It is proposed that government, being the tangible expression of the legitimate authority within an organised society, has undegone a long transformational journey since its very emergence. The various evolutionary forms and features of the government have been the product of its meaningful and viable responses to the changing expectations of the people as well as to the challenges they faced in an ever-changing environment. The exclusive domain of the state over the period became a shared space with inclusion of other actors and stakeholders, and an era of governance was ushered in since the 1980s. The much celebrated success of the liberal democracy and its market-led open economy heralded as an era of good governance. However, the universal model of good governance fails to take into account the local constraints of a society. Thus, the idea of good governance has to face various types of challenges in the developing as well as underdeveloped societies.
This commentary points to the poor state of empirical measures of the quality of states, that is, executive branches and their bureaucracies. Much of the problem is conceptual, as there is very little agreement on what constitutes high‐quality government. The commentary suggests four approaches: (1) procedural measures, such as the Weberian criteria of bureaucratic modernity; (2) capacity measures, which include both resources and degree of professionalization; (3) output measures; and (4) measures of bureaucratic autonomy. It rejects output measures and suggests a two‐dimensional framework of using capacity and autonomy as a measure of executive branch quality. This framework explains the conundrum of why low‐income countries are advised to reduce bureaucratic autonomy while high‐income ones seek to increase it.
AbstractThis article examines how modes of governance are reconfigured as a result of using algorithms in the governance process. We argue that deploying algorithmic systems creates a shift toward a special form of design‐based governance, with power exercised ex ante via choice architectures defined through protocols, requiring lower levels of commitment from governing actors. We use governance of three policy problems – speeding, disinformation, and social sharing – to illustrate what happens when algorithms are deployed to enable coordination in modes of hierarchical governance, self‐governance, and co‐governance. Our analysis shows that algorithms increase efficiency while decreasing the space for governing actors' discretion. Furthermore, we compare the effects of algorithms in each of these cases and explore sources of convergence and divergence between the governance modes. We suggest design‐based governance modes that rely on algorithmic systems might be re‐conceptualized as algorithmic governance to account for the prevalence of algorithms and the significance of their effects.
This paper reviews governance and public governance related to an emerging area of policy interest – social innovation. The European Commission's White Paper on European Governance (2001) focused on openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence in public policy as characteristics of good governance. The EC has prioritised social innovation to address policy problems. Yet, the extant literature and research on social innovation is sparse. The paper questions whether it is a new mode of governance which contributes to good governance or a continuum of neoliberal reforms of the state which alters the relationship between the state, market and civil society.
Purpose Growing social concerns and ecological issues accelerate firms' environmental, social and governance (ESG) engagement. Hence, this study aims to advance the existing literature by focusing on the interplay between institutional and firm governance mechanisms for greater ESG engagement. More specifically, the authors investigate whether public governance stimulates excessive ESG engagement and whether corporate governance moderates this relationship.
Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of 43,803 firm-year observations affiliated with 41 countries and 9 industries, the authors adopt a country, industry and year fixed-effects regression analysis.
Findings The authors find that public governance strength via its six dimensions stimulates excessive ESG engagement. This implies that firms in countries with strong voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption are more motivated for ESG engagement. Furthermore, corporate governance negatively moderates the relationship between all public governance dimensions (except political stability) and excessive ESG engagement. This implies that public governance and corporate governance are substitutes for encouraging firms to commit to ESG. Further tests reveal that whereas these results in the baseline analyses are valid for developed countries, they are not valid in emerging markets.
Research limitations/implications The findings support the interplay between institutional and agency theories. In countries with strong (weak) institutional mechanisms, corporate governance becomes weak (strong) in inciting greater stakeholder engagement. This implies that the public governance mechanism alleviates agency costs, rendering internal mechanisms of corporate governance noncompulsory for ESG engagement.
Practical implications The findings suggest that emerging countries need to reinforce their institutions for greater accountability, regulatory quality and control of corruption, which will have a domino effect on firms in addressing stakeholder expectations. The results also advise emerging country firms to augment their internal monitoring mechanisms for greater stakeholder engagement, such as structuring boards and establishing corporate social responsibility mechanisms, committees and policies.
Originality/value This study contributes to the recent literature investigating the role of corporate governance mechanisms in excessive ESG engagement. The study also explores whether public governance is associated with greater ESG involvement and provides a comprehensive analysis of the association between six indicators of public governance quality and excessive ESG practices in developed and emerging economies.
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore the prominence and positioning of ethics in the four editions of the King Report on corporate governance for South Africa that were published since 1994. It tells a tale of how certain ethics aspects remained fairly constant over the four editions of the King Report on corporate governance for South Africa (King I in 1994; King II in 2002; King III in 2009; King IV in 2016), whilst other ethics aspects evolved quite substantially over the four editions.
Design/methodology/approach In this paper, a conceptual distinction between "Ethics of Governance" and "Governance of Ethics" will be introduced, which will then be used to analyse the ethics dimensions of the four King reports.
Findings It will be demonstrated that there is continuity across the four editions of the King Report as far as the Ethics of Governance is concerned.
Originality/value With regards to the Governance of Ethics, there has been a quite drastic evolution in both the prominence and positioning of ethics since the publication of the first King Report in 1994.