Die Eurokrise hat tiefgreifende Veränderungen im Gefüge von Institutionen und Kompetenzen in der Europäischen Union angestoßen, dafür stehen der 'Fiskalpakt' und die 'excessive imbalance procedure'. Ein effi zientes Governance-System hat sich aber bisher nicht herausgebildet. Die einzelnen Politikbereiche sind zudem innerhalb der EU unterschiedlich stark integrierbar. Zwischen Bereichen, in denen Zentralisierungstendenzen wünschenswert sind und solchen, in denen das Subsidiaritätsprinzip angemessen ist, muss klar unterschieden werden. Bei der Krisenbewältigung müssen demokratische Prinzipien dringend stärker beachtet werden.
Inhalt: - 1. Einleitung - 2. Ein friedensstrategisches Vakuum? - 3. Wandel in den Internationalen Beziehungen - 4. Der Sicherheitsbegriff im Global-Governance-Ansatz - 5. Bestehende Global Governance-Strukturen im Bereich "Frieden und Sicherheit" - 6. Fazit: Gemeinsame Sicherheit als friedensstrategisches Leitbild - Literatur
Current discourses in science, technology and innovation policy describe a shift from formal, governmental, or statutory regulation to non-hierarchical, informal, and cooperative self-regulatory approaches. They narrate a turn from government to governance, described as a "governance turn." Governance as a new and popular mode of regulation, deliberation and shared responsibility is often linked to favored attributes of science and technology development, and policy making such as democracy and responsibility. This article analyzes the connection between governance and ideas of accountable and democratic science and technology development in the case of nanosciences and nanotechnologies. For this purpose, soft law measures, self-regulatory initiatives, and public engagement projects in Europe and the U.S. were analyzed using the concept of social robustness (Nowotny et al. 2001). The study showed that most of the analyzed governance approaches and engagement projects only partially met aspects of social robustness, and that the governance and deliberative turn in science and technology policy has not led, so far, to greater democracy and responsibility in nanoscience and nanotechnology development. As a consequence, the delegation of techno-political decision making to less socially robust governance approaches might lead to a vacuum in science and technology policy and affect not only academic knowledge production but also the innovative force of a society.
It has now become quite obvious that the Internet has brought significant changes to our society and a break on how we lived before its emergence. It is still too early to assess the impact on society of the new services at our disposal, such as the capacity to communicate faster and cheaper on a global scale, access information and, perhaps more importantly, to produce and disseminate information in a way that is accessible to all. It is clear that the advent of the Information Society implies changes in our society that constitute a point of no return. However, contrary to what happened when we entered the Industrial Age about three centuries ago, when the changing process was slow and led by older individuals, these days the entrance into the Information Society is taking place rapidly and the decisive players are younger people. The global nature of the Internet, the possibility of producing and distributing any type of content in digital form at almost zero cost, as well as the vast number of people who use the web, have highlighted the need for new forms of intervention in a sector where there are many types of players. It is in this context that the problem of Internet Governance becomes a very current issue, inasmuch as one feels the need to guarantee a diversity of rights and duties, which may appear difficult to reconcile. This paper presents a brief overview of the main players and initiatives which, in the field of Internet Governance, have tried to contribute to turning this network into a factor for social development and democraticity on a global scale.
Das europäische Verwaltungsrecht steht vor Koordinierungsproblemen, die es mit einer eigenen Perspektive auf Governance einzufangen hat. Am Beispiel der europäischen Regulierungsverbünde in den Netzwirtschaften wird deutlich, wie neue Formen exekutiver Zusammenarbeit, die auf die Institutionalisierung horizontalen Vertrauens ausgerichtet sind, entstehen. Das hat Konsequenzen. Stärker als bisher müssen Entkoppelungen von Politik und Recht in den Beobachtungsrahmen eingestellt werden. Recht, so argumentiert der Beitrag, hat horizontalen Freiheitsgefährdungen auch dort zu begegnen, wo der Rückgriff auf den Willen eines kollektiven Makrosubjekts aus-scheidet, universelle Vernunft aber nicht zu haben ist.
Progress in measuring governance is assessed using a simple framework that distinguishes between indicators that measure formal rules and indicators that measure the practical application or outcomes of these rules. The analysis calls attention to the strengths and weaknesses of both types of indicators as well as the complementarities between them. It distinguishes between the views of experts and the results of surveys and assesses the merits of aggregate as opposed to individual governance indicators. Some simple principles are identified to guide the use and refinement of existing governance indicators and the development of future indicators. These include transparently disclosing and accounting for the margins of error in all indicators, drawing from a diversity of indicators and exploiting complementarities among them, submitting all indicators to rigorous public and academic scrutiny, and being realistic in expectations of future indicators.
Das vorliegende Papier definiert und diskutiert das Konzept der Economic Governance. Die Kernfrage des Papiers ist, in welcher Form wirtschaftliche Akteure Governance-Leistungen – wie etwa Vertragssicherheit oder Eigentumsrechte – bereitstellen können. Außerdem werden Beispiele aufgeführt, wie der Marktmechanismus gezielt bei politischer Steuerung eingesetzt wird. Dabei wird die aktuelle ökonomische Literatur zu Governance und Institutionen gezielt für die deutsche Governance-Debatte zusammengefasst. Das Papier zeigt, dass private Akteure gerade in Entwicklungsländern fehlende Staatlichkeit durch eigene Governance-Formen ersetzen. Sie schaffen sich selbst die nötigen Rahmenbedingungen ihrer wirtschaftlichen Transaktionen. Auch in entwickelten Ländern gibt es eine Vielzahl solch privater Steuerungsformen wirtschaftlicher Akteure. Diese können als Economic Governance verstanden werden, allerdings nur, wenn sie intentional auf die Ordnungsbildung der Wirtschaft Einfluss nehmen. Die "spontane" Bereitstellung von Gütern und Dienstleistungen durch Märkte kann nicht zu Governance gezählt werden.
Sustainable development is rapidly moving from the periphery to the mainstream of politics, business, and science. Over the past several years, a strong consensus has started to emerge that some of the major global problems can only be overcome through large-scale concerted action. Recent additions to the debate include the reports by the International Panel on Climate Change, the Stern Report on the economics of climate change, Al Gore's An Inconvenient Truth and, perhaps less known, the Potsdam Memorandum1. The latter communication was recently presented by a broad group of Nobel laureates and is titled "The Great Transformation." The statement pleads for fundamental changes in our economies and societies and asks
This paper, to appear in revised form in the third volume of the series on governance in Australia editied by Glyn Davis, Michael Keading, John Wanna and Patrick Weller, examines the place of accountability in the emerging framework of Australian national governance. The aim is not to map the institutional configuration of accountability agencies in government but to examine a number of basic tensions surrounding accountability and the role of accountability agencies. Although the term 'accountability' is fundamental to governance discourse, expectations of accountability vary quite markedly with different institutional and community perspectives. This paper attempts to sort through some of the more basic tensions associated with the mixed expectations of accountability by identifying how the one term of 'accountability' is often attached to mechanisms that operate at cross-purposes, to the detriment of national governance. The paper begins with a review of the conventional forms of accountability in Australian national governance and then examines three challenging arenas of accountability. First, the arena of open government associated with the agenda of the so-called new administrative law. This is a model of process-accountability which is frequently criticised as having become (i) too costly given the meagre range of benefits it has generated, and (ii) too burdensome on government decision-making given the rights of interested parties to stay the hand of government through round after round of administrative review. The second model is the new public management one of results-oriented accountability, which is frequently criticised as detrimental to due-process safeguards of accountability. The third line of inquiry concerns changing public expectations of accountable government. In the Conclusion, we place these accountability developments in the increasingly international context of Australian governance. Emerging international practices, such as those involving United Nations committees with monitoring responsibilities in relation to Australian government compliance with treaty obligations, highlight growing 'accountability gaps'. We use this term to refer to gaps between the nature of information required by demanders and suppliers of accountability. We note that increasingly public officials who appear before some accountability agencies find themselves in 'accountability traps', where no amount of performance reporting can ever satisfy the demands made of their accountability obligations. We acknowledge that accountability requires more than simply the provision of information from decision-makers, but debates over the qualities of information provide us with a focus for analysing wider trends. Our basic argument is that Australian governance suffers from an increasing number of 'accountability gaps'. We are not original in drawing attention to the messy state of accountability in Australian governance. We conclude that it is unrealistic to expect anything much in the way of an 'accountability accord' until some of the more fundamental accountability gaps are bridged, on the basis of a new appreciation of the information requirements required by each set of demanders and suppliers of accountability.
This paper, to appear in revised form in the third volume of the series on governance in Australia editied by Glyn Davis, Michael Keading, John Wanna and Patrick Weller, examines the place of accountability in the emerging framework of Australian national governance. The aim is not to map the institutional configuration of accountability agencies in government but to examine a number of basic tensions surrounding accountability and the role of accountability agencies. Although the term 'accountability' is fundamental to governance discourse, expectations of accountability vary quite markedly with different institutional and community perspectives. This paper attempts to sort through some of the more basic tensions associated with the mixed expectations of accountability by identifying how the one term of 'accountability' is often attached to mechanisms that operate at cross-purposes, to the detriment of national governance. The paper begins with a review of the conventional forms of accountability in Australian national governance and then examines three challenging arenas of accountability. First, the arena of open government associated with the agenda of the so-called new administrative law. This is a model of process-accountability which is frequently criticised as having become (i) too costly given the meagre range of benefits it has generated, and (ii) too burdensome on government decision-making given the rights of interested parties to stay the hand of government through round after round of administrative review. The second model is the new public management one of results-oriented accountability, which is frequently criticised as detrimental to due-process safeguards of accountability. The third line of inquiry concerns changing public expectations of accountable government. In the Conclusion, we place these accountability developments in the increasingly international context of Australian governance. Emerging international practices, such as those involving United Nations committees with monitoring responsibilities in relation to Australian government compliance with treaty obligations, highlight growing 'accountability gaps'. We use this term to refer to gaps between the nature of information required by demanders and suppliers of accountability. We note that increasingly public officials who appear before some accountability agencies find themselves in 'accountability traps', where no amount of performance reporting can ever satisfy the demands made of their accountability obligations. We acknowledge that accountability requires more than simply the provision of information from decision-makers, but debates over the qualities of information provide us with a focus for analysing wider trends. Our basic argument is that Australian governance suffers from an increasing number of 'accountability gaps'. We are not original in drawing attention to the messy state of accountability in Australian governance. We conclude that it is unrealistic to expect anything much in the way of an 'accountability accord' until some of the more fundamental accountability gaps are bridged, on the basis of a new appreciation of the information requirements required by each set of demanders and suppliers of accountability.
This article engages critically with the International Governmentality Studies, delineating a new use of Foucault's toolbox applied to analyse the New Economic Governance (NEG) reforms. The main argument is that the NEG is a reaffirmation and a reinforcement of the fiscal governance machine established with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The fiscal governance machine is an ensemble of techniques shaped by and through which the European art of government is able to work in the entire European space. The article analyses how the Treaty on Stability Coordination and Governance reaffirms this fiscal governance machine. By looking at three techniques – the structural deficit, the Fiscal Council, and the Automatic Mechanism – it shows some key features of this fiscal governance machine: a new discretional power in the hand of the European Commission and of its DG Finance, a decentralised and semi-automatic form of control on Member states, the structuration of a euro-national ensemble of executives and finance institutions.
"State-Building" wird vielerorts als Prinzip moderner Entwicklungspolitik angesehen. Dies beruht auf der Annahme, dass dem modernen Staat eine zentrale Rolle im Bereich der Gewährleistung von Governance-Dienstleistungen zukommt. Das Verhältnis zwischen Staatlichkeit und so verstandener "Governance" ist jedoch alles andere als klar. Auf Basis eines makro-quantitativen Ansatzes, analysieren wir die Performanz von Staaten in Bereichen wie Sicherheit, Gesundheit, Bildung, ökonomische Subsistenz, Infrastruktur und Umwelt und fragen, inwieweit Staatlichkeit die entsprechenden Unterschiede erklären kann, wenn für diverse andere Faktoren kontrolliert wird, die in den entsprechenden Debatten (v.a. in der Politikwissenschaft und (Entwicklungs-) Ökonomie) als zentral angesehen werden. Drei Ergebnisse der Untersuchung stechen hervor: Erstens – und entgegen der obigen Annahme – lässt sich keine signifikante, konsistente Beziehung zwischen Staatlichkeit und objektiver Governance- Performanz herstellen. Zweitens schneiden die entsprechenden Indikatoren besser ab, wenn es um den Zusammenhang zur subjektiven Wahrnehmung von Governance- Performanz geht, was die Ubiquität der o.g. Annahme bestätigt. Drittens schließlich stellt sich der Grad des "Empowerment" von Frauen über ganz verschiedene Sachbereiche hinweg als stärkster Prädiktor der Governance- Performanz heraus. Dieses Ergebnis rechtfertigt den Schwerpunkt, den viele Akteure der Entwicklungspolitik derzeit auf die Förderung von Frauen legen. ; State building is seen as the central tenet of many present-day development efforts. This rests on a global normative script that emphasizes the modern state's role in providing governance services from security to education to health. However, the relationship between statehood and governance outcomes is not well understood. We use a macro-quantitative approach to analyze state performance in various governance dimensions including security, health, education, economic subsistence, infrastructure, and the environment. We test for the ...
Adaptive governance focuses our attention on the relationships between science and management, whereby the so-called 'gaps' between these groups are seen to hinder effective adaptive responses to biophysical change. Yet the relationships between science and governance, knowledge and action, remain under theorized in discussions of adaptive governance, which largely focuses on abstract design principles or preferred institutional arrangements. In contrast, the metaphor of co-production highlights the social and political processes through which science, policy, and practice co-evolve. Co-production is invoked as a normative goal (Mitchell et al., 2004) and analytical lens (Jasanoff, 2004a and Jasanoff, 2004b), both of which provide useful insight into the processes underpinning adaptive governance. This paper builds on and integrates these disparate views to reconceptualize adaptive governance as a process of co-production. I outline an alternative conceptual framing, 'co-productive governance', that articulates the context, knowledge, process, and vision of governance. I explore these ideas through two cases of connectivity conservation, which draws on conservation science to promote collaborative cross-scale governance. This analysis highlights the ways in which the different contexts of these cases produced very different framings and responses to the same propositions of science and governance. Drawing on theoretical and empirical material, co-productive governance moves beyond long standing debates that institutions can be rationally crafted or must emerge from context resituate adaptive governance in a more critical and contextualized space. This reframing focuses on the process of governance through an explicit consideration of how normative considerations shape the interactions between knowledge and power, science and governance. ; This research was funded by a Land and Water Australia PhD scholarship and a top-up scholarship from the CSIRO Climate Adaptation Fund.
Adaptive governance focuses our attention on the relationships between science and management, whereby the so-called 'gaps' between these groups are seen to hinder effective adaptive responses to biophysical change. Yet the relationships between science and governance, knowledge and action, remain under theorized in discussions of adaptive governance, which largely focuses on abstract design principles or preferred institutional arrangements. In contrast, the metaphor of co-production highlights the social and political processes through which science, policy, and practice co-evolve. Co-production is invoked as a normative goal (Mitchell et al., 2004) and analytical lens (Jasanoff, 2004a and Jasanoff, 2004b), both of which provide useful insight into the processes underpinning adaptive governance. This paper builds on and integrates these disparate views to reconceptualize adaptive governance as a process of co-production. I outline an alternative conceptual framing, 'co-productive governance', that articulates the context, knowledge, process, and vision of governance. I explore these ideas through two cases of connectivity conservation, which draws on conservation science to promote collaborative cross-scale governance. This analysis highlights the ways in which the different contexts of these cases produced very different framings and responses to the same propositions of science and governance. Drawing on theoretical and empirical material, co-productive governance moves beyond long standing debates that institutions can be rationally crafted or must emerge from context resituate adaptive governance in a more critical and contextualized space. This reframing focuses on the process of governance through an explicit consideration of how normative considerations shape the interactions between knowledge and power, science and governance. ; This research was funded by a Land and Water Australia PhD scholarship and a top-up scholarship from the CSIRO Climate Adaptation Fund.
1\. Introduction 2\. Governance for (and against) whom? Gaps in the governance literature 3\. Different qualities and "unintended" effects of governance – toward an analytical framework 3.1 Inclusiveness of governance contributions 3.2 Unintended effects of governance 3.3 Negative externalities of core business practices 4\. The quality of governance in light of different collectivities 5\. Conclusion ; Research on governance by external non-state actors in areas of limited statehood concentrates on the conditions under which these actors engage in governance. However, this literature largely ignores findings from research on the anthropology of development, the privatization of security, and non-state welfare provision in developing countries that point to the limitations and negative effects of governance by non-state actors. Hence there are many reasons to distinguish carefully between different qualities of governance contributions and the (unintended) effects of external actors' practices. This paper deals with the quality of governance in that it suggests an analytical framework for distinguishing different qualities along three dimensions: inclusiveness, the indirect effects of governance, and the external effects of non-governance practices. Empirically, the paper focuses on multinational companies in sub-Saharan Africa. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the literature on business and governance noticeably isolates the positive contributions by firms from the negative effects of business activities in areas of limited statehood. Secondly, the case of companies – actors that do not aim at contributing to governance in the first place – clearly illustrates the added value of distinguishing different qualities of governance contributions. This is also relevant, however, for other governance actors. ; Die Forschung zu Governance durch externe, nichtstaatliche Akteure in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit konzentriert sich auf die Bedingungen, unter denen diese zur Bereitstellung kollektiver Güter beitragen. ...