This paper defines women's political empowerment borrowing from the UNDP's development framework using the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) "which examines whether women and men are able to actively participate in economic and political life and take part in decision making" (UNDP 1995:73). Furthermore, in modifying GEM this paper focuses only on women in local governance, since it is an area where efforts in political empowerment is easier studied using micro lenses. The modified GEM focuses on three main concerns: election of women local chief executives, local chief executives' advocacy of women-oriented programs and women's advocacy at the grassroots level. The paper also shows that gender alone is not the way to engendered governance. Female and male local officials must all be aware of the need to redress inequalities among the genders through policy and action.
Der auf die institutionelle Steuerung von Wirtschaft gerichtete Governance-Ansatz geht davon aus, dass nationale Ökonomien in ein Bündel nichtmarktförmiger Koordinationstypen (wie Firmenhierarchien, Netzwerke, Verbände und Staat) eingebettet sind. Die Governance-Forschung fragt nach der Konfiguration von Governance-Typen in sektoralen, regionalen oder nationalen Produktionszusammenhängen und nach deren komparativen Leistungsvorteilen. Die wachsende Integration von Märkten scheint jedoch Spielräume für kapitalistische Vielfalt zu reduzieren und Länder mit einer eher marktförmigen Organisation ihrer Wirtschaft zu begünstigen. Während die international vergleichende Governance-Forschung auch weiterhin von einer Stabilität nationaler Wirtschaftskontexte ausgeht, sieht eine jüngere, vorwiegend auf Deutschland bezogene Debatte nationale Ökonomien erheblichen Wandlungsprozessen unterworfen. Der vorliegende Beitrag vermittelt einen Überblick über den Verlauf der Governance-Diskussion und setzt sich kritisch mit den Vor- und Nachteilen des Varieties-of-Capitalism-Ansatzes auseinander. Abschließend wird für eine stärker prozess- und akteurorientierte Forschungsperspektive plädiert, die Antriebskräfte, Mechanismen und Dimensionen des Wandels kapitalistischer Institutionen in den Mittelpunkt stellt. ; The institutional governance approach sees national economies embedded in a bundle of non-market types of coordination (e.g. corporate hierarchies, networks, associations and the state). Governance oriented research explores configurations of governance types in sectoral, regional and national systems of productions and asks for their comparative advantages. The growing integration of markets, however, seems to reduce capacities for capitalist diversity and to benefit countries with market-like organisation of their economy. While comparative governance approaches still assume stability of national economic contexts, a recent, more on Germany centred debate discovers substantial change in the governance of political economies. The following article presents an overview of the course of the governance debate and discusses advantages and disadvantages of the varieties of capitalism approach. The paper argues in favor of a more process- and actor-centred research perspective which focuses on forces, mechanisms and dimensions of change in capitalist institutions.
This paper, to appear in revised form in the third volume of the series on governance in Australia editied by Glyn Davis, Michael Keading, John Wanna and Patrick Weller, examines the place of accountability in the emerging framework of Australian national governance. The aim is not to map the institutional configuration of accountability agencies in government but to examine a number of basic tensions surrounding accountability and the role of accountability agencies. Although the term 'accountability' is fundamental to governance discourse, expectations of accountability vary quite markedly with different institutional and community perspectives. This paper attempts to sort through some of the more basic tensions associated with the mixed expectations of accountability by identifying how the one term of 'accountability' is often attached to mechanisms that operate at cross-purposes, to the detriment of national governance. The paper begins with a review of the conventional forms of accountability in Australian national governance and then examines three challenging arenas of accountability. First, the arena of open government associated with the agenda of the so-called new administrative law. This is a model of process-accountability which is frequently criticised as having become (i) too costly given the meagre range of benefits it has generated, and (ii) too burdensome on government decision-making given the rights of interested parties to stay the hand of government through round after round of administrative review. The second model is the new public management one of results-oriented accountability, which is frequently criticised as detrimental to due-process safeguards of accountability. The third line of inquiry concerns changing public expectations of accountable government. In the Conclusion, we place these accountability developments in the increasingly international context of Australian governance. Emerging international practices, such as those involving United Nations committees with monitoring responsibilities in relation to Australian government compliance with treaty obligations, highlight growing 'accountability gaps'. We use this term to refer to gaps between the nature of information required by demanders and suppliers of accountability. We note that increasingly public officials who appear before some accountability agencies find themselves in 'accountability traps', where no amount of performance reporting can ever satisfy the demands made of their accountability obligations. We acknowledge that accountability requires more than simply the provision of information from decision-makers, but debates over the qualities of information provide us with a focus for analysing wider trends. Our basic argument is that Australian governance suffers from an increasing number of 'accountability gaps'. We are not original in drawing attention to the messy state of accountability in Australian governance. We conclude that it is unrealistic to expect anything much in the way of an 'accountability accord' until some of the more fundamental accountability gaps are bridged, on the basis of a new appreciation of the information requirements required by each set of demanders and suppliers of accountability.
This paper, to appear in revised form in the third volume of the series on governance in Australia editied by Glyn Davis, Michael Keading, John Wanna and Patrick Weller, examines the place of accountability in the emerging framework of Australian national governance. The aim is not to map the institutional configuration of accountability agencies in government but to examine a number of basic tensions surrounding accountability and the role of accountability agencies. Although the term 'accountability' is fundamental to governance discourse, expectations of accountability vary quite markedly with different institutional and community perspectives. This paper attempts to sort through some of the more basic tensions associated with the mixed expectations of accountability by identifying how the one term of 'accountability' is often attached to mechanisms that operate at cross-purposes, to the detriment of national governance. The paper begins with a review of the conventional forms of accountability in Australian national governance and then examines three challenging arenas of accountability. First, the arena of open government associated with the agenda of the so-called new administrative law. This is a model of process-accountability which is frequently criticised as having become (i) too costly given the meagre range of benefits it has generated, and (ii) too burdensome on government decision-making given the rights of interested parties to stay the hand of government through round after round of administrative review. The second model is the new public management one of results-oriented accountability, which is frequently criticised as detrimental to due-process safeguards of accountability. The third line of inquiry concerns changing public expectations of accountable government. In the Conclusion, we place these accountability developments in the increasingly international context of Australian governance. Emerging international practices, such as those involving United Nations committees with monitoring responsibilities in relation to Australian government compliance with treaty obligations, highlight growing 'accountability gaps'. We use this term to refer to gaps between the nature of information required by demanders and suppliers of accountability. We note that increasingly public officials who appear before some accountability agencies find themselves in 'accountability traps', where no amount of performance reporting can ever satisfy the demands made of their accountability obligations. We acknowledge that accountability requires more than simply the provision of information from decision-makers, but debates over the qualities of information provide us with a focus for analysing wider trends. Our basic argument is that Australian governance suffers from an increasing number of 'accountability gaps'. We are not original in drawing attention to the messy state of accountability in Australian governance. We conclude that it is unrealistic to expect anything much in the way of an 'accountability accord' until some of the more fundamental accountability gaps are bridged, on the basis of a new appreciation of the information requirements required by each set of demanders and suppliers of accountability.
Governance for Architects is the text of a guest lecture given January 18th 2002 at the Fontys Academy of Architecture and Urbanism in Tilburg. The lecture was programmed in a wider discussion on network society and spatial design. Referring to government building commissions in three phases of history, the lecture shows the development of politics and administration, and their influence upon architecture and urbanism.
Der Forschungsbericht enthält Referate, die anlässlich des gleichnamigen Symposiums vom 29. bis 30. September 2000 am Forschungsinstitut für öffentlich Verwaltung in Speyer gehalten worden sind. Der Referentenkreis setzte sich unter anderem aus Mitgliedern des Arbeitskreises "Entwicklung und Verwaltung" zusammen, ein eher informaler Zusammenschluss von Persönlichkeiten aus der Verwaltungspraxis, von entwicklungspolitischen Vollzugsorganisationen, Stiftungen, Universitäten, Hochschulen, der die freie Diskussion einschlägiger Themen pflegt. Das Symposium zieht zugleich eine Zwischenbilanz zu dem von Univ.-Prof. Dr. Dr. Klaus König seit Beginn 1999 geleiteten Forschungsprojektes "Staat und Verwaltung aus globaler Sicht: Die Perzeption der Vereinten Nationen, der OECD und der Weltbank". Inhaltlich finden sich sowohl Beiträge zu den verschiedenen Governance-Ansätzen der Vereinten Nationen, der OECD und der Weltbank, als auch Referate zu der Governance-Programmatik verschiedener Durchführungsorganisationen wie der Hans-Seidel-Stiftung, der Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit und der Deutschen Stiftung für internationale Entwicklung. Weiterhin werden Local Governance und die Erfahrungen mit Dezentralisierungsprojekten thematisiert.
International audience ; Since the late 80s', emerging economies are striking by a recurrent instability of their financial system. The main lesson is that the domestic institutional infrastructure represents a critical condition necessary for successful liberalization. This critical condition refers to what we agree to call the " domestic governance " approach. The traditional answer provided in order to deal with this instability refers to the so-called " new international financial infrastructure ". This initiative seems insufficient because it does not take into account the degree of adaptability of the prevailing domestic institutions. The purpose of our paper is to propose an analytical framework aimed at studying the relationship between " domestic governance " and " global governance ". The challenge becomes to organize a multi-speed financial liberalization process in which capital controls could play a decisive role.
International audience ; Since the late 80s', emerging economies are striking by a recurrent instability of their financial system. The main lesson is that the domestic institutional infrastructure represents a critical condition necessary for successful liberalization. This critical condition refers to what we agree to call the " domestic governance " approach. The traditional answer provided in order to deal with this instability refers to the so-called " new international financial infrastructure ". This initiative seems insufficient because it does not take into account the degree of adaptability of the prevailing domestic institutions. The purpose of our paper is to propose an analytical framework aimed at studying the relationship between " domestic governance " and " global governance ". The challenge becomes to organize a multi-speed financial liberalization process in which capital controls could play a decisive role.
International audience ; Since the late 80s', emerging economies are striking by a recurrent instability of their financial system. The main lesson is that the domestic institutional infrastructure represents a critical condition necessary for successful liberalization. This critical condition refers to what we agree to call the " domestic governance " approach. The traditional answer provided in order to deal with this instability refers to the so-called " new international financial infrastructure ". This initiative seems insufficient because it does not take into account the degree of adaptability of the prevailing domestic institutions. The purpose of our paper is to propose an analytical framework aimed at studying the relationship between " domestic governance " and " global governance ". The challenge becomes to organize a multi-speed financial liberalization process in which capital controls could play a decisive role.
International audience ; Since the late 80s', emerging economies are striking by a recurrent instability of their financial system. The main lesson is that the domestic institutional infrastructure represents a critical condition necessary for successful liberalization. This critical condition refers to what we agree to call the " domestic governance " approach. The traditional answer provided in order to deal with this instability refers to the so-called " new international financial infrastructure ". This initiative seems insufficient because it does not take into account the degree of adaptability of the prevailing domestic institutions. The purpose of our paper is to propose an analytical framework aimed at studying the relationship between " domestic governance " and " global governance ". The challenge becomes to organize a multi-speed financial liberalization process in which capital controls could play a decisive role.
International audience ; Since the late 80s', emerging economies are striking by a recurrent instability of their financial system. The main lesson is that the domestic institutional infrastructure represents a critical condition necessary for successful liberalization. This critical condition refers to what we agree to call the " domestic governance " approach. The traditional answer provided in order to deal with this instability refers to the so-called " new international financial infrastructure ". This initiative seems insufficient because it does not take into account the degree of adaptability of the prevailing domestic institutions. The purpose of our paper is to propose an analytical framework aimed at studying the relationship between " domestic governance " and " global governance ". The challenge becomes to organize a multi-speed financial liberalization process in which capital controls could play a decisive role.
During the last ten years, Estonia has made strong efforts in terms of the transition to a market economy. This is particularly true with respect to the soundness and transparency of monetary and fiscal policies, the privatisation of former state-owned enterprises, the development of the financial sector and the institutional setting. This paper argues that strengthening the formal institutional setting, and in particular the corporate governance institutions, is crucial to further enhance the process of economic transition of the country. It describes the current state the corporate governance structures as compared to other countries in Central and Eastern. ; In den letzten 10 Jahren hat Estland viele Anstrengungen in der Umwandlung in eine Marktwirtschaft unternommen. Dies trifft insbesondere auf die Stabilität und Transparenz der Währungs- und Finanzpolitik zu, der Privatisierung ehemaliger Staatsbetriebe, die Entwicklung im Finanzsektor und im institutionellen Umfeld. Der Aufsatz zeigt auf, dass die Stärkung des formellen institutionellen Umfeldes und im einzelnen auch die der Bereiche der Unternehmensorganisation essentiell wichtig für den weiteren Tranformationsprozess des Landes sind. Er stellt den heutigen Stand der Unternehmensstrukturen im Vergleich zu anderen Staaten dar.
This report describes financial management and governance arrangements in Pakistan, identifies deficiencies in those arrangements, and presents recommendations to address those deficiencies. For the purposes of this study, financial management and governance arrangements are narrowly defined as being accounting and auditing arrangements and practices.
This report describes financial management and governance arrangements for Cambodia, identifies deficiencies in those arrangements, and presents recommendations to address those deficiencies. For the purposes of this study, financial management and governance arrangements are narrowly defined as being accounting and auditing arrangements and practices. The report was prepared for the Asian Development Bank by Ted Godden (International Consultant) with overall guidance from Francis B. Narayan (Lead Financial Specialist, ADB) under Regional Technical Assistance (RETA) 5877 – Strengthening Financial Management and Governance in Selected Developing Member Countries. Savora Tia provided research assistance. The contents of the draft report were discussed and debated with representatives from the Government, the private sector, and international organizations at a workshop that was held in Phnom Penh on 6 July 2000. The issues and recommendations were further discussed at an international conference at ADB headquarters in Manila from 16-18 October 2000.
This report describes financial management and governance arrangements in Mongolia, identifies deficiencies in those arrangements, and presents recommendations to address those deficiencies. For the purposes of this study, financial management and governance arrangements are narrowly defined as being accounting and auditing arrangements and practices.
