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Dear colleagues, Welcome to the "Journal of Policy & Governance"! In my opinion, an editorial may reflect the general direction of the journal, values, strategy, priorities, goals and objectives, and so on. This is the first edition of the Journal of Policy & Governance where I act as the Editor-in-Chief. The title of the journal includes two key concepts, the "Policy" and the "Governance", and they are crucial for the target audience of the journal. That is, the field of "Policy Science": policy cycle, problem identification for analysis, policy environment, resources, stakeholders' analysis, communications (strategic, multilevel, etc.), policy tools and evaluation, etc. Also, these are values, objectives and methodology of the research and policy analysis, policy as the process and reasons for state intervention, evidence-based policy, quantitative and qualitative methods of data processing and the formation of evidence in the policy process and so on. The field of governance is also valuable for research: democratic, good, sensitive, multilevel, digital, and so on: Service State, public consultation, and interaction between government, business and civil society in the policy-making process. Common decisions, power and out of power policy makers, leadership, analysts and policy actors also require semantic and empirical content in the articles of the journal.

In diesem Beitrag wird das Potential von Qualitätszertifizierungen zur Förderung eines nachhaltigen oder ethisch verantwortlichen Lebensmitteleinkaufs, sowohl in Bezug auf VerbraucherInnen als auch Akteure des öffentlichen Beschaffungswesens, vorgestellt. Es wird gezeigt, dass Governance-basierte Qualitätszertifizierungen wie Label effiziente Kommunikationsinstrumente für nachhaltigkeitsorientierte Ernährung sein können, indem sie Ernährungskompetenz und nachhaltigeres Einkaufsverhalten bei potentiell widersprüchlichen Interessen fördern, insbesondere, wenn die Zertifizierung den Mehrwert des Produktes transparent aufzeigt und die definierten Nachhaltigkeitskriterien gesetzlich verpflichtend sind. Political food communication may take many forms, including direct recommendations to public institutions and private households (cf. Reckinger/Régnier 2017), or more indirect labelling schemes that certify various types of quality – from sustainable via nutritious to ethical. The underlying governance claims differ in those cases: in the first one, priority is given to analytical, top-down information to procurement actors and to individuals of a given population; in the second one, action is rather taken in the direction of food production and transformation, be it top-down or participatory, with an associated effort to make the communicated guarantees transparent to consumers. In this article, we will analyse in a praxeological perspective the contrasting governance claims that structure a selection of labelling schemes in contemporary Luxembourg: official ones (such as organic produce, among others), voluntary and regional ones, international ones, as well as supermarket brands blurring boundaries and using overlaps of several labels. We will compare the guarantees and transparency that labels tend to offer in the socio-ecological, socioeconomic, sociocultural and socio-political dimensions of food certification, viewed as a potentially enabling or disabling form of food communication. At the same time, we will examine the potential of these aids for individual consumers' priorities and public procurement actors' legal framework in selecting foodstuffs with added sustainable or ethical value, asking the question if such certifications are efficient tools of food communication and ultimately of an enhanced food literacy in an arena of potentially conflicting and crowded messages.

We identify an important feature of current digital governance systems: "third-party funded digital barter": consumers of digital services get many digital services for free (or under- priced) and in return have personal information about themselves collected for free. In addition, the digital consumers receive advertising and other forms of influence from the third parties that fund the digital services. The interests of the third-party funders are not well-aligned with the interests of the digital consumers. This fundamental flaw of current digital governance systems is responsible for an array of serious problems, including inequities, inefficiencies, manipulation of digital consumers, as well as dangers to social cohesion and democracy. We present four policy guidelines that aim to correct this flaw by shifting control of personal data from the data aggregators and their third-party funders to the digital consumers. The proposals cover "official data" that require official authentication, "privy data" that is either generated by the data subjects about themselves or by a second parties, and "collective data." The proposals put each of these data types under the individual or collective control of the data subjects. There are also proposals to mitigate asymmetries of information and market power.

Scholars and practitioners are increasingly questioning formal disaster governance (FDG) approaches as being too rigid, slow, and command-and-control driven. Too often, local realities and non-formal influences are sidelined or ignored to the extent that disaster governance can be harmed through the efforts to impose formal and/or political structures. A contrasting narrative emphasises so-called bottom-up, local, and/or participatory approaches which this article proposes to encapsulate as Informal Disaster Governance (IDG). This article theorises IDG and situates it within the long-standing albeit limited literature on the topic, paying particular attention to the literature's failure to properly define informal disaster risk reduction and response efforts, to conceptualise their far-reaching extent and consequences, and to consider their 'dark sides.' By presenting IDG as a framework, this article restores the conceptual importance and balance of IDG vis-à-vis FDG, paving the way for a better understanding of the 'complete' picture of disaster governance. This framework is then considered in a location where IDG might be expected to be more powerful or obvious, namely in a smaller, more isolated, and tightly knit community, characteristics which are stereotypically used to describe island locations. Thus, Svalbard in the Arctic has been chosen as a case study, including its handling of the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic, to explore the merits and challenges with shifting the politics of disaster governance towards IDG.

We identify an important feature of current digital governance systems: "third-party funded digital barter": consumers of digital services get many digital services for free (or underpriced) and in return have personal information about themselves collected for free. In addition, the digital consumers receive advertising and other forms of influence from the third parties that fund the digital services. The interests of the third-party funders are not well-aligned with the interests of the digital consumers. This fundamental flaw of current digital governance systems is responsible for an array of serious problems, including inequities, inefficiencies, manipulation of digital consumers, as well as dangers to social cohesion and democracy. We present four policy guidelines that aim to correct this flaw by shifting control of personal data from the data aggregators and their third-party funders to the digital consumers. The proposals cover "official data" that require official authentication, "privy data" that is either generated by the data subjects about themselves or by a second parties, and "collective data." The proposals put each of these data types under the individual or collective control of the data subjects. There are also proposals to mitigate asymmetries of information and market power.

Congress and federal financial regulators have long prioritized the safety and soundness of banking firms. But at the same time, the directors and officers of banking firms are legally bound to prioritize shareholder wealth maximization, which creates incentives for risk-taking that work against these regulatory goals. This shareholder primacy norm has long been a central feature of corporate governance, but as I describe in this Article its application to banks was not a deliberate policy choice but rather a historical accident. Indeed, banks possess several unique features that make shareholder wealth maximization an inapt governance priority for them. Banks are highly leveraged, which increases the importance of creditor agency costs. Banks also enjoy government guarantees, either explicit or implicit, on their short-term debt, and thus their governance is a matter of public concern. Finally, bank failures result in high negative externalities, and this also creates a strong public interest in bank safety and soundness. This Article argues that a new federal governance regime for banking institutions is appropriate and consistent with the historical purposes of banking regulations and charter oversight in the United States. Furthermore, such a regime would reduce the tensions between the law of state entities and the sprawling federal banking regulatory framework created by Congress, and harmonize the internal governance of banking firms with the broader goals of external banking regulations. Finally, I offer some thoughts on the key principles that should be present in any such federal governance regime for banking. For too long, we have tolerated a "cat-and-mouse" dynamic in banking, one in which regulators have sought to identify and address risky practices while knowing that the directors and officers of banking firms have strong incentives to take on higher risk. By changing this paradigm and realigning the incentives inherent in banking governance, we can take a major step towards ensuring long-term stability in our financial system.

We identify an important feature of current digital governance systems: "third-party funded digital barter": consumers of digital services get many digital services for free (or underpriced) and in return have personal information about themselves collected for free. In addition, the digital consumers receive advertising and other forms of influence from the third parties that fund the digital services. The interests of the third-party funders are not well-aligned with the interests of the digital consumers. This fundamental flaw of current digital governance systems is responsible for an array of serious problems, including inequities, inefficiencies, manipulation of digital consumers, as well as dangers to social cohesion and democracy. We present four policy guidelines that aim to correct this flaw by shifting control of personal data from the data aggregators and their third-party funders to the digital consumers. The proposals cover "official data" that require official authentication, "privy data" that is either generated by the data subjects about themselves or by a second parties, and "collective data." The proposals put each of these data types under the individual or collective control of the data subjects. There are also proposals to mitigate asymmetries of information and market power.

This thesis is composed of three chapters. In the first chapter, I analyze the effect of change in product market competition on board composition and evaluate its consequences on firm performance. Using industry-specific exogenous changes in product market competition, I test whether firms respond to changes in the demand for board independence. I find that firms decrease their level of board independence by 5.52 percentage points in response to an increase in product market competition. Moreover, by exploiting the 2003 NYSE and NASDAQ rulings in a triple-difference design, I show that constraint on firm's ability to adjust its board structure in response to changes in competition has negative consequences on its performance; firms which are constrained by the regulation to reduce their board independence experience a 10.5 percentage points lower return on assets (ROA) compared to unconstrained firms. This suggests that the decrease in board independence is in the interest of shareholders. By showing that regulation may actually harm some firms, the analysis sheds light on the costs of "one size fits all" governance regulations. In the second chapter, I shed light on the political ideology of the CEO as an important determinant of firm performance. Using individual campaign contribution data, I measure the political ideology of U.S. CEOs over the period 1994 to 2014 and analyze the relation between CEO ideology and firm performance. To identify the causal effect of CEO ideology, I use a combination of time-varying effects and novel instruments based on the ideology of the pool of potential CEO hires. Across all specifications, I find that firms with Republican CEOs, on average, 6 percentage point higher ROA compared to firms with Democrat CEOs. Several alternate explanations such as time varying differences at state-industry level, political connections and firm fixed effects do not explain away the results. In the third chapter, joint work with Antonio Vazquez Lopez (UC3M), we test whether focal firms whose CEOs sit on multiple boards can suffer decreases in performance due to transient attention-grabbing events in firms where CEOs sit as independent directors. We exploit extreme returns (positive and negative), extreme earnings and extreme volatility in firms where CEOs sit as independent directors and find that such distraction leads to an average decrease of approximately 1% of focal firm's ROA, Q, market returns and ROE. This effect is stronger for focal firms that are geographically more distant to firms where CEOs sit as independent directors, which suggests that distraction is costlier in such situations. Additionally, we show that distraction is greater for CEOs that sit on the audit committee or chair a major sub-committee. Finally, we show that these distraction events also lead to lower CEO compensation and higher probability of forced turnover. ; Programa de Doctorado en Empresa y Finanzas / Business and Finance por la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ; Presidente: Andrés Almazán; Secretario: Pedro Gete; Vocal: Miguel Antón

Spain is lagging behind in the transition to a sustainable energy system compared to other EU member states. Its unique position as an energy island, coupled with errors in energy planning inherited from previous government regimes, constitute a legacy that makes changes in the system difficult to achieve. Current political instability adds to the difficulties, under a governance framework characterised by lack of coordination and supremacy of the central government in the decision making process, in an environment where traditional energy companies still exert lobby power. The continuous changes in the regulatory framework of the energy sector have hindered investments in low carbon sources of energy due to perceived uncertainty. Small changes in the right direction are being observed though, with a more prominent role expected from the local levels of government. But many measures still originate on requirements linked to EU commitments and more initiatives at the national level need to be seen.

What is at stake for how the Internet continues to evolve is the preservation of its integrity as a single network. In practice, its governance is neither centralised nor unitary; it is piecemeal and fragmented, with authoritative decision-making coming from different sources simultaneously: governments, businesses, international organisations, technical and academic experts, and civil society. Historically, the conditions for their interaction were rarely defined beyond basic technical coordination, due at first to the academic freedom granted to the researchers developing the network and, later on, to the sheer impossibility of controlling mushrooming Internet initiatives. Today, the search for global norms and rules for the Internet continues, be it for cybersecurity or artificial intelligence, amid processes fostering the supremacy of national approaches or the vitality of a pluralist environment with various stakeholders represented. This book provides an incisive analysis of the emergence and evolution of global Internet governance, unpacking the complexity of more than 300 governance arrangements, influential debates and political negotiations over four decades. Highly accessible, this book breaks new ground through a wide empirical exploration and a new conceptual approach to governance enactment in global issue domains. A tripartite framework is employed for revealing power dynamics, relying on: a) an extensive database of mechanisms of governance for the Internet at the global and regional level; b) an in-depth analysis of the evolution of actors and priorities over time; and c) a key set of dominant practices observed in the Internet governance communities. It explains continuity and change in Internet-related negotiations, opening up new directions for thinking and acting in this field.

Der Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über den Themenkomplex "wirtschaftspolitische Governance". Dieser Begriff dient in Volkswirtschaftslehre und benachbarten Sozialwissenschaften als Ober-/Sammelbegriff unter dem üblicherweise alle Aktivitäten subsumiert werden, die wirtschaftspolitische Akteure entfalten, um das Wirtschaftssystem, einzelne Märkte darin oder bestimmte Wirtschaftsakteure (z.B. Unternehmen, Konsumenten) zu steuern. Neben einer genaueren Klärung des Governance-Begriffs und der Vorstellung von wirtschaftspolitischen Governance-Instrumenten und -Akteuren wird diskutiert, warum bzw. in welchen Situationen wirtschaftspolitische Governance notwendig ist. Diese Fragestellung ist Gegenstand einer anhaltenden, in Politik, Öffentlichkeit und den Sozialwissenschaften geführten Debatte.

This variable indicates the quality of governancem, and is based on "Government Effectiveness" national level data set by World Bank. According to World Bank, this ind Governance data set contains annual data from 1990 to 2015. The index is country-spesific and thus not gridded. Global gridded data set with a spatial resolution of 5 arc-min, annual data from 1990 to 2015, and scaled from 0 to 1. Based on https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/

Der Beitrag verortet die Diskussion um Regionalentwicklung in Großschutzgebieten in der politikwissenschaftlichen Diskussion um Governance und Regional Governance. Ziel des Beitrages ist es aufzuzeigen, dass es drei Hauptgründe gibt, warum Governance eine Rolle für Großschutzgebiete spielt: 1. aufgrund eines veränderten Naturschutzverständnisses, 2. aufgrund einer Bedeutungszunahme von Konzepten naturschutzorientierter Regionalentwicklung und 3. aufgrund der zwangsläufigen Umsetzung von Großschutzgebieten im politischen Mehrebenensystem. Empirisch sollen diese Governance-Aspekte anhand des Bundeswettbewerbes 'idee.natur' illustriert werden. Deutlich werden soll, dass Governance und Regional Governance wichtige Anknüpfungspunkte für Naturschutz und Großschutzgebiete bieten und es solche Konzeptionen mittlerweile tatsächlich in der naturschutzpolitischen Praxis gibt. ; The paper locates the debate on regional development in large-scale protected areas in the political-science discussion on governance and regional governance. The aim is to demonstrate that there are three primary reasons why governance is of relevance for large-scale protected areas: 1. due to a changed understanding of nature protection, 2. due to the increased significance of regional development concepts oriented towards nature protection, and 3. due to the necessity of implementing large-scale protected areas in a multi-level political system. These aspects of governance are empirically illustrated using the example of the federal competition 'idee.natur'. It becomes clear that governance and regional governance are important approaches for nature conservation and large-scale protected areas and that such concepts are already in use in the policy practice of nature protection.

There are many critiques of existing forms of urban governance as not fit for purpose. However, what alternatives might look like is equally contested. Coproduction is proposed as a response to address complex wicked issues. Achieving coproduction is a highly complex and daunting task. Bottom up approaches to the initiation of coproduced governance are seen as fruitful, including exemplification of utopian alternatives though local practices. New ways of seeing the role of conflict in participation are needed, including ways to institutionalise agonistic participatory practices. Coproduction in governance drives demands for forms of knowledge production that are themselves coproductive. New urban governing spaces need to be coproduced through participative transformation requiring experimentation and innovation in re-designing urban knowledge architectures. Future research in this field is proposed which is nuanced, grounded in explicit weightings of different democratic values, and which mediates between recognition of contingency and the ability to undertake comparative analysis.

In this paper, the authors use the lab to test a series of policy proposals designed to constrain rent-seeking behaviour in a policymaking context. The baseline governance game is conducted in the following way: subjects are randomly assigned to groups of four, with one subject randomly selected to be the "policymaker", while the other three are the "citizens". Citizens are informed that they can use their endowments to contribute to a group account. Any amount contributed to the group account are doubled. Once citizens have made their contribution decisions, the policymaker observes the contribution decisions of each citizen, and the total amount in the group account. The policymaker formulates a distribution "policy" to distribute the tokens among all four group members. The game is repeated for 20 rounds. With this basic framework, the authors implement and test the effect of three institutions designed to constrain policymaker rent-seeking behaviour: voting, policy commitment, and punishment. The results show that voting and enforced commitment are the most effective policy mechanisms to constrain rent-seeking, and improve citizen welfare. The authors find policymaker punishment regimes to be largely ineffective, both in reducing rent-seeking and improving welfare of citizens.