing a purely civil religion that admits only those dogmas that are truly useful to society. Rousseau highlights the contradiction of a Christian religion that, although it is the religion of peace par excellence, fuels continuing bloody clashes among men due to a dogmatic theology that is totally alien to the essence of the Gospel and extremely hazardous for the life of the State. The second path consists in allowing Christianity to retain its authentic spirit, its freedom from any material constraint, without any obligations other than those of individual conscience. The Christian religion has such a pure and noble moral that it cannot but benefit the State, as long as one does not expect to make it part of the constitution.

Almost all interpreters of Cartesian philosophy have hitherto focused on the epistemological aspect of Descartes' thought. In his Cartesian Theodicy, Janowski demonstrates that Descartes' epistemological problems are merely rearticulations of theological questions. For example, Descartes' attempt to define the role of God in man's cognitive fallibility is a reiteration of an old argument that points out the incongruity between the existence of God and evil, and his pivotal question `whence error?' is shown here to be a rephrasing of the question `whence evil?' The answer Descartes gives in the Meditations is actually a reformulation of the answer found in St. Augustine's De Libero Arbitrio and the Confessions. The influence of St. Augustine on Descartes can also be detected in the doctrine of eternal truths which, within the context of the 17th-century debates over the question of the nature of divine freedom, caused Descartes to ally himself with the Augustinian Oratorians against the Jesuits. Both in his Cartesian Theodicy as well as his Index Augustino-Cartesian, Textes et Commentaire Janowski shows that the entire Cartesian metaphysics can - and should - be read within the context of Augustinian thought

The paper argues that Fridrikh Gorenshtein's preoccupation with evil and with the search for a proper response offers a useful lens through which to explore his conception of Jewishness and his identity as a Jewish writer working within the Russian literary tradition.

This paper examines Hegel's claim that philosophy "has no other object than God" as a claim about the essentiality of the idea of God to philosophy. On this idealist interpretation, even atheistic philosophies would presuppose rationally evaluable ideas of God, despite denials of the existence of anything corresponding to those ideas. This interpretation is then applied to Hegel's version of idealism in relation to those of two predecessors, Leibniz and Kant. Hegel criticizes the idea of the Christian God present within his predecessors in terms of his own heterodox reading of the Trinity in order to resolve a paradox affecting them – the "paradox of perspectivism".