European governance ranks high on the present research agenda on Europe. Based on new empirical research, this book presents a broad-ranging view of the multi-faceted interdependence of EU and national governance.
Limiting Institutions examines the security threats in Eurasia and the role of institutions in the post-Cold War international environment. It looks at both the crucial aspect of foreign policy as well as a theoretical area of security studies and its impact in the former Soviet States including Russia, Belarus, Armenia, the Ukraine and Moldova. The first section addresses the important and varied range of security threats to this area of the world, and examines the range of responses open to European countries and to the United States. Threats such as ethnic conflict, transnational crime, and environmental and energy security issues are examined in depth. The second section addresses an important theoretical issue, namely the role that international institutions can perhaps play as arbiters of conflict and facilitators of cooperation in a region abutting the European political space. The role of the OSCE, NATO, the European Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council are consequently examined closely. The contributors are scholars with solid international reputations, and the book will be of benefit to students of international relations and conflict analysis.
In this paper we present a general model of organizational problem-solving in which organizations engage into an activity of cognition (un-derstanding the world in which they operate) and an activity of action (implementing those policies which cognition indicates as targets which better fit the world’s characteristics). Both cognition and action are adaptively determined as the organization faces limitations in the cog-nitive capabilities of its members and in its control functions. Interde-pendencies among relevant dimensions of the environment and among basic operational tasks are only partly understood. The model allows us to study various combinations of decompositions of cognition and ac-tion and various stylized reward systems. In particular, we can address issues of centralization vs. decentralization of cognition, production and rewards schemes and the possible complementarities among these choices. ∗Luigi Marengo gratefully acknowledges financial contribution from the European Com-mission within the project NORMEC (SERD-2000-00316), Research Directorate, 5th frame-work program. The authors are the only responsible for the opinions expressed in this paper, which are not necessarily those of the European Union or the European Commission.
Compared to the various forms of intergovernmental or public-private co-operation, transna-tional private self-regulation is a rather rarely studied case of global economic governance. Furthermore, existing research on transnational self-regulation has neglected the issue of corporate governance, which is central to the way capitalism is organised today. Transnational private self-regulation, however, appears to be a crucial part of any explanation of current changes of national models of corporate governance and, therefore, of the basic organisation of economic life. Three features of private self-regulation are singled out for a more detailed study, namely credit rating, private codes of “good corporate governance ” and the transna-tional harmonisation of accounting standards. In all of these cases, co-ordination service firms such as rating agencies, institutional investors and accounting companies play an important role as mechanisms for the transnational harmonisation of corporate governance. The paper concludes that the increasing role of transnational private self-regulation raises important nor-mative concerns and, in more particular, asks for the identification of alternative agency.
"Der auf die 'institutionelle Steuerung von Wirtschaft' gerichtete Governance-Ansatz geht davon aus, dass nationale Ökonomien in ein Bündel nichtmarktförmiger Koordinationstypen (wie Firmenhierarchien, Netzwerke, Verbände und Staat) eingebettet sind. Die Governance-Forschung fragt nach der Konfiguration von Governance-Typen in sektoralen, regionalen oder nationalen Produktionszusammenhängen und nach deren komparativen Leistungsvorteilen. Die wachsende Integration von Märkten scheint jedoch Spielräume für kapitalistische Vielfalt zu reduzieren und Länder mit einer eher marktförmigen Organisation ihrer Wirtschaft zu begünstigen. Während die international vergleichende Governance-Forschung auch weiterhin von einer Stabilität nationaler Wirtschaftskontexte ausgeht, sieht eine jüngere, vorwiegend auf Deutschland bezogene Debatte nationale Ökonomien erheblichen Wandlungsprozessen unterworfen. Der vorliegende Beitrag vermittelt einen Überblick über den Verlauf der Governance-Diskussion und setzt sich kritisch mit den Vor- und Nachteilen des Varieties-of-Capitalism-Ansatzes auseinander. Abschließend wird für eine stärker prozess- und akteurorientierte Forschungsperspektive plädiert, die Antriebskräfte, Mechanismen und Dimensionen des Wandels kapitalistischer Institutionen in den Mittelpunkt stellt." (Autorenreferat)