Suchergebnisse

AbstractThis commentary focuses on three points related to the debate about urban governmental restructuring: existing conflicts in the literature regarding the outcomes of local government consolidation; insights about consolidation based on an assessment of the amalgamation of twelve municipal units creating the new city of Ottawa; and, a discussion of a variety of methodological and political factors that may well account for the continuing inconsistency in academic assessments of structural change in local government. One possible explanation for the latter conflict is that governmental reorganization does not really make things substantially different in terms of taxes and services, that is, those outcomes most directly experienced by the average citizen. Over the long term other forces, such as intergovernmental relations and the economy, will tend to negate most of the initial effects of change. While there are likely to be winners and losers related to power in government or regime, it will be argued that in large part, for most citizens, governmental reorganization produces the same governance on a different day.

Corporate governance as a coherent notion and independent topic of academic and practitioner interest has developed rapidly in the last ten years. In particular, most countries have seen the publication of vast numbers of regulatory reports outlining best practice in handling the issues that arise from the increased prominence of the governance concept. Although a vast literature exists on the implications of an Initial Public Offering (IPO) for financial performance and ownership structure, few investigations have communicated directly with issuing firms and analysed the practical difficulties encountered on a day‐to‐day basis when a company decides to float. In particular, very few studies have sought to examine what corporate governance changes, if any, are made in the process. This note reports the findings of a questionnaire survey and a series of interviews with practitioners about the changes that are made before and after a sample of IPOs in the UK.

Abstract This paper presents a new theoretical framework for understanding the governance of co‐operative and mutual organisations. The theoretical literature on the governance of co‐operatives is relatively undeveloped in comparison with that on corporate governance. The paper briefly reviews some of the main theoretical perspectives on corporate governance and discusses how they can be usefully extended to throw light on the governance of co‐operatives and mutuals. However, taken individually these different theories are rather one dimensional, only illuminating a particular aspect of the board's role. This has lead to calls for a new conceptual framework that can help integrate the insights of these different theories. The paper argues that a paradox perspective offers a promising way forward. Contrasting the different theoretical perspectives highlights some of the important paradoxes, ambiguities and tensions that boards face.

Accountability has frequently been presented as a rational practice that can and should be implemented in all governance structures including civil society, economic institutions and organizations. In accounting, it has been identified as a primary objective of financial reporting. This paper examines two emotional states, i.e. guilt and shame that are likely to influence accountability. The paper argues that (a) accountability through information disclosure is a cultural practice closely associated with the emotional state of guilt that is common in certain cultures, and (b) in cultures where the emotional state of shame is common, accountability is likely to be weak and, people are likely to be negatively inclined towards information disclosure. Studies in psychology have also shown that "typical" shame experiences were common in collectivistic, large power‐distance and high uncertainty avoidance cultures; while "typical" guilt experiences were more pronounced in individualistic, small power distance and low uncertainty avoidance cultures.

This article argues that good governance has been elusive in much of Africa. The failure of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) to address Africa's developmental challenges, including the crisis of governance, led to its demise. In an attempt to promote good governance, as well as to address Africa's post-cold war legion of challenges, the successor organisation, the African Union (AU) and its attendant development programme, the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), were established. These projects embody an innovative peer review mechanism by which African governments are assessed in terms of their progress towards good governance. Countries passing the review test would be rewarded with western aid. NEPAD, the AU and the review mechanism have exited hope because of the expectation that these would reorder governance policies in Africa. However, the article contends that in spite of the expectations and euphoria generated by these projects, they have a truncated capacity to induce good governance. This is not only due to the intrinsic contradictions in these initiatives, but also because of a confluence of factors, including the vulnerability of the projects to manipulation by African leaders, the preponderance of neo- patrimonial politics in Africa, the confusing relations between especially NEPAD and the AU, and the tendency for the G8 – Africa's key partners – to renegade from their initial aid commitments.